

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW



AUTUMN 1989

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The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02841-5010. Published quarterly, distribution is generally limited to: commands and activities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard and military officers of other U.S. services; foreign officers and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; selected U.S. Government officials and agencies; and selected U.S. and international libraries, research centers, publications, and educational institutions. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters should be directed to its editorial offices. (Telephone: Area Code 401-841-2236/4552, Autovon 948-2236/4552.) All other departments of the college may be reached by calling 401-841-3089, Autovon 948-3089.

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits made available to resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate, and to challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to service-wide readership, and timeliness. Reproduction of an article published in the *Review* requires the approval of the Editor. Caution should be exercised in the case of those articles protected by copyright. The reproduction of such articles is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and treaties of the United States, to the extent that they are applicable. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

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Second Class postage paid at Newport, R.I. and pending at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTERS, send address changes to: Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120-5099. ISSN 0028-1484

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Our cover: Photographs of small auxiliaries seldom appear on magazine covers. But here is one, the 2,880-ton salvage ship *USS Grasp* (ARS 51) of the Atlantic Fleet. The class numbers four, with two ships in either ocean. Official U.S. Navy photo by Peterson Builders, Inc.

The Secretary of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required by law of the Department of the Navy. Funds for printing of this publication have been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee.



President's Notes

What the Naval War College Foundation Means to the Naval War College

One can argue that while the success of any organization depends ultimately upon the decisions of its leader, the difference between excellence and adequacy rests upon the vitality of its support. The Naval War College Foundation is a highly successful supporting arm aimed at fostering excellence in professional military education. Indeed, the assistance provided by the Foundation has helped drive the College to its current premier position as the locus for naval graduate education, research and strategic study.

Twenty years ago a dynamic group of College alumni and friends of the Navy created a foundation trust not only to support the mission of the Naval War College, but also to advance its execution. The founding members, soon numbering 176, donated \$1,000 each. The trust has since tripled in value. Originally the trust provided funds to purchase artifacts, historical documents of military significance, and art. But it quickly moved toward broader support, funding a range of enrichment programs which could not be sponsored by the Department of the Navy.

The Foundation's annual gift to the Naval War College profoundly enhances this institution's stature. It provides that extra edge which not only deepens and broadens the education of senior and mid-grade warfighters, but also helps create the rich academic environment which enables the President to attract and keep the finest faculty and staff to teach and support 500 U.S. and international students. The return per dollar in professional education, research and strategic conceptualization is remarkably high, especially considering that the War College's annual operating costs amount to only

16 million dollars, less than one-third the price tag of a modern naval fighter aircraft.

The Naval War College Foundation makes possible a number of academic conferences and symposia which bring the students together with members of the government's executive and legislative branches, the media, foreign dignitaries, scientists, political theorists and prominent business figures. Our students wrestle with difficult issues regarding the basis of national strategy, the rationale of our force structure, the best means to integrate forces in joint operations, the ethical obligations of the military to the ideals of the society it protects, military operations and the press, and executive relations with the Congress in the planning and execution of national military strategy. Similarly, Contemporary Civilization and International lectures delivered at the College expose both students and faculty to a wide range of local and international figures who speak on topics varying from American business in the international market to Nato's role in a changing Europe.

In addition, the Foundation makes possible original research on specific strategic problems. Sponsorship of special studies, support for academic fellowships, annual prize awards for superior student essays, and acquisition of archival research materials all provide strong stimuli for faculty, students and visiting fellows to interact and tackle issues of emerging and long-range strategic significance.


The Foundation also makes some intangible contributions to the War College. For example, it sponsors Naval Command College graduate reunions, held on alternate years, which help maintain ties formed at the College among the present and future leaders of over 40 navies. Thus it promotes unparalleled bonds of international friendship and cooperation among men of a common calling. The Foundation serves as host to many social receptions that welcome both students and distinguished visitors, thus adding a touch of warmth and hospitality to life at the War College. This positive and lasting impression given to each student and visitor contributes to the continued success of the institution.

The importance of the Foundation's assistance to the Naval War College will take on even greater proportions in the future. The new era of jointness and the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandate radical changes in personnel management aimed at allowing more Navy officers the benefit of joint military education. Consequently, the College must meet the demands of a larger student body than we now serve. The Naval War College Foundation will probably be a major source of support for this growth. Such support will likely require growth in the Foundation Trust and continued expansion of its membership. The Foundation is currently considering the pursuit of new objectives to meet this challenging but most worthwhile and rewarding future.

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To sustain the critical edge of excellence which this institution now enjoys, and to meet the growing challenges of future joint military education, the Naval War College will depend increasingly upon the Foundation. The fine and dedicated men and women who make up the Foundation—and especially its Board of Trustees—serve in a quiet, steady and deliberate manner. Through their vitality and pride in the Naval War College they have made the difference in the College's achievement of excellence.

Elsewhere in this issue of the *Review*, there is an article which covers more specifically what the Naval War College Foundation accomplishes here.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Ronald J. Kurth". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Ronald" and last name "Kurth" being the most prominent parts.

RONALD J. KURTH

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Reflections on Soviet New Thinking on Security Questions

Marshall Brement

These are momentous times. It does not take a Toynbee to grasp that we are living in a period when great empires, built on the blood, the sacrifice, the lives of millions of martyrs and victims, are beginning to crack at the seams. Even the most casual television viewer is able to appreciate that three great contiguous areas of the world, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, and Eastern Europe, are being convulsed by currents and forces which ultimately may not be controllable—that they are, in short, in a pre-revolutionary situation.

We may be witnessing the breakup of the Marxist-Leninist system. We are certainly witnessing its profound transformation, a transformation that has been brought about by the boldness and vision of our prime potential adversary, the only man on earth who has the power at his fingertips to inflict indescribable destruction on our historically sheltered country.

This man has shaken up his own society in a way and at a pace previously unimaginable, not only to expert foreign observers, but to his own countrymen. He has proposed a new domestic agenda and has directed a creative group of civilian strategists to formulate a new rationale for looking at defense and security questions, known as the "New Thinking." In doing so, he has questioned the fundamental assumptions underlying Soviet perceptions about their own security. We are thus walking in new and uncharted country, deprived of familiar landmarks.

In this situation, it behooves us to look again at our own assumptions regarding security, particularly in Europe, assumptions which have convinced us as a society to spend more than \$1.5 trillion in the past decade to maintain

Ambassador Brement is the current director of the Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College. Fluent in eight languages, he has held senior State Department positions in Moscow, in several U.S. Embassies in Southeast Asia, and served with distinction as Ambassador to Iceland from 1981-1985. Before that time he was in charge of U.S.-Soviet Relations on the National Security Council staff.

a forward posture designed to contain and deter a war with Moscow. A number of influential thinkers have recently pointed out that this is an awful lot to pay for an insurance policy whose goal is to protect us from something which will not happen, particularly since critical defense needs in other areas will not be met in our present stringent budgetary environment if these premiums continue to be paid at current rates.

I

Within the past two years, Mikhail Gorbachev has called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the turn of the century; the reduction of Warsaw Pact and Nato conventional forces to equality at half Nato's current levels; and the restructuring and redeployment of residual forces in an entirely defensive mode. As an earnest of his seriousness, last December he announced unilateral cuts in Soviet tank, artillery, aircraft and manpower levels, including nearly half the Soviet tanks now in Eastern Europe. And last May he proposed a first-phase treaty which would require massive Soviet ground force cuts in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in return for minimal Nato changes.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has repeatedly acknowledged that the Soviets need to change an image which others understandably find threatening. Moscow's new thinking, its adherence to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, its recognition of a military defeat in Afghanistan, as well as its constructive contribution to peaceful settlements in southern Africa and hopefully Indochina, may in part reflect this realization.

Gorbachev has captured the imagination of the world. In country after country—particularly in Western Europe—polling data indicates that people generally rate the Soviet leader as working harder for world peace than any Western politician, including the American president. He has achieved this effect, at least in part, because the Western response to his actions has been cautious. Given Soviet history and the enormous and redundant size of Moscow's force structure and weaponry, this caution is understandable.

Nevertheless, this country cannot afford to convey the impression that when the chips are down, we somehow prefer maintaining leadership of an alliance based on fear to a fundamental transformation of our relationship with the only nation that can destroy our homeland. Furthermore, these new opportunities are opening up at a time when many of us are beginning to conclude that a fundamental strategic reassessment by the United States and its allies is long overdue, that now is the time for us to determine whether we are pursuing the right path to lead us smoothly and safely into the next century.

Americans are aware that the international commitments which we assumed 40 years ago may no longer be entirely appropriate. For one thing

we are not as rich, relative to the nations with whom we are allied, as we were when we formulated the basic framework of our international military presence just after World War II. At that time we consistently produced more than 40 percent of the world's gross domestic product. In recent years that figure has been closer to 20 percent.

Equally important, there is enormous pressure on our leaders to reduce our military budget. With a smaller U.S. military, no matter how efficient, we would have trouble maintaining our international commitments in the same manner as over the past four decades. Diminishing natural resources, changes in the world's economic structure, the growth in importance of the countries bordering the Pacific Basin, the recent political shifts in the U.S.S.R., China and elsewhere, and the improved capabilities of many of our allies dictate that we must, perhaps for the first time since the late 1940s, seriously debate the military posture of the United States around the world and the roles and missions assigned to our military services.

The total population of our four largest European allies—West Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy—is only slightly less than that of the Soviet Union. Their total annual gross national product exceeds that of the U.S.S.R. by at least \$500 billion. They are much more developed industrially and scientifically. They have a great military tradition and a credible nuclear deterrent. It is therefore legitimate to question why U.S. ground forces should be poised in such quantities on their front lines.

A prerequisite for making significant changes in our defense policy is coming to terms, both within our government and with our allies, on how we want relations to develop with our only major potential military enemy, the U.S.S.R. Those who urge caution in response to Gorbachev's initiatives and who defend a straight-line continuation of past strategy and policy point out that we have experienced four decades without war in Europe, an era of peace on that continent unprecedented in the past millennium. They state that Nato deserves the credit for preserving that peace and stability.

They have in mind not just Nato's success in deterring war in Europe for 40 years, but also the framework it has provided for West Germany's reintegration into the Western community. They warn that significant changes in the U.S. military role in Europe could be destabilizing during the present period of ferment in Eastern Europe. Only by remaining firmly locked in an Atlantic alliance led by the United States, they warn, can Bonn pursue political and economic ties in Eastern Europe beneficial to all of us without alarming its Eastern and Western neighbors.

The present moment of unparalleled East-West opportunity, this argument runs, is the worst possible time to confront West Europeans with hard political choices about how to organize their own defense, including the appropriate conventional and nuclear role for the *Bundeswehr*. Many thoughtful Germans share this view. One of them recently described his country as being like a

teenager with a million dollars in the bank and consequently with lots of very nervous friends, neighbors, and relations.

Those who urge caution on military grounds point out that despite Gorbachev's various assertions and proposals, and the beginning of his promised unilateral cuts, there has been little diminution of the Soviet military threat, as evidenced by the enormous investment which the Soviets continue to put into their military effort. What real value does the elimination of old tanks have when new and better tanks continue to pour off the assembly line in thousands? Indeed, we would all agree that declarations of defense sufficiency and defensive defense do not in themselves turn swords into ploughshares and that the size of Moscow's current force structure is entirely out of proportion to any kind of defensive need on its part.

When Nikita Khrushchev assumed power in the U.S.S.R., its armed forces totalled 5,732,000 men. He reduced that to 3.2 million, a cut of 2.5 million men. This manpower was desperately needed by the civilian sector in the late 1950s. Similar needs exist in the stultified Soviet economy of the late 1980s and the 1990s. Yet today the armed forces of the Soviet Union, a country which faces no real military threat from any of its neighbors, total more than five and a quarter million men.

These forces are not only immense in size but have become extremely sophisticated and effective. That the maintenance of such enormous, well-equipped, well-exercised, and well-trained forces by an economy which is about half the size of that of the United States has bollixed the Soviet civilian sector is not a matter of dispute. The Soviets themselves have acknowledged this repeatedly.

Yet if they have no hostile intentions, why are they distorting their economy, overburdening their society, and dissatisfying their citizenry? What are they afraid of? Aleksandr Yakovlev, who ranks just behind Gorbachev on the Politburo and who spent a year studying at Columbia University and four years as Ambassador to Canada, understands that the United States does not have aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union and that Nato is not an offensive threat to Moscow.

Surely Willie Brandt's private secretary, who was a Soviet spy throughout the entire period Brandt was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, managed to convey to his KGB spy-masters that there was no threat to the U.S.S.R. from West Germany. And surely brilliant and highly experienced Soviet China experts such as Mikhail Kapitsa and Igor Rogachev have explained to the Politburo that Beijing has neither the capacity nor the desire to initiate hostilities with the U.S.S.R., as evidenced by the fact that the lowest priority among China's "Four Modernizations" is accorded to military modernization.

To explain this propensity of the Soviets to overspend on armies and weaponry, analysts have been reduced to disquisitions on paranoia, inferiority

complexes, and aberrant behavior. But there is perhaps a better explanation. The Soviets approach military planning with a seriousness and scientific methodology that warms the hearts of war college professors. And my own experience at the Naval War College, where the exigencies of wargaming placed me in the shoes of Soviet military commanders, first on the Western front and then in the Pacific, has given me insights into the basic dilemma facing the Soviet General Staff which I had not been able to obtain elsewhere.

I found that the military problems confronting the Soviets in a protracted, global, nonnuclear war against Nato, China and Japan—the worst case scenario which the Soviets must consider—are literally insoluble. The Soviets simply do not have the economic and military resources to prevail in a protracted war against such a formidable array of enemies. As long as China, Japan and Nato are determined to fight until victory is attained, the Soviets cannot win, even if they do achieve initial victories in Western Europe.

Given the inability of the Red Army to smash all its opponents and the realization by Moscow that nobody emerges a winner from nuclear warfare, the very best possible war scenario for the Soviet generals—and the construction of such scenarios is what they are paid to do—is to drive to the Channel within three weeks to a month, outflank and destroy our armies, and try to kill or capture the 325,000 troops and the 300,000 dependents the United States has on the Continent.

They could then use these hostages and this early success to try to conclude the war on favorable terms through political negotiations and before our naval superiority became a decisive factor and we had time to engage them in the Pacific and elsewhere on a global basis. In fact, there is considerable and credible evidence that this Hitler-like plan had been the Soviet global military grand strategy until the emergence of the new thinking. It had seemed to the Soviet General Staff the only way Moscow could win.

When looked at in this context and from the view of Soviet military planners, one finds that the 156 divisions in Europe and the 57 divisions along the Sino/Soviet border and facing Japan are by no means overwhelming. Indeed, they are an inadequate force, since there can be no reasonable guarantee that the Soviets could achieve victory through a blitzkrieg strategy. Nato is getting stronger, not weaker. The *Bundeswehr* has become a formidable force. Moscow well understands this. As high-tech solutions come more and more to dominate military problem-solving, as will certainly be the case in the 21st century, the chances of emerging relatively unscathed from a war with the West becomes less realizable for the Soviet military planner with each passing year.

And this may be one of the most important reasons why a fundamental strategic turning point is opening before us and why the Soviet military—albeit reluctantly—is going along with the radical proposals of Gorbachev and his new thinking strategists. Thus, both Soviet weaknesses and our own

internal need to readjust our grand strategy suggest that major initiatives are possible in U.S./Soviet relations in the coming decade, provided that we play our cards right. In order to do so, we must first understand why the Soviet leadership is calling for a fundamental restructuring of their society and for "New Thinking" about security problems.

II

What the Soviet leadership has come to realize is that Leonid Brezhnev's long-sought total security was not only unattainable, but counterproductive. The time has come, various "New Thinkers" assert, to react to the other side's intentions, and not just to its capabilities. It is true that by giving the Soviet military everything it desired during a 20-year period, the Kremlin achieved such awesome military power that none of its neighbors would dare to attack it. But no matter what the Soviets had spent on defense from 1964-1984, they still would not have been attacked by any conceivable enemy.

Even more important, the Kremlin now realizes that granting the military on a regular basis somewhere between 15 and 25 percent of the Soviet gross national product had the effect not only of crippling economic growth and lowering living standards, but also of decreasing Moscow's capability to participate in the technological revolution which will alter the nature of warfare in the 21st century. Thus, Soviet strategists have concluded that the attempt to achieve total security has paradoxically resulted in a weakening, rather than a strengthening, of the U.S.S.R. vis-à-vis its potential enemies. They realize that Moscow's unrelenting military expansion during the Brezhnev period, plus the reckless adventurism which followed the fall of Saigon and lasted through the invasion of Afghanistan, made the U.S.S.R. weaker by spurring Nato nuclear deployments and causing the Reagan military buildup.

In one of the most notable passages in Shevardnadze's extraordinary speech to his foreign ministry colleagues in July 1988, he acknowledged that the Soviet Union had actually weakened its security by neglecting the development of its economic base for the sake of current military readiness. Even in strictly military terms, he maintained, the arsenal at hand at war's outbreak would be far less crucial than the capacity to generate new sinews of war.

Contributing to Moscow's uneasiness about its security was the inability of the vaunted Red Army to subdue an ill-equipped, disunited, and primitive foe in Afghanistan. The performance of Soviet troops in this tough mountain country was an eye-opener for the Kremlin. Problems of logistics, sanitation, morale, and even drug abuse revealed surprising military weaknesses which the General Staff failed to correct over an eight-year period. The best glasnost face has been put on the Politburo decision to withdraw. But let there be

no doubt that it was an unequivocal military defeat and that the inability to prevail against Afghans has kindled internal doubts about the Red Army's ability to subdue Germans and Americans.

Similarly, Gorbachev's call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, which I believe must be taken seriously, was not the result of a sudden philosophical conversion to the antinuclear movement, but was instead based on hard military judgment. Keep in mind the enormous cost—in fiscal, human, and prestige terms—which the current Soviet leadership paid as a result of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl and the subsequent evacuation of a city of 40,000 people. Nothing could better bring home to the Politburo the problems and costs of nuclear warfare, problems and costs which would make their efforts at Chernobyl seem like child's play. In fact, Soviet "New Thinkers" have specifically pointed out that even in a world free of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence would remain because of the ability of both sides to target nuclear power plants with conventional weapons.

Equally important, Soviet strategists believe that increasing missile accuracies coupled with enhanced conventional fuel-air explosives will give the battlefield commander of the 21st century all the advantages of nuclear weapons without their enormous ancillary drawbacks. They anticipate that future nonnuclear systems will experience an order of magnitude increase in destructive potential, thereby making nuclear systems redundant. Furthermore, conventional weapons of the future will be far more expensive than those in the present inventory.

The Soviet General Staff realizes that to keep the U.S.S.R. in the military forefront—and this is almost certainly the aim of Gorbachev as well—the leadership will have to make enormous investment in microelectronics, automated decision support systems, lasers, enhanced munitions lethality, telecommunications, and other high technologies. In order to do so, savings will have to be found elsewhere, perhaps—"New Thinkers" suggest—by reductions in nuclear expenditures, perhaps by reductions in the size of conventional forces. The East's proposal in the Conventional Force Negotiations last Spring to cut Soviet tanks from 41,500 to 14,000 almost certainly was motivated in part by this need.

"New Thinking" also asserts that the Soviets must strive for defensive sufficiency through mutual security, i.e., a situation where each side takes into consideration the security needs of the other. "By relying exclusively on technical-military assets," New Thinkers assert, "a country inevitably sets its own security against world security."

As noted earlier, a constant theme of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is that the U.S.S.R. must change its international image. True security can only be achieved by the Soviet Union, he argues, when potential enemies realize that Moscow is not a threat to its neighbors. To achieve this, peaceful intentions have to be demonstrated by actions as well as by words. This is

why the unilateral troop and tank reductions Gorbachev announced last December—which even the most skeptical must admit have genuine military significance—focused so heavily on Eastern Europe. This is why Soviet tanks are not now threatening Poland, even though current developments in that remarkable country are far more ominous for the Kremlin than they were in 1981, or for that matter in 1956.

Correspondingly significant steps have been made by Gorbachev in helping to settle seemingly never-ending disputes in Angola and, hopefully, Cambodia. Despite a stated commitment to *détente*, the Brezhnev regime could not resist taking unilateral advantage of our defeat in Vietnam by engaging in the grossest kind of adventurism in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Cambodia, and finally, Afghanistan. Gorbachev, by his actions, now seems to be saying that such moves were mistakes and that by making the U.S.S.R. seem a threat, they detracted from, rather than enhanced, Soviet security. Whatever their intention, their result turned out to be great increases both in American defense budgets and in Third World hostility.

Furthermore, to enhance its security in the 21st century, Soviet society and the Soviet educational system must be restructured to enable the U.S.S.R. to achieve the kind of widespread computer literacy which is common in the West and in Japan. This will be enormously expensive. It will mean the introduction of tens of millions of computers and copying machines into the Soviet Union—with all that implies for KGB control of Soviet society. As former President Reagan said last June in a speech in London, “the Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip.” The Soviet Union by any rational calculus is, in every way except military power, a second-class nation. If the U.S.S.R. does not remedy its shortcomings, Soviet strategists predict that it could become a second-class nation militarily as well.

Gorbachev is an apparatchik. Educated in the law, which is very unusual for a top Soviet leader, he has spent his entire working career in party affairs. Everything he has done since taking over in March 1985 suggests that his preeminent goal is to restructure, rejuvenate and reinvigorate the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and fit it within an overarching legal framework. The widespread cynicism and apathy endemic throughout Soviet society can only be countered by an injection of the kind of idealism and mass participation which motivated party workers in the 1920s. This idealism is now moribund. Whether Gorbachev can resuscitate it is doubtful.

The rulers of the Soviet Union are widely perceived—both within and without the U.S.S.R.—to be in charge of a failed imperial system and a bankrupt society. It takes more than military power to rule a great empire. It takes a powerful cultural force, the kind which others seek to emulate, which London and Paris still exert today over many of their former dominions, whose sons and daughters—just as their grandfathers did—seek to be educated at Oxford and the Sorbonne. But which Hungarian or Polish or Czech

philosopher, poet, or painter yearns for tutelage in Moscow or Leningrad? Even the Russians themselves look abroad for cultural stimulation. After all, the greatest living Russian writer now lives in New Hampshire; the greatest Russian poet in upstate New York; the greatest Russian dancer in Manhattan; the greatest Russian musician in Washington.

Before the Russian revolution, Russia and Poland were the breadbaskets of Europe. Now they suffer perpetual food shortages. Before the Second World War, Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia were world-class centers of heavy industrial production. Today the products manufactured in those regions—and in the U.S.S.R.—are hopelessly uncompetitive on world markets. It is the task of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to sell its program to its citizenry. But as Willy Loman and other salesmen long ago discovered, hyping a second-class product over an extended period of time corrodes both one's morale and one's morality. It destroys the soul.

The focus of perestroika is the Soviet economy, a genuine basket case. Despite a statistical system which exaggerates the level of real growth, the Soviets now admit that expansion has ceased. Living standards have fallen, as has life expectancy. Medical care is inadequate. Consumer goods are not available. The banking system is rudimentary. There are still no computerized banks or even private checking accounts in the Soviet Union. Instead of becoming a more modern country, the U.S.S.R. is falling further and further behind the West and the advanced Asian economies.

III

Gorbachev's program to resolve the above problems, all of which are interrelated, has been encapsulated in three Russian phrases: *perestroika* [restructuring]; *glasnost* [openness]; and *novoe mishlenie* [new thinking]. We have every reason to wish him well in his efforts to restructure Soviet society and to make the Soviet military less threatening, both in appearance and in reality. Nevertheless, we have equally compelling reasons to maintain an attitude of hopeful skepticism about his chances.

First of all, it is highly doubtful that Gorbachev will succeed in his efforts to restructure the massive, sluggish Soviet economy. The implications of this probable failure are not clear to anyone, probably not even to Gorbachev himself; and we cannot be expected to take irrevocable decisions until the security ramifications of such failure can be gauged more accurately.

The Soviet Union, despite Gorbachev's reforms, is still a command economy. But many of the links which made that command economy function coherently have now been destroyed by perestroika. The result is something like an army in which each division commander suddenly has the right to deploy his troops and armored forces as he sees fit, but in an area of responsibility which is only vaguely defined. As a result, we are now seeing

economic dislocations and a consumer goods scarcity far worse than when Gorbachev took over four years ago.

Transforming a command economy into a market economy after 70 years of attempted extirpation of the very forces which make a market economy work is no easy matter. A lack of economic knowledge is pervasive throughout the top Soviet leadership. Although the "New Thinking" in economics pays tribute to market forces, incentives associated with profits make Soviet planners uneasy because the profit motive is still deeply distrusted, is still felt to be immoral. They remain committed to full employment and to fixed pricing of essential services and commodities and are therefore unwilling to condone taking risks or to reward entrepreneurial ability.

The collapse of the Stalinist economic system is already taking place. Since Peter the Great, the historical cycle in Russia has consisted of short periods of reforms inexorably followed by long periods of repression. Only the most starry-eyed observer would be willing to suggest that this historical precedent cannot be repeated.

Second, it is by no means clear that the Soviet military will ultimately accept radical cuts in the conventional force structure. Going along with perestroika and new thinking on nuclear matters is one thing, but agreeing to conventional cuts deep enough to persuade Western skeptics that Moscow no longer poses a threat to its neighbors will unquestionably evoke stubborn resistance from at least some elements of the General Staff and the uniformed services.

Khrushchev crippled the Soviet Navy and cut the Red Army significantly. As a result, the Soviet marshals played an important role in his ouster. Whether Gorbachev will be successful in a similar attempt must remain an open question until the cuts which the Soviets have proposed have actually been made. As Professor Thomas Nichols recently remarked, the Soviet military "has a view of the world, and a sense of duty to country, that is coming more and more into conflict with a general secretary who does not share those views, and who seeks to remove the military from a position in security policy they have enjoyed for at least twenty years."

Third, despite many changes of personnel at the top, those on whom the leadership is counting for innovation and new thinking beneath the upper layer are essentially the same people in the same jobs they have been holding for years, and sometimes for decades. Whether these people, especially the Soviet military and key defense production officials, can be prevailed upon to implement the kind of perestroika Gorbachev is proposing is highly doubtful.

Fourth, history suggests that other nations should be extremely leery about placing much faith in Soviet verbal declarations. An old Russian proverb asserts that words can be twisted into any desired shape. Two-thirds of the nations which signed nonaggression treaties with the Soviet Union in the 1930s, for example, were subsequently invaded by Moscow. This includes

Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, none of whom took any action which could conceivably be interpreted as having provoked such attacks. A solemn 1972 agreement not to take unilateral advantage of the United States turned out to be a scrap of paper when prospective easy victories in the international class struggle in the Third World seemed to be in the offing for the Kremlin.

Fifth, an educated Western skepticism is far more helpful to Gorbachev in dealing with conservatives and doubters in his own society than uncritical acceptance of Soviet declarations and assertions would be. For six decades, some in the West have apologized for Soviet actions, catered to Moscow's rather leaden sensitivities, and urged that we be more forthcoming and more understanding in our treatment of Soviet security concerns. It is now possible to ask ourselves where we would be today had we followed their policy dictates. If we had listened to them, would we at this moment be trying to figure out how to respond to Moscow's exciting "New Thinking" and the proposals, and even actions, which it has generated—proposals and actions which would have been unimaginable only a few short years ago? The answer to that question is clearly no.

If we had listened to them, Brezhnev's program in the security arena would have been viewed in the Soviet Union as a great success and not as an abysmal failure. It was the strength of Western institutions and the solidarity of Western governments which were major factors promoting the new thinking. In this sense, the Westerners who have given Gorbachev a shot of much needed credibility are Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Gorbachev's fulsome praise for Reagan, by then a lame duck president, in his speech to the United Nations last December, was no empty gesture.

Finally, although Gorbachev himself is a political genius, his program, in much of its philosophical underpinning, is old wine in new bottles, cleverly articulated rehashes of ideas and phrases that the Soviets have been putting forward for decades. We have already experienced Khrushchevian reforms and Brezhnevian détente and have watched those reforms and that détente disappear when they no longer coincided with the dictates of proletarian internationalism. We hope Gorbachev will be more successful than his predecessors. But whether he will or not remains to be seen.

IV

However, while caution is understandable, there are also compelling reasons for attempting to match Gorbachev in boldness and vision, and for doing so without waiting for further Soviet evolution. First of all, the Soviet programmatic decisions which we would like to see will have to be made within the context of the upcoming five-year plan, i.e., within the next two years. Because of the need for significant immediate progress, Soviet "New

Thinkers" have argued that if the U.S.S.R. waits for mutual agreements, time will pass it by. They fear political inertia. So should we.

Furthermore, developments in Central America or the Middle East, an uprising in Eastern Europe or a major conflict between Soviet nationalities could all result in a situation in which Gorbachev himself would be forced to retreat from his perestroika goals in unforeseeable ways. Gorbachev has managed, thus far successfully, to blame the ills of Soviet society on his predecessors. But at some point, after he has been in power long enough, he will have to start assuming the blame for such ills himself. We must be on the path leading toward fundamental changes in our relationship well before this takes place.

This is even more true if one agrees with Defense Secretary Richard Cheney that Gorbachev is likely soon to fall and be replaced by a more belligerent Soviet leader. If we accept this rather shaky hypothesis, we should be doubly eager to obtain Moscow's agreement to deep reductions while that is still possible. But in order to go further and change our fundamental relationship, we must first articulate what Moscow has to do to persuade us that it is no longer a threat to world peace and stability, that its proposals have genuine, permanent substance and are not just smoke and mirrors.

President Bush was criticized for his Texas A&M speech last May which laid out some simple markers by which to judge Soviet behavior. I disagree with such criticism and indeed wish the president had expanded his list and been even more specific. Gorbachev has already demonstrated—by deeds, not just words—that he is a serious and determined leader who deserves to be taken seriously. But nothing which he has done thus far is irreversible. Our task is to convince him that if he wishes to alter the political and security climate of our planet irrevocably and irreversibly and thereby give his party and his nation the breathing space [*peredishka*] needed for a basic political and economic transformation, he should publicly set as his ultimate goal the following 17 points:

- To reduce the total Soviet Armed Forces from five million to approximately two million men, which—along with their enormous reserves and their "cadre" system of mobilization—would still be a large force, adequate to maintain Soviet internal and external security.
- To withdraw all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, Mongolia and the Kuriles, and to demilitarize the Sino-Soviet border.
- To halt further production of land-based ICBMs and to destroy these weapons or reconfigure them for space-launch purposes. (These are fearsome first-strike weapons of indiscriminate and immoral destructive power; one cannot build a relationship of trust with a neighbor who has a loaded 50-caliber machine gun pointed at one's bedroom.)
- To convert a significant portion of Soviet military industry to civilian purposes.

- To renounce chemical warfare, to destroy stocks and production facilities for such weapons, and to agree to an intrusive inspection scheme verifying that such actions have been taken.

- To publish accurate data on the Soviet military budget in accordance with agreed cost-accounting methods.

- To limit lethal arms shipments to participants in Third World conflicts.

- To position foreign inspectors at appropriate Soviet command and control centers, arms depots, airfields, rail heads and fuel dumps to monitor preparations for going to war.

- To cease promoting and engaging in espionage activities (i.e., to stop suborning our citizens and running agents within our country and to close the mammoth phone-tapping operation at Lourdes in Cuba covering our entire East Coast).

- To cut out disinformation programs designed to discredit the United States. (Soviet media to the contrary, the AIDS virus was not invented in biological warfare laboratories in Fort Dietrick, Maryland; Noriega and Qaddafi are not noble victims of persecution by American reactionaries.)

- To destroy the Berlin Wall and the armed corridor which separates East and West Germany and Eastern and Western Europe and to renounce the Brezhnev doctrine as specifically as academician Bogomolov did at the 19th CPSU Party Conference.

- To stop meddling harmfully in various trouble spots throughout the world, particularly in Central America and the Middle East, and to join us in constructive efforts to settle these problems equitably, thereby laying the framework for cooperation in the security arena of the type envisaged by Roosevelt for the United Nations in 1945.

- To grant Soviet citizens reasonable and convincing guarantees that their fundamental rights will be respected.

- To increase scientific and space cooperation and significantly relax spurious definitions of what are considered to be state secrets in this area.

- To join the international economy, including the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade and the World Bank, and to rationalize pricing and foreign exchange control systems with the ultimate objective of making the ruble a fully convertible currency.

- To allow for the opening of foreign university-level institutions in the Soviet Union, similar to the Johns Hopkins University Center in Bologna.

- To increase exchanges to the point where they reach a critical mass and make a significant impact upon Soviet society. (There are at present 20,000 Chinese students in the United States. Let us look forward to the day when we have 20,000 or more Soviet students as well.)

V

Not long ago, calling for a Soviet leader to adhere to such a program would have seemed hopelessly naive. But none of these points are inconsistent with declared Soviet aims and with Soviet "New Thinking" on security questions. To press for genuinely radical global solutions may seem like pie in the sky, but keep in mind that China not too long ago was thought by many in the United States to be the most threatening of all nations. The joke in the early sixties was that optimists study Russian and pessimists study Chinese.

If the Soviet Union took major steps toward implementing all, or even a significant portion, of these 17 points, we obviously would be living in a different world. We would have laid the foundations of trust upon which a fundamentally different security relationship could be based.

What can we do to move Gorbachev along the path he claims to have chosen? In those areas which are internal to the U.S.S.R., we can achieve much by helping Gorbachev open up Soviet society and create a market-influenced economy. We have much to offer in the implementation of glasnost. Our interests in this regard parallel those of the Soviet leadership.

On the economic side, we can help him by providing managerial skills for a market environment at which we are expert, skills which Soviet economists and planners—who have no idea, for example, of simple Western accounting concepts such as depreciation or amortization—sadly lack. This can have a double payoff: first, by giving Moscow incentive to create an economic environment in which Western businessmen will want to operate, and second, over time, by the "constructive subversion" of exposing Soviet middle managers to Western practices and thinking.

Most immediately, we can help Gorbachev in framing a productive atmosphere in the security arena. It is essential to keep in mind that for Gorbachev to succeed in his domestic program, he must maintain the appearance and prestige of a successful world leader. He well realizes that an increase in East-West conflict would lead to a loss of domestic authority, which would strengthen those in the Soviet Union resisting his proposed changes.

What we say and do about him is watched closely in the Soviet Union and can be a critical factor in his success or failure. It is watched even more closely in Eastern Europe, the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Empire. Finding the right balance between continuing to hold Gorbachev to high standards, and acknowledging partial but encouraging improvements in Soviet behavior, should be a demanding challenge for President Bush.

Above all, we must constantly keep in mind that measured and reciprocal negotiations to achieve our goals are not the only answer. To proceed cautiously in a series of mutually agreed lockstep negotiations, trading narrow concession for narrow concession, being infinitely careful not to mix apples

and oranges, giving each of our bureaucracies a piece of the action, will be the overwhelming preference of bureaucrats, arms controllers, diplomats, and alliance managers. But it is a sure formula for stagnation. History suggests that time will run out on us. Negotiations develop a life of their own and, indeed, can and will be used by opponents of change on both sides to block creative moves which, by definition, probably must be unilateral and only ultimately reciprocal.

President Bush seems well aware of this problem. When he asked for arms control initiatives and the bureaucracy served up oatmeal, he took Baker, Cheney, Crowe and Scowcroft to Kennebunkport, decided that Soviet acceptance of our proposals on conventional ground forces in Europe merited Nato movement on aircraft and personnel, and consulted at the top of key Nato governments before most senior officials in Washington who work conventional arms control knew anything was up.

Having spent 30 years in the bureaucracy myself, I am certain that this move, for which the president so rightly has been praised, never would have survived the Washington bureaucratic process, much less the normal pattern of Nato consultations, which are at best painfully slow. Bureaucrats and negotiators can now work out the details, but the President himself will have to stay enough involved to ensure they do not gum up the works.

But there is also scope for moves outside the negotiating arena; indeed, this may be the most promising course on many, if not most, issues. For starters, we can stress the obvious: that Soviet action inevitably will beget Western response. Does anyone imagine that the United States could proceed with the MX program if Moscow began getting rid of ICBMs; that Congress would fund binary chemical weapons if Moscow invited international observers to the destruction of a chemical weapons stockpile consistent with our estimates of its holding; or that U.S. or West German publics long would tolerate the present large U.S. force levels in West Germany if Soviet forces left East Germany or Eastern Europe?

But we are not condemned merely to respond to Soviet moves, thus permanently ceding the initiative. In important areas we could challenge Moscow to make radical reciprocal changes. To cite just one example, we could announce our willingness to eliminate all ICBMs by a certain date, on a specific drawdown schedule, if Moscow would do likewise. Our preannounced schedule would be implemented only if the Soviets made proportional cuts on the same schedule. This could easily be verified by National Technical Means, and would leave the most secure and stabilizing legs of our deterrent—sea and air-based nuclear systems—intact.

But this kind of proposal is only desirable, or even viable, within the framework of a broad, overarching strategy. We have to know where we want to go before we decide how to get there. We cannot deal effectively

with U.S.-Soviet relations without a coherent concept of the kind of Europe—East and West—we want to bring about.

Any transformation of U.S.-Soviet relations inevitably will affect our relations with Western Europe, including our influence on European domestic and foreign policies well beyond what is usually thought of as the security area. But despite an extensive policy review, so far as I can tell, little if any thought is being given in Washington even to what Nato military posture would be desirable if the Soviet threat continues to decline. Nato's conventional reductions proposal calls for minimal Western change; even our big concession in agreeing to aircraft cuts would cost Nato about one-tenth of the aircraft it would cost the Warsaw Pact. More basic questions about the U.S. role, the German role, and the scope for greater West European defense cooperation and influence within the alliance seem to be getting even less attention.

This is at least partly because any U.S.-generated changes will trouble our allies. The same West European leaders who have been warning that we risk missing a historic opportunity to transform East-West relations also fear any diminution in the U.S. contribution to their defense. They are comfortable with the status quo. Change is scary, especially when it involves the formula which many credit with national survival. But growing European strength and American budgetary constraints, coupled with a declining perception of the Soviet threat, ensure that Nato is in for a rocky period in any case. Trying to resist unavoidable change is the best recipe for panicky action forced on reluctant Western governments by impatient electorates.

A major realignment of political and military forces in Europe is in the works. The inevitable comparative decline of Soviet power vis-à-vis a more integrated Western Europe after 1992 will make this happen. It is therefore only sensible for us to begin thinking about the kind of world we want to live in and the kind of Europe we want to achieve. Then we must design and articulate a strategy for bringing this about. We must not be caught in the trap of dealing piecemeal with issues such as arms control, defense realignment, trade, and burden sharing. Our aim in conventional arms control, for example, should be at least as much to change the Soviet political role in Eastern Europe as to reduce the number of tanks threatening Nato.

Nor can we allow Europeans and Europeanists to determine security questions which have implications far beyond Europe. We are a superpower and our interests are global. It is only through broad-ranging, strategic thinking at the highest levels of our government that we will be able to successfully navigate these uncharted shoals, these dangerous waters.

Let us firmly keep in mind that the most important difference between the superpowers is that the United States is a secure society held together by philosophical bonds that are indissoluble. Take away our armed forces, our FBI, our local police forces, and the United States still stays together.

There is no group in the United States, no matter how kooky or how radical, which is calling for a reshaping of our borders.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is a society held together by force. Take away that force and at least seven of the 15 republics of the U.S.S.R. split off and become independent countries. Take away that force and the nations of Eastern Europe go their not so merry way. For this reason, we hold the stronger cards in any negotiation to bring about a safer world. And we must keep as our primary goal in such a negotiation the shaping of a world in which the citizens of this country need not be concerned about their own survival.

In sum, at first consideration in dealing with Gorbachev and his "New Thinking," caution and prudence might seem to be the order of the day. This, as we have already seen, will be the course recommended to our leaders by my former colleagues in the State Department and the National Security Council Staff. But there are also important—and in my own view overriding—reasons why the West should, on an urgent basis, react vigorously and imaginatively to the Gorbachev phenomenon, and why we should take a few gambles. We must first of all recognize that by constantly responding to Gorbachev's prodding, rather than initiating new ideas and proposals of our own, we could lose the worldwide public relations battle, a battle which is bound to have important effects over the long run on democratic states.

But this is not just a public relations problem. We are facing the first serious opportunity of the postwar era both for major improvements in European security and for fundamental changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. We must recognize that a window of opportunity has been opened to us and that both Soviet history and the course of human events strongly suggest this window will not remain open indefinitely. History will not forgive us if we fail to seize this extraordinary moment. And if what now seems so promising proves to be yet another false dawn, it is our obligation to make clear that the blame for not seizing this priceless opportunity cannot be laid on the American doorstep.

This article is adapted from a speech delivered by Ambassador Bremont to the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College on 14 June 1989.



The Impact of "Reasonable Sufficiency" on the Soviet Ministry of Defense

Thomas M. Nichols and Theodore William Karasik

Recently, a flood of new terms entered the Soviet lexicon: New Thinking, Defensiveness, Sufficiency, and others. There is a proliferation of explanations of these terms both in the West and, surprisingly, in the Soviet Union as well. Until the Soviet debate on these issues is closed, defining their content will be difficult.

One new term, "reasonable sufficiency" [*razumnaia dostatochnost'*] provides material for a wide-ranging civil-military and intra-military conflict on Soviet national security policy. Rather than attempt to define the content of reasonable sufficiency, this article studies the concept in its domestic context—as one of the tools used by the leadership to undermine and divide the Soviet military so that it cannot function as an interest group opposing changes in doctrine and defense spending.

Definitions of New Thinking and Reasonable Sufficiency

As propounded by Gorbachev, new thinking [*novoe myshlenie*] addresses the Soviet Union's need to adjust its outlook on military affairs in international relations. Briefly, the new thinking includes a devaluation of the role of technology in security; a reaffirmation of war and peace as problems solvable only through political, rather than military means (in other words, only through diplomacy and politics rather than through unilateral military measures); an acknowledgement of the reality that a state's one-sided efforts to gain security (especially in the military realm, where it can be difficult to separate offensive from defensive measures) can be perceived as threatening and therefore make other states insecure; a definition of security as attainable

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only by mutual rather than individual efforts; and an attempt to use the mechanisms of international organization to secure peace through the elimination of international social and economic disparities and inequalities.¹

Reasonable sufficiency lies within the framework of the "new thinking." In essence, proponents of reasonable sufficiency seem to argue that Soviet security can be maintained at a lower level of armaments, and that strictly symmetrical responses to Western arms programs are not necessary. The Soviet formulation maintains that the Soviet Union will not seek a level of security greater than other nations, but at the same time cannot accept military inferiority; however, there is still some confusion over what constitutes "inferiority," and specifically whether or not it should be interpreted in a strictly numerical sense. This kind of imprecise language means that the definition of reasonable sufficiency remains flexible, and thus continues to elicit substantial debate within the Soviet military.

Soviet military leaders view Gorbachev's definition of reasonable sufficiency in several forms. A pro-Gorbachev group (small though it is) articulates a version of reasonable sufficiency somewhat similar to that advocated by Gorbachev himself. Unlike Gorbachev, however, this group sees in reasonable sufficiency a rejection of unilateral or asymmetrical initiatives in arms control, while agreeing that strategic parity may not be required either. These leaders still see the West as a threat to Soviet interests but also see political methods as the primary means of achieving security. They also consider a reduction in defense spending to be necessary in order to create a healthy Soviet economy.

A more undecided group of military leaders promotes a variant of the concept called "sufficient defense" [*dostatocnaia oborona*]. Here, it is acknowledged in the abstract that the military needs to reform, but this is coupled with stiff opposition to the dramatic reductions in defense spending advocated by Gorbachev. This group likewise rejects unilateral and asymmetrical responses in arms control, but also supports strategic parity.

Oppositionist military leaders resort to a standard phrase in Soviet military literature in their rejection of the Gorbachev program: "reliable defense" [*nadezhnaia oborona*]. Reliable defense describes traditional Soviet thinking on security issues. This position rejects Gorbachev's intention to alter Soviet military doctrine and advocates that defense expenditures be maintained or even increased. Its proponents argue that Soviet forces must prevent large-scale destruction of the homeland during wartime and be able to defeat and destroy Western aggression before it reaches Soviet soil. At the same time, these Soviet military leaders adhere to traditional calls for reforms in the military that will strengthen discipline and improve weaponry and equipment.

Gorbachev and the Genesis of Reasonable Sufficiency

The genesis of reasonable sufficiency no doubt has its foundations in a policy decision made by senior members of the political leadership to achieve reform. Besides its rhetorical value, they saw one other strength in the concept: after Gorbachev introduced reasonable sufficiency, the military seemed unable to coordinate its responses.

Gorbachev spoke about reasonable sufficiency on several occasions. At first his comments appeared to lack specific content.² At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in 1985, for example, just eight months after assuming the post of General Secretary, Gorbachev mentioned reasonable sufficiency only in vague terms: "The USSR and the US will have to reach a common understanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient. . . . We are convinced that the level of this sufficiency is much lower than that which the USSR and the United States in fact possess at the moment. This means that weighty practical steps for the limitation and reduction of weapons are perfectly possible, measures that not only will not lessen, but will strengthen security both for the USSR and the US, and the entire strategic stability of the world."³

In a report to the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev gave his first detailed explanation of reasonable sufficiency. This explanation broke away from the concept of strategic parity, advocated a reduction in nuclear arsenals, and suggested the need for a reduction in defense spending: "Our country stands for . . . restricting military potentials within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. Security . . . can only be mutual, and if one considers international relations as a whole, it can only be universal."⁴ In addition, Gorbachev's emerging ideas on reasonable sufficiency appeared in the 27th Party Congress program which emphasized in very strong terms the dominant party role in military affairs and also indicated a lower priority for defense needs for the first time: "The basic foundation of the strengthening of the defense of the socialist homeland is the Communist Party's guidance of military construction and the Armed Forces. Policy in the field of defense, and the country's security policy, and Soviet military doctrine, which is purely defensive in nature, are worked out and implemented with the party playing the guiding role."⁵

A year after the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev continued to advance the concept of reasonable sufficiency. In a speech to the Trade Union Congress in February 1987, Gorbachev stated: "Now when the opponent's gamble on our backwardness has taken a serious shaking, imperialism is switching the emphasis on to something else: preventing the implementation of our plans for transformation, hindering them, slowing them down, and foiling them by the arms race. . . . But we will not take a single step over and above the demands and requirements of reasonable, sufficient defense."⁶

However, Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations on 7 December 1988 focused on the unilateral withdrawal of equipment and troops from the Soviet periphery in conjunction with achieving reasonable sufficiency: "[These] reductions will be made on a unilateral basis. . . . By agreement with our allies in the Warsaw Pact, we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to disband them by 1991. . . . The Soviet forces in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons, and their arms by 5,000 tanks. [In addition], in the [European part] of our country and on the territory of our European allies, the Soviet Armed Forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft."⁷ Three aspects of this compressed overview of Gorbachev's position on reasonable sufficiency are particularly noteworthy. First, it indicates Gorbachev's willingness to intervene in military affairs, even to the point of Khrushchev-like efforts at massive reductions. Second, it also shows that Gorbachev is powerful enough—or at least feels he is powerful enough—to implement his ideas. Finally, it reveals definite differences with the military concept of "sufficiency"; in particular, no mention is made of the need for the concept to be based on reciprocal measures in the West, something upon which the military has been insistent from the start.

Dobrynin, Yakovlev, and the Civilians

Both former Central Committee Chief of the International Department and now Foreign Policy Advisor Anatoli Dobrynin and Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev are active participants in the drive to enshrine the idea of reasonable sufficiency in Soviet security policy.⁸ Although they rarely refer to reasonable sufficiency *per se*, their actions suggest that they play an important role in defining the defense agenda.

Dobrynin became the first leader to propose an enhanced civilian role in the Soviet national security debate. In an article in *Kommunist*, Dobrynin stated that "immediate scientific analysis to [determine] the questions of what is the reasonable sufficiency in lowering the level of military potentials [is needed]."⁹ Although civilians did not immediately respond at that time, some did participate in the creation of civilian think tanks designed to address the issues raised by reasonable sufficiency. For example, under Dobrynin's direction, the International Department created a special section dealing with arms control. Headed by Lieutenant General Viktor Sharodubov, who took part in the Soviet delegation to the SALT talks on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and staffed by civilian specialists, this body plans to strengthen arms control expertise in the International Department and to ensure that several points of view are incorporated into the policy process. This provides Gorbachev with a source of information on defense security issues.¹⁰

The early reaction to reasonable sufficiency was predictably negative; more alarming, however, was the fact that civilian analysts were incapable of rebutting military arguments with any intellectual authority. Major General Yuri Lebedev, chief of the Treaty and Legal Directorate of the General Staff, and his coauthor, A. Podberezkin, admitted as much when they noted that the experiences of recent years indicated that Soviet political analysts still are not competent to discuss military doctrinal matters.¹¹ This poor preparation, perhaps coupled with a continued lack of support by even some civilians for reasonable sufficiency (as well as the ongoing complaints from supporters of the military), is possibly a catalyst behind Yakovlev's earlier challenge to Soviet civilian foreign policy specialists to undertake analysis of military doctrine. This appeal seemed to be stronger than the one articulated by Dobrynin: "The concept of sufficiency of military potentials, including under the conditions of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons—a concept which was advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress—needs to be revealed and filled with substance. Of no less importance is the task of analyzing, in conjunction with the military specialists, our military doctrine, the strategic essence of which is based on the policy of averting nuclear war."¹² The civilian policy establishment answered Yakovlev's call with several articles on everything from strategic stability to the appropriate role of the armed forces.

Before Gorbachev's rise to power, Soviet civilian analysts did not comment on Soviet military affairs. Thus, both Dobrynin's and Yakovlev's "invitations" provided civilians with sanctions to participate. Several civilians, who represent prestigious Moscow-based institutes with close ties to Gorbachev and Yakovlev, entered the debate espousing broad points of view. First, the director of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, Evgeni Primakov, a close associate of both Gorbachev and Yakovlev, argued that the U.S.S.R. requires only a qualitative parity, which he defined in the McNamaresque language of finite deterrence as the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on an aggressor in response to a nuclear first strike.¹³ In addition, Primakov also argued that military strength between the superpowers should be reduced to levels acceptable to both sides.¹⁴

Second, three members of the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada (IUSAC), Deputy Director Vitalii Zhurkin (now director of the new Institute of Western Europe), section head Sergei Karaganov (now deputy director of the Institute of Western Europe), and senior researcher Andrei Kortunov (head of the international security department at the IUSAC), argued for reasonable sufficiency in Soviet military doctrine. The authors also noted that a reduction in military spending would release economic resources for Gorbachev's reform program ("The need to shift to sufficiency is also the result of economic factors"). Furthermore, they advocated unilateral cuts in

Soviet forces and criticized the current policy of maintaining armed forces capable of countering all potential enemies.¹⁵

Other prominent Soviet commentators sought to redefine the nature of the Western threat. For example, *Izvestiia* political commentator Aleksandr Bovin suggested in an 8 November 1987 article in *Moskovski novosti* that the traditional Soviet assessment of the West's intentions to wage war to eliminate socialism might be incorrect. He argued that in the nuclear age there exists a desire for self-preservation. In addition, Chief of the Central Committee International Department Valentin Falin noted the political ramifications of implementing reasonable sufficiency.¹⁶ He stated that the problem of security has become primarily political, and that military solutions are impossible. Falin also articulated his views on the Soviet television program "Studio Nine" on 9 October 1988. In a roundtable discussion on reasonable sufficiency, which also included then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vladimir Lobov, Falin defined reasonable sufficiency according to the definitions stated by Gorbachev; Lobov, for his part, countered by advocating sufficient defense. Thus, Soviet television became the latest forum for defining Soviet security issues and promoting discussion of these issues by millions of television viewers.¹⁷

Shevardnadze and the Defense Agenda

Like other civilians criticizing the military, statements by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze threaten the interests of the military in determining Soviet security dilemmas and needs. While Shevardnadze may not be an articulate foreign policy analyst in his own right, he is nonetheless a close Gorbachev ally and confidant, and thus his statements provide insight into, and amplification of, the general secretary's thinking.

Shevardnadze appears to be telling the military what it should do in terms of the new thinking in security issues and defense spending. For example, at a Foreign Ministry conference on 25 July 1988, Shevardnadze stated that the 19th Party Conference set the stage for the strengthening of civilian control of the military: "From the party conference decisions to create the constitutional-plenipotentiary mechanism follows the need to introduce a legislative procedure in accordance with which all departments concerned with military and military-industrial activity will be under the control of the supreme nationwide elected bodies."¹⁸ Moreover, in a front page article in the weekly *Argumenty i fakty* of 10-16 September 1988, Shevardnadze argued that the U.S.S.R. made serious and costly mistakes in military policy due to a lack of adequate controls. He stated that the military budget, defense construction, and the use of Soviet forces outside of the country should be monitored by a civilian body that is elected nationwide and not by the Defense

Council. This argument is currently being debated by those elected to the newly created Congress of People's Deputies.

Shevardnadze has also been instrumental in increasing the involvement of civilian specialists in Soviet military affairs.¹⁹ For example, the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, headed by Viktor Karpov and Lieutenant General Konstantin Mikhailov, is intended to erode the monopoly on military data in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Scientific Control Center in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, headed by one of the ministry's top arms control specialists, Vladimir Shustov, assists in collecting military data that were unavailable just a few years ago. These bodies assist the reformers in the Politburo to control and integrate the military into Gorbachev's aspirations for reform.²⁰

A Divided Soviet Ministry of Defense

The Soviet leadership's drive towards reasonable sufficiency and reform has created a division of opinion in the Soviet military.²¹ For example, former First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeev²² adhered closely to Gorbachev's intended use of reasonable sufficiency, with the notable exception of his insistence that the concept must be influenced by Western actions—a corollary Gorbachev seems to have accepted at least rhetorically. (Akhromeev did not insist on strict parity but rather endorsed a need for a "rough equilibrium" of forces.) He endorsed the cornerstone of the new thinking in February 1987 in an explicit acknowledgement of the tenet that security issues can and should be resolved through political means.²³ Akhromeev, of course, played a key role in arms control negotiations, including those leading to the successful conclusion of the INF treaty. In a 9 May 1987 article in *Krasnaia zvezda*, Akhromeev joined the civilians by arguing for political means to prevent war and seemed to suggest that an additional military buildup would be unnecessary. He also attacked his fellow officers for not participating in the new political thinking.²⁴

Even Akhromeev had limits, however, and Gorbachev reached those limits on 7 December 1988. There is plenty of evidence to support the belief that Akhromeev opposed unilateral cuts for some time. The day before his resignation, he wrote in the Bulgarian press: "Errors in evaluating the likely nature of aggression and in forecasting the possible results of such an aggression are always dangerous and, especially given the defensive nature of our strategy, may entail serious consequences."²⁵ Even worse, in his view: "Certain influential circles in the West are now more realistic in evaluating the situation in the Soviet Union and within its Armed Forces, as well as the disastrous consequences which the arms race may produce for world peace. Other, no less influential circles, however, are relying, as in the past,

on the 'position of strength' as regards the Soviet Union, are trying to frighten our country and to extort one-sided actions from us."²⁶ This was not new from Akhromeev: it was basically what he told a Party meeting at the General Staff in August 1988.²⁷ He made this statement even earlier, in January: "In conditions of the constant military threat being created by the active military preparations of imperialism, defense sufficiency cannot be interpreted one-sidedly, without regard to the developing correlation of forces. It would be even more of a mistake to understand it as unilateral disarmament, a unilateral lessening of our defense."²⁸ Furthermore: "The limits of defense sufficiency are not set by us, but by the practical actions of the United States and the NATO bloc and their attempts to have a military capability that would ensure military superiority over us."²⁹

In March 1988 Akhromeev delivered a stinging attack on Nato policies, and argued that "in reality [i.e., despite Nato claims], there is an approximate parity [*paritet*] between the WTO and NATO in the area of armed forces and conventional weapons."³⁰ Note that he did not use the usual word, *ravnovesie* [equilibrium], choosing instead the cognate for parity, with its more strictly numerical connotations. This did not bode well for a General Secretary who was trying to move security issues away from strict "bean counts."

Divisions in the General Staff were no less raucous—or confusing. Lobov, as noted earlier, has argued for sufficient defense, stating that sufficient defense is necessary in "... maintaining, training, and using armed forces" while pursuing arms control agreements.³¹ He took a more conciliatory line, however, on the subject of asymmetries, a key barrier to many officers' acceptance of reasonable sufficiency. Unlike others (including such notables as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral Chernavin), Lobov accepted the idea that there are legitimate asymmetries that might concern Nato strategists.³²

Another Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Makmut Gareev, has advocated reliable defense.³³ He cited a growing threat from imperialism and the need to preserve parity with Nato and the United States.³⁴ Gareev, like his "co-religionist" Colonel General Volkogonov, also attacked those who question the putative Western threat. Last June, Gareev sounded off during an interview with *Argumenty i fakty*: "In all branches of activity of the Armed Forces many new and complex questions arise. A fundamental question has been raised about the reality of the military threat to us from the imperialist states. Certain press organs have begun to cast doubt on the presence of such a threat, and consequently, on the necessity of defense measures, of the defense of the Fatherland. . . . Positive international changes . . . [must also be considered along with] military preparations of the imperialist states."³⁵ Furthermore, Gareev stated that a real military threat continues to exist. He said that Soviet doctrine is indeed defensive, but

apparently only during the "initial" repulsion of aggression. Finally, Gareev asserted that Nato simply is not ready to deal with the U.S.S.R. in good faith.³⁶ (This latter point is echoed by a *Krasnaia zvezda* reviewer in September 1988, who said that "realistic tendencies" in Nato military policy are not yet "dominant.")³⁷

If the civilians hoped that the new Chief of the General Staff, General Mikhail Moiseev,³⁸ would impose some unity on the situation, they must be disappointed. Moiseev echoed Gareev, word for word, recently: "Thus, the presence of a military threat on the side of imperialism is a fundamental question. And from this, whatever the social opinion around it will be, the success of much depends on the realization of the party directives on defense. Meanwhile, some authors in our publications try to cast doubt on the reality of the military threat and on the rectitude of defense measures that have been adopted."³⁹ And: "Precipitousness in any matter is dangerous. And this is all the more so when we are talking about the preservation of peace and the defense of the nation. Here it is especially important, as they say, 'not to lose touch with the earth.' The reality is that the USA, for example, has not given up, and is not thinking of giving up, [even] one of its military-technical programs. Moreover, they are talking about equipping their armed forces with the kind of weapon systems for which the search for countermeasures will demand many times more time and resources from the Soviet Union. Thus the matter here is not some sort of 'imaginary military threat' to our country, invented, as some think, by military men, but the urgent necessity of a search for new ways to guarantee the reliable defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people."⁴⁰ Moiseev attempted to support two essentially conflicting arguments: one that accepts limits on military growth, the other that warns of a harsh "reality" in which the West will quickly outpace the U.S.S.R. in the race for military-technical superiority. Meanwhile, Gorbachev's statements repeatedly downplayed the dominance of technology in military affairs; either Moiseev disagreed or was unaware of the implications of his statement.

Other signs of trouble exist within the General Staff. Akhromeev's then senior deputy, General Vladimir Varennikov,⁴¹ in a piece highly critical of further arms negotiations with the West, identified reasonable sufficiency as "a reliable defense and the strengthening of parity between the U.S.S.R. and the United States."⁴² Major General V.A. Kuklev, apparently yet another new arrival to the General Staff, also exhibited some ambiguity about the Gorbachev program. His responses during an interview about the Moscow summit were entirely uncontroversial, approving of the business of the summit while chiding then-President Reagan for lecturing the U.S.S.R. about human rights.⁴³ Recently, however, Kuklev challenged Western estimates of the European balance. Moreover, Kuklev made an observation on the meaning of unilateralism (and by extension, on reasonable sufficiency) that may catch

on among the military: He stressed that the force reductions announced by Gorbachev are unilateral, but added that "we have the right to expect an adequately significant answer from the other side."⁴⁴ He is backed by *Krasnaia zvezda* reviewer M. Ponomarev; at the recent Nato session, Ponomarev wrote, "... talk was not about responding steps . . . but how to demand yet greater concessions from the U.S.S.R."⁴⁵

(Major General Lebedev has also voiced ire over the Western reaction that Gorbachev's cuts are a propaganda move and do not significantly impact Soviet security interests. Lebedev had this to say to Western skeptics: "Judging from some statements in the West, their scale and depth are not yet acknowledged by everyone.")⁴⁶

Some senior officers have shown restraint. General D.S. Sukhorukov, head of the Soviet Ministry of Defense cadres desk, was somewhat evasive in this January 1988 exchange, when he was asked if Gorbachev's reductions would hurt the nation's defense capability: "With regard to reductions in the Armed Forces, the chief problem in cadre policy in the army and navy will be to ensure their full combat readiness on the basis of our defensive doctrine. Basic efforts will be directed toward instilling in officers a high feeling of responsibility. . . ." ⁴⁷ In other words, perhaps: My job is cadres, and I am not going to answer the question. It is important to remember that when Lebedev answered the same questions, he responded with a flat denial, unlike Sukhorukov.

On 29 May 1987, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact promulgated a new military doctrine based on defensive concepts. The new defensive doctrine prohibited the use of military force unless a Warsaw Pact member became the victim of armed aggression; renounced the first use of nuclear weapons; and stated that the Warsaw Pact has no territorial ambitions against any state either in Europe or outside of it.⁴⁸ (It is interesting to note that Marshal Victor Kulikov, then Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, was listed at the very end of the attendee list, even behind the East German diplomat Herbert Krolkowski.)

The problems created within the General Staff by this new defensive doctrine are indicated in Marshal Kulikov's speech at the recent party conference: "In his speech, MSU [Marshal of the Soviet Union] V. Kulikov . . . stressed that . . . the plans for combat preparedness in a series of military districts do not correspond with the abilities of the troops. In new conditions a new mechanism of discharge [of duties] is needed at all levels. New. Something that allows the attainment of qualitative parameters to be guaranteed. There is no alternative."⁴⁹ Kulikov continued: "A subject of special concern in the current period was the work of the General Staff and all of its *podrazdelenii* and party organizations on the elimination of shortcomings noted by the Central Committee of the party in June 1987. And in the report as well as in the speeches it was noted that the work conducted

has been great. But this is only a part of the matter. Approaches have changed principally not only in the organization of duty [*boevogo dezhurstva*] and service in the troops, including the solving of extraordinary problems in peacetime, but also in the theoretical bases of a whole series of standing conceptions. In consideration of the defensive military doctrine, plans are being reworked, and documents and regulations are being defined more precisely and perfected; other work is being carried on as well."⁵⁰ Kulikov, unfortunately, did not elaborate on the Central Committee's criticisms, but it seemed that directorates charged with military science (Gareev again) were slow to react to new changes. Moiseev partly confirmed this possibility: "One of the most complex problems of military science is the prevention of war. Such a task was never before put before our Armed Forces. It requires deep scientific research and working out of concrete recommendations to the organs of direction, to the troops and the naval forces. It has been put before us to generalize experience and realize in practice the tenets of a defensive military doctrine, and to work out unified views and prevention of aggression. Together with this, it must be noted that military-scientific organizations called upon to provide preliminary deep working through of these questions often lag behind. In part, one of the questions that has been insufficiently worked through is connected with the organization and conduct of combat actions of a defensive character."⁵¹ This "lag" may be behind Marshal Kulikov's cryptic statement at a recent General Staff party conference about remedying "shortcomings" in General Staff work.

Overall, it appears that Akhromeev and his deputies on the General Staff were divided on the issue of reasonable sufficiency, and this has continued to fuel arguments in the General Staff, as is evident from the statements of Moiseev and others. As a result of these disagreements, the General Staff's influence in this phase of policy formulation is being challenged.⁵² This may be significant in respect to the critical budget planning phase for the 13th Five Year Plan (1991-1996). However, the Soviet General Staff understands fully that a stagnant economy is not in the best interests of the country and might reluctantly accept unilateral arms control initiatives and greater reform of the military.

Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov is a more confusing case, in that he seems to endorse both the concepts of sufficient defense and reliable defense. He has defined sufficient defense as the minimum necessary and the highest quality of armed forces and armaments capable of ensuring the country's defenses.⁵³ However, Yazov does not endorse asymmetrical and unilateral arms control initiatives. Instead, he defends parity as the decisive factor in preventing war and advocates that Soviet forces cannot remain static. In addition, Yazov has asserted that "[the Soviet Union is] not the one who sets the limits of sufficiency, it is the actions of the United States at Nato"⁵⁴ which support a symmetrical response. Moreover, Yazov addressed reliable

defense in his 1987 book, *Na strazhe sotsializma i mira*. In it, he states that "... the reliable defense of the Soviet people relies on the success of all tasks given to the army and the navy based on Soviet military doctrine."⁵⁵ This is most likely an expression of the tension between Yazov's loyalties to the leadership and his instincts as a career field commander.

The Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, General Aleksei Lizichev, supports sufficient defense. Lizichev rejects unilateral arms cuts and hints that defense spending must be maintained at current levels: "And today expenditures on defense, the number of personnel in the Army and Navy, the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment are defined exclusively by the demands of the Fatherland and the collective defense of the gains of socialism. In our country, nothing more is being done than is necessary."⁵⁶

However, Lizichev also recognizes the benefits of a political dialogue concerning new thinking in Soviet security issues. For example, he stated that "to any sensible person it is clear that peace-loving initiatives, coming from a powerful state, are not evidence of weakness but rather are a manifestation of the necessity in the modern era for new political thinking."⁵⁷

Finally, several members of the Soviet Ministry of Defense have promoted the concept of reliable defense. For example, first Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces Petr Lushev argues that parity is necessary and states that any army must "train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses or may possess."⁵⁸

By contrast, however, Lushev's support of reliable defense is tepid compared with the vitriol of his predecessor, Marshal Viktor Kulikov.⁵⁹ Kulikov, recognizing that his theater would be the first affected by a defensive doctrine based on reasonable sufficiency, argued that Europe is the "most explosive place on Earth" and he argued for maintaining the status quo in terms of military strength.⁶⁰

And Soviet PVO (Air Defense Troops) CINC General Ivan Tretyak has not supported Gorbachev's reasonable sufficiency or, indeed, any form of sufficiency. He expressed publicly his disregard for defense cutbacks and charged that the doctrine of reliable defense is not enough "to assure the final destruction of the enemy" and insisted that "the defense of the U.S.S.R. should be absolute." Tretyak also warned against being "lured by the apparent benefits" of change in the Soviet defense posture.⁶¹

The evidence of the past few years thus indicates that the Soviet Ministry of Defense is divided on the issue of reasonable sufficiency, reflecting some success on the part of the leadership in using the concept as a divisive tool to control the military agenda. However, this divisiveness may not last. Disagreements between the services and within the Ministry of Defense are

obviously not nearly as great as those between the military and the civilians, and Gorbachev's unilateral cuts may have accelerated a kind of military *sblizheniie* [rapprochement], a closing of whatever gaps may have opened over the issue since 1986.

Still, the existence of the reasonable sufficiency debate is significant in itself. The discussion has moved from a loose set of conceptual ideas made by Gorbachev to arguments which have culminated in deep divisions within the military. Routines, norms, and values of the Soviet military are being disturbed by Gorbachev's promulgation of reasonable sufficiency and associated concepts and doctrine. This is not surprising: Reasonable sufficiency, a subset of new thinking, reflects a growing attack on the military that began in the early 1980s.⁶²

Gorbachev and his followers wish to redefine who will decide the nature of the external threat to the Soviet Union. They use reasonable sufficiency as an ideological tool to divide the military, thus weakening the military cadres' resistance to doctrinal and structural reform. Gorbachev and others want to control the ideological and functional interests of the military, and they pursue the policy of reasonable sufficiency forcefully and consistently. As a result of this policy, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff's monopoly on defense policy development appears to be broken. Whether the civilians will maintain the momentum and expertise to exploit this breakthrough remains to be seen.

Notes

1. See Gorbachev's speech in *Materialy XXVII S" ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), pp. 62-76.

2. Gorbachev first mentioned reasonable sufficiency in Paris, France. See "Za mirnoe, svobodnoe, protsvetaushchee bydyshchee evrope i vsekh drugikh kontinentov (rech M.S. Gorbacheva)," *Pravda*, 4 October 1985.

3. "Doklad General'nogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS deputata Gorbacheva, M.S.," *Pravda*, 28 November 1985.

4. "Doklad General'nogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarisha Gorbacheva, M.S.," *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, pp. 2-3.

5. "Rech tovarisha Gorbacheva, M.S.," *Pravda*, 7 March 1986, p. 2.

6. "Perestroika—Krovnoe delo naroda (Rech M.S. Gorbacheva na XVIII S"ezde profsoiuzov SSSR)," *Pravda*, 26 February 1987, p. 2.

7. "Vystuplenie M.S. Gorbacheva na Organizatsii Ob"edinennykh Natsii," *Pravda*, 8 December 1988, p. 2.

8. Yakovlev's power continues to grow. His appointment to head the Central Committee Commission on International Affairs gives him unprecedented power over foreign policy. This must also include security aspects of Soviet foreign policy as well. In addition, it is surprising that Yakovlev, who actively depicts a threat from the United States which is both "imminent and irrational," supports reasonable sufficiency. See Aleksandr Yakovlev, *Po kraiu bezhny* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985). Also, Dobrynin "retired" on 30 September 1988 from his position at the International Department and then was appointed a foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev on 28 October 1988.

9. Anatoli Dobrynin, "Za bez'iademyi mir, navstrechu 19 veku," *Kommunist*, June 1986, p. 27.

10. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, p. 1011.

11. Yuri Lebedev and Aleksandr Podberezkin, "Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost'," *Kommunist*, no. 13, 1988, pp. 110-119.

12. Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Dostizhenie kachestvenno novogo sostoiianiia sovetskogo obshchestva i obshchestvenno nauku," *Kommunist*, no. 8, 1987, p. 18.

13. FBIS-SOV-87-073, 16 April 1987, p. F1.

14. Evgenii Primakov, "Novaia filosofia vneshnei politiki," *Pravda*, 10 July 1987, p. 4.

15. Vitalii Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov, "Razumnaia dostatochnost'-ili kak razorvat' pochnyi krug," *Novoe vremia*, no. 40, 1987, pp. 13-15. This article later appeared in SSHA, December 1987, and a slightly altered version was published in *Kommunist*, January 1988, under the title of "Vyzovy bezopasnostistare i novye."

16. Falin's appointment to head the International Department occurred on 20 October 1988. He made his comment while chief of APN, or Novosti. Falin's expertise on Western Europe will most likely shape the Soviet Union's outlook on security issues and ultimately contribute to the reasonable sufficiency debate. A lessening of tensions in Europe would contribute to lower defense expenditures in the Warsaw Pact.

17. An example of citizens becoming involved in the defense debate occurred on Soviet television on 30 October 1988. During a live interview at GUM (Moscow's largest department store) with representatives of the consumer goods industry, a GUM customer grabbed the microphone and said, "We will never resolve the problem of deficit goods without the demilitarization of our economy!" "RFED/RLD Daily Report," *SOVSET*, 31 October 1988.

18. "Vneshniaia politika i diplomatiia," *Pravda*, 26 July 1988, p. 4.

19. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Foreign Ministry is becoming more involved in the publishing of materials related to Soviet security issues instead of the Ministry of Defense. For example, a book on the history of the Warsaw Pact entitled *Organizatsiia Varshavskogo Dogovora, 1955-1985, Dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1986), was released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs almost a year after Shevardnadze took over the post of Foreign Minister.

20. Larrabee, p. 1011.

21. See R. Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense," *International Security*, Fall 1988 for a listing of the military and civilian responses to reasonable sufficiency.

22. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov announced Akhromeev's "retirement" due to health reasons on 7 December 1988 in New York City.

23. "Slava i gordost' sovetskogo naroda, Sovetskaiia Rossiia," 21 February 1987, p. 1.

24. "Perestroika trebuat del," *Krasnaia zvezda*, (hereafter cited as KZ), 13 August 1988, p. 2.

25. "Marshal Akhromeev on Military Restructuring," FBIS-SOV-88-237, 9 December 1988, p. 1. The original appeared in Bulgarian in *Rabotnicesko delo* on 6 December 1988.

26. *Ibid.*

27. See footnote 24. This was a meeting of the Party aktiv.

28. "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine Described," FBIS-SOV-88-001, 4 January 1988, p. 1.

29. *Ibid.*

30. "Chto kroetsia za briussel'skim zaiableniem NATO," KZ, 20 March 1988, p. 3.

31. Soviet Television, *Studio Ninn*, 15 October 1988. Lobov was appointed First Deputy Chief of the Warsaw Pact on 26 January 1989.

32. See U. Lobov, "Mirovomu Okeanu: Mir i stabil'nost'," KZ, 28 June 1987, p. 3 and U. Lobov, "Kmo stremitsia k prevos khodstv," KZ, 14 July 1987, p. 3.

33. It was reported in the 28 December 1988 issue of KZ that the General Staff Party Conference criticized Gareev. This might be related to his harsh views on reasonable sufficiency. See "Kursom obnoveniia," KZ, 28 December 1988, p. 2.

34. Makmut Gareev, "Sovetskaiia voennaia nauka," *Zashchita oteschestva*, no. 11, 1987.

35. "Vooruzhennnye sily v usloviakh glasnosti," *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 39, 1988, pp. 4-5.

36. *Ibid.*

37. V. Markushin, "Inertiia protivostoianiia," KZ, 13 September 1988, p. 3.

38. Moiseev's appointment occurred on 15 December 1988 and his promotion from colonel general to general occurred on 15 February 1989.

39. "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma," KZ, 23 February 1989, p. 2.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Varennikov's appointment as Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces occurred on 16 February 1989.

42. V. Varennikov, "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti narodov," *Partiinaia zhizn'*, March 1987, p. 10.

43. V. Kuzar' and V. Kocherov, "Vo imia bezopasnosti narodov," KZ, 1 June 1988, p. 3.

44. "Po printsipu razumnoi dostatochnosti," KZ, 28 December 1988, p. 3.

45. M. Ponomarev, "Realizm idei, smelost' podkhodov," KZ, 11 December 1988, p. 3.

46. "Sokraschenie armii i oboronospособnost," KZ, 16 December 1988, p. 3.

47. D. Sukhorukov, "Smotr ofiterskikh kadrov," KZ, 14 January 1988, p. 2.

48. For an analysis on the role of the new thinking in the Warsaw Pact, see Theodore William Karasik, "Current Perspectives on the Warsaw Treaty Organization," *Current World Leaders*, December 1988, pp. 899-910.

49. "Kursom obnoveniia," *KZ*, 28 December 1988, p. 2.

50. *Ibid.*

51. "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma," *KZ*, 23 February 1989, p. 2.

52. Ellen Jones, "Defense R&D Policymaking in the USSR," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds., *Soviet Decision Making for National Security* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 129. Jones argued that the General Staff played an intricate role in defense planning for several decades.

53. This viewpoint is expressed by Yazov in an article he wrote in *Die welt*, 21 October 1988, p. 2.

54. D. Yazov, "Voennaia doktrina Varshavskogo Dogovora: Doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma," *Pravda*, 27 July 1987, p. 5.

55. Dmitri Yazov, *Na strazhe sotsializma i Mira* (Moscow: 1987), p. 26.

56. Aleksei Lizichev, "Oktiabr' i leninskoe uchenie o zashchite revolyutsii," *Kommunist*, no. 3, 1987, pp. 87-88. For more on Lizichev and new thinking, see Thomas M. Nichols, "The Military and 'The New Political thinking': Lizichev on Leninism and Defense," *Radio Liberty Research* RL 80/87, 26 February 1987.

57. Lizichev, p. 85.

58. *International Affairs*, no. 9, 1987. It is interesting to note that the conservatives appeared to support a letter-writing campaign against reasonable sufficiency. For example, a letter from Captain Third Rank A. Petrov prior to the 19th Party Conference stated, "We have no right to allow the loss of military parity with the West which we had difficulty in achieving. Many officers on our ship share my opinion." See "Sokhranit' paritet," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 4 June 1988, p. 1. In addition, two new books recently published argued for a stronger naval presence as new thinking and reasonable sufficiency help to deny the Soviet Union a fully operational blue water navy. These books are the memoirs of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov and a book on naval strategy under the editorship of Fleet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov. The Kuznetsov book revived the debate on the need for more submarines and aircraft carriers; something the Soviet Navy did not want to give up, while Gorshkov's book basically argued that any enemy "should be smashed."

59. Lushev replaced Kulikov on 2 February 1989.

60. Nichols, 1987.

61. *Moscow News* (English edition), no. 8. 1989.

62. For more information on the Party's attack on the military leadership, see Jeremy Azrael, *The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986*, RAND Report R-3521-AF, June 1987, pp. 38-44.

This article is a combined version of two papers, one of which was presented to the Air Force Intelligence Agency Conference entitled "The Soviet Union Towards the 21st Century: Soviet Military and Political Affairs in the Gorbachev Era," Washington, D.C., 22 October 1988, and a second paper presented to the 21st Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, 18 November 1988.



"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."

Winston Churchill
Radio Broadcast
1 October 1939

Competitive Strategies? Good Next? Long-Range Planning

Commander George Victor Galdorisi, U.S. Navy

“**I**t must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.”¹

All military establishments have inherent strengths and weaknesses. Applying one's own strength against an enemy's weakness, while seeking to prevent the enemy from doing the same, has been a fundamental principle of successful operational planning and execution since the days of Alexander the Great.

In its waning years, the Reagan administration attempted to do just that, maturing the maritime/continental debate into one involving competitive strategies designed to apply enduring U.S. strengths against long-term Soviet weaknesses. As articulated specifically by President Reagan in 1987: “Competitive strategies are aimed at exploiting our technological advantages in thoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets to compete less efficiently or less effectively in areas of military application. Such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous Soviet military machine obsolete and force the Soviets to divert resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not necessarily threaten our own forces. Low, observable (stealth) technology, for example, can render much of the Soviet investment in air defense obsolete and require the Soviets to divert resources from offensive to defensive forces. The contribution which new technologies can make to our competitive strategies is an explicit consideration in making defense procurement decisions.”²

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Key tenets of the competitive strategies include:

- Maintaining a secure deterrent without matching the Soviets plane for plane, ship for ship, tank for tank.
- Adopting programs that make existing Soviet defense investments obsolete. Such programs must insure that an effective Soviet response would be far more costly to them than our initiative is to us.
- Forcing the Soviets to shift resources from offensive to defensive operations.
- Forcing the Soviets to forgo other offensive forces because of their real and perceived inability to overcome our defensive systems.
- Determining which combination of technology, weapon systems, and operational plans will allow the United States to capitalize on its strengths and exploit Soviet weaknesses.³

The competitive strategies have several antecedents. The post-World War II policy of massive retaliation, using nuclear weapons at times and places of our choosing, sought to apply U.S. strengths against Soviet weaknesses. As early as 1972 the Pentagon established the Office of Net Assessment under the direction of Andrew Marshall. This organization's charter, "to provide a comparative analysis of those military, technological, political and economic factors which impede or have a potential to impede our national security objectives, with those factors available or potentially available to enhance accomplishment of those same national security objectives," was the precursor of Secretary Caspar Weinberger's competitive strategies.⁴ Many defense analysts have been urging the United States to do business in this fashion. Some have urged that U.S. military strategy be based on America's remaining strategic advantage over the U.S.S.R., that is, the fact that the United States is blessed with many rich allies while the Soviets have only a few poor ones. Jeffrey Record has urged the United States to attempt to gain qualitative advantage in critical war-fighting technologies while fashioning a war-fighting doctrine that exploits Soviet geographic and operational weaknesses. Record goes further in providing a basic list of Soviet weaknesses:

- Unreliable allies
- Rigid centralized control system
- Constrained access to the sea
- Fragile East-West lines of communications
- Technological inferiority
- Ethnic nationalism⁵

Thus, the concept of competitive strategies looks at technologies, mission areas, and leverage points in attempting to go beyond the old maritime/continental debate and to determine the optimum application of U.S. defense resources.

How real is the Department of Defense's commitment to competitive strategies? One view is that of long-time defense critic, Edward Luttwak. Referring to the competitive strategies working group, Luttwak noted that "there are among the 35,000 working in the Pentagon at least six who are actually thinking about how to make the United States stronger. The last thing on their minds is public relations."⁶

Luttwak may be unfair. The competitive strategies had the personal attention of former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger; his successor, Secretary Frank Carlucci, appeared to share the same enthusiasm for the concept, for he chaired a powerful competitive strategies council. All indications are that Secretary of Defense Richard Chaney has also resolved to support the competitive strategies.

The continuing personal attention of three successive secretaries of defense and their strong efforts to insert the concept into the mainstream of the Pentagon's processes, along with well-conceived efforts to give all the services a piece of the action, have given the competitive strategies an enormous amount of institutional momentum within the Department of Defense. Secretary Weinberger specifically directed that in the services' proposals for new systems and presentations for ongoing systems, they would be required to provide an analysis of how these systems exploit natural U.S. strengths and Soviet weaknesses. In addition, the strategies now have a congressional mandate. Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to report each January on the specifics of the progress of the competitive strategies. This all but guarantees that competitive strategies will survive changes in administrations which bring new personalities to the department.

While not a panacea for all our national security ills, competitive strategies do provide some relief from the well-worn continental/maritime debate and offer the possibility of igniting fresh thinking about the defense of the United States. If properly and consistently applied, competitive strategies can lead to a truly robust deterrent that relies on advanced design, manufacturing capabilities, and fighting doctrine.

Competitive strategies have the potential to focus incisively on technologies, mission areas, and leverage points, however, they do not address the timing of these concepts directly, and the Secretary of Defense's *Fiscal Year 1988 Report to the Congress* called for just that: greater attention to the timing and phasing of U.S. initiatives in order to render Soviet systems obsolete at the point when investment in them reaches its height.⁷ The relatively recent adoption of the competitive strategies doctrine is perhaps one reason why this critical concept has not yet been addressed, but it is necessary that we do so soon.

Long Cycles and Strategies

It is no surprise that long-range timing gets little attention in the national security strategy debate. Competition between the services for resources is so intense that they present virtually all requirements as pressing needs that must be fulfilled immediately in order to fit neatly into the current year's planning, programming, and budgeting cycle (PPBS) and the ongoing Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Each military service and service subgroup has learned painfully that futuristic requirements become the first victims of the mark-up process within the service, DoD, Executive Department, and Congress. Hence, smart players try to get as much as possible under contract as soon as possible.

These budget battles drive force structure, which, in turn, shapes strategies. U.S. global leadership does not seek hegemony; it seeks to deny hegemony to a nation aiming for absolute security, a security which by definition can only be achieved by world domination. Global leadership implies a long-term commitment that cannot be dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis. Unfortunately, this long-term commitment has not been part of our national security strategy planning process. Long-range planning was tried in the Navy in the 1970s but dissolved into staffs working frantically on current issues. Such planning as there is for long-term force requirements is often done by upper echelon leaders responding to outside, often compelling stimuli. This disjointed approach to decision making is not adequate to ensure that the nation's vital interests are protected.

What the tortuous budget process shows is that U.S. forces cannot defend the whole world at any time against every threat. This mismatch between obligations and resources is symbolized by a Persian Gulf intervention force composed of units stripped from other theaters. In contrast, the concept of competitive strategies provides a rational approach to defense. It recognizes that Allied forces cannot be strong everywhere at once and that therefore many campaigns must be sequential; we must be able to defend that which we value, and in our attacks we must concentrate our strengths against Soviet vulnerabilities instead of matching our strength against theirs.

But this process does not yet answer the critical question of *when* it is important to be strongest. Should we posture our force structure to be able to stop a Soviet blitzkrieg on the Central Front in 1990 or 1995, or 2010, or 2030, or 2050? Should our naval forces seek to be more secure against a Soviet blitzkrieg at sea in 1990 or 2000, 2020? These are perhaps the most critical questions that must be addressed in order to plan the allocation of defense resources logically, but they have never been tackled. The primary reason for this failing may be that we lack a method to determine the necessary "when" in defense resource allocations. Attempting to plan logically for the application of defense resources when a planning structure is in place is a

difficult process at best; attempting to do so without a planning structure is impossible.

One method that has some promise of bringing a degree of order out of chaos is the long-cycle approach to U.S. strategic policy as recently devised by George Modelski, William Thompson, and others. The theory of long cycles provides a coherent and meaningful account of the historic role of the United States in world politics and could help us define our strategies for the future. The basic propositions of the theory of long cycles may be formulated in the following statements:

- A global political system has been in existence since about 1500 A.D. This is the modern world's system of politics. The theory explains its behavior, and the patterns it identifies are attributes of the system.

- At intervals of about one century, the global political system has experienced global wars—each finalized by a general and legitimizing peace settlement. Among the more recent of such conflagrations were the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars at the turn of the 19th century and the two world wars of the 20th century. Global wars have been the critical turning points in the evolution of the global political system. The time elapsed between two such wars has marked the period of the long cycle.

- Each global war has resulted in the emergence of a preponderant world power as the system's principal provider of public goods for security and world organization. The world powers since 1500 have been Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Great Britain, and now the United States.

- Each world power is, at first, a preponderant supplier of public goods, largely as the function of its sea power and related command of the sea. This gives the political system a structure of unipolarity (high power concentration). But over the lifetime of the long cycle this preponderance gradually erodes, and the system moves into multipolarity (low power concentration).

- Each successive global order (as defined by its preponderant world power) has gradually decayed and deteriorated into another global war, thus completing the cycle.

- The system has bred the nation-state. All preponderant world powers have been successful nation-states, and through competitive emulation the nation-state has become the dominant political organization in the world system.

- The global political system has been associated with a high-growth economy. In their time, all world powers have been economically "active" zones, known first as mercantile and more recently as industrial powers. Through competitive emulation their example has propelled the world onto a path of rapid growth and development and instigated the formation of economic organizations of global scope.⁸

The existence of these long cycles of world leadership is an empirical fact that may be explained theoretically. In fact, long cycles have close identification with the long waves of the economic system (Kondratieff waves).⁹ All of the world powers shared some common characteristics. Most had an island or peninsular location, each was favored with stable domestic politics, each had a strong economy, and each had a politico-strategic organization (in particular, a strong navy) that could exert power on a global scale.

Long Cycles in Global Politics

Phases			
Global War	World Power	Delegitimation	Deconcentration
Events			
Major Warfare	Role Assumed by	Challenger	
Portuguese Cycle			
1491-1516	1516-1539	1540-1560	1560-1580
Italian and Indian Ocean Wars	Portugal		Spain
Dutch Cycle			
1580-1609	1609-1639	1640-1660	1660-1688
Spanish-Dutch Wars	Netherlands		France
First British Cycle			
1688-1713	1714-1739	1740-1763	1764-1792
Wars of Louis XIV	Britain I		France
Second British Cycle			
1792-1815	1815-1849	1850-1873	1874-1914
Wars of French Revolution and Napoleon	Britain II		Germany
American Cycle			
1914-1945	1945-1973	1973-2000	2000-2030
World Wars I & II	United States		Soviet Union

Long cycles help to explain past international relations and, more importantly, help to clarify the future. They tell us a great deal about how the world works and promise to reveal more in the years to come. Since a

systematic long-range planning process is essential for maintaining strategic vision and building a strategic program, the long-cycle theory appears to be an attractive candidate to help plan strategic futures.

What implications do these long cycles have for U.S. strategic planners? First, the long-cycle theory suggests that the most important indicator of global power during the entire period of modern world politics has been sea power and the global reach it affords. Second, it indicates that the Soviet Union cannot achieve global leadership. Military force is a necessary condition for determining outcomes of interstate conflict, and the U.S.S.R. is a great military power, but military force alone is inadequate. The Soviet Union is incapable of projecting an appealing image worldwide—a condition essential for global leadership. American displacement could not be followed by Soviet replacement.¹⁰ Third, the long-cycle theory indicates that the United States is engaged in world affairs as a successor and heir to a line of world powers, and its accomplishments in organizing world order in the past generation have been substantial. Fourth, the U.S. role calls for a fundamentally defensive posture to protect and maintain that order rather than to overthrow it. Fifth, this defensive strategy will avoid any imperial acquisitions.

These five factors, while important, do not address the question of timing resource allocations. However, a sixth factor does. The long-cycle theory indicates strongly that global war is not now imminent and, even though accidental wars among some powers are conceivable, the theory does not predict another global war for at least another generation. Hence, strategies that heavily prepare for such a war in the near term are likely to be wasteful.¹¹

This understanding is absolutely critical to formulating national security strategy and can provide a heretofore missing dimension, that of the proper timing of defense allocations. The long-cycle theory strongly discourages spending defense dollars today on near-term fixes and shoring up initiatives (additional military manpower, service life extension programs, additional operating funds for steaming and flying hours, mission upgrades for aging systems) while encouraging significant investment designed to have a payoff during the height of the prospective Soviet challenge circa 2030 (such as advanced SDI technology, advanced stealth technology, space-based weapon systems, nonacoustic or transparent ocean antisubmarine warfare technology). What is required is that the long-cycle theory be institutionalized into the national security strategy planning process.

Those who think this approach is a radical departure from sound defense decision making and that we are mortgaging a perilous present for an uncertain future would do well to observe the current actions of our principal adversary, the Soviet Union. Could the Soviets already be factoring some type of long-cycle approach into their defense decision making? In a recent article in the *Naval War College Review*, James Westwood identified a retrenchment in Soviet naval deployments and a possible far-reaching

restructuring of their defense priorities. In addition to cutting back deployments, the Soviets have slashed readiness expenditures and dramatically curtailed hardware acquisition. They are pouring the money saved into technology for the future. This major investment in technology acceleration has been made with a view to achieving a more robust military establishment after the turn of the century.¹²

Who's for Change?

Whatever they criticize, the overwhelming majority of the critics of America's national security strategic development process basically agree that there is a decided lack of long-range planning at any level. Even those who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, such as congressmen who hold weapons systems development hostage to yearly budget review, are nearly unanimous in their demand that we inject some strategic vision and more long-range planning into national security strategy.

Those who have been in the inner circle of government for extended periods also decry the lack of planning. In the words of Henry Kissinger, "lip service is paid to planning. What passes for planning is frequently the projection of the familiar into the future."¹³ Congressman Newt Gingrich points out that this weakness is perhaps characteristically American, noting that "America is traditionally a pragmatic, fragmented, short-term focused country. We lack effective systems for systematic, long-range planning and an ability to think about long-range agendas for larger institutions."¹⁴ Collectively, these criticisms focus on a problem in need of solution.

The long-cycle approach to U.S. strategic policy helps to solve this problem and provides a means to help strategic planners target their force structures and strategies to a time that is most propitious for achieving their maximum effectiveness. By introducing this long-range vision to the process and by having the patience to wait for results, we can bridge a critical gap.

But there are large and obvious obstacles in the way of reaching such seemingly desirable ends.

In Western societies, the science of planning has a bad reputation. It conjures up visions of governmental direction and control, and bureaucratic inefficiency and waste. This anti-planning bias tends to spill over into the national security environment.

Change, particularly long-range planning for change, by its very nature, tends to be viewed as a threat by some leaders and staffs, both appointed defense officials and career military officers. Long-range planning appears to reduce the authority of leaders who want to make decisions. This is particularly true if one organization is trying to develop long-range plans for other organizations.

Within the Pentagon in particular, officials hold their positions for short periods of time before they are reassigned, retire, resign, or are ousted because of a change in administration. Therefore, they tend to have "planning horizons" that generally correspond to the amount of time they expect to hold their present jobs. Astute long-range planning designed to make your successor's successor look good is not part of this bureaucratic ethic.

A large number of senior leaders in our government have a basically deterministic view of the future. Many are so accustomed to having their programs and ideas buffeted about by diverse groups and sources that they come to believe that the course of the future is already largely predetermined by forces outside their control. They believe that the best they can do is to make slight adjustments to an already decided future and otherwise make the best of what is bound to happen anyway.

Given this institutional resistance to change within the national security strategy planning bureaucracy, is it possible to either adapt the process to the system, or change the system to embrace a long-range planning process incorporating a good degree of strategic vision?

The answer to the first question is yes, it is possible to adapt the process to the system, but this is not desirable. The long-range strategic planning process has, over time, been adapted to, and corrupted by, the existing governmental bureaucratic structures with disastrous results that have made hip-shot decision making the order of the day by rewarding short-range crisis management and punishing long-range planning. It does not work well.

If it is not desirable to plan for national security within the context of the current system, is it possible then to adapt the system to encourage strategic vision and long-range national security strategy planning? This is a crucial question. Certainly anything is possible, but many efforts fail because the payoff is not worth the investment. This is not the case with national security strategy planning. The stakes could not be higher. Therefore, we must assume that such an adaptation is possible and then ask two questions: One, what steps can be taken to facilitate effective long-range national security planning and two, what conditions will assist in making this work?

There are a number of logical steps that must be taken if long-range planning is to succeed. The key components are:

- We must recognize that long-range planning is the centerpiece of the organization's existence.
- We must institutionalize it.
- We must recognize that it is useful in making current decisions.
- Top decision makers in the organization must support it.¹⁵

The second step is perhaps the most important because it is only through institutionalization that long-range national security strategy planning can survive.

The only question to ask is, Will we institutionalize these changes rationally and in an orderly fashion, or will we do so in response to a crisis when it may already be too late to change? It is perhaps ironic that most of those willing to gamble on the latter course probably could never envision themselves wasting their money on a lottery ticket.

Notes

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The author wishes to express his thanks to Commander Michael McCune of the Secretary of Defense Office of Competitive Strategies and to Doctor Patrick Drinan, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of San Diego, for their invaluable help in preparing this article.



What Is a War Game?

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As we now know it, war gaming started in Germany about 165 years ago, where the term *Kriegspiel* was applied to a game played on a map rather than on a chessboard. Here at the Naval War College, war games have been played for just over a hundred years. For the first seventy of those years, games were played on maps or charts or giant plotting boards.

Then in 1958 the Navy installed its first computer game, the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS). The computer was an analog computer and contained a very large collection of vacuum tubes. This system was replaced during the mid-1970s by the Warfare Research and Analysis System (WARS), a digital computer, which was in turn replaced in the early 1980s by another computer system called the Naval Warfare Gaming System (NWGS). Two years ago this system was “enhanced,” so the system is now referred to as ENWGS. Similar installations are now operating at the tactical training centers at Dam Neck, Virginia and San Diego. These “host computers,” as they are called, are interconnected to four remote sites at the headquarters of the fleet commanders-in-chief and to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. One measure of the increased capabilities of succeeding generations of computers is that while the NEWS could track 48 ships or aircraft, its successor, the WARS, could track 300, and its successor, NWGS, 1,000, while the ENWGS can track 2,000.

The year NWGS was installed, 1983, may go down in history as something of a high point in computer war games:

- A movie, *War Games*, was released that year, giving audiences an exaggerated view of a computer war game. The story was based on the premise that a computer game could take over military operations in the real world.
- On television, ABC ran an enactment of a Southwest Asia problem. You might remember it: Edmund Muskie played the president, Clark Clifford played the secretary of state, and James Schlesinger played the secretary of

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defense. This game could really be called a political-military simulation rather than a war game, but it was like a war game, for there was a large staff that provided the players with the basic situation and later with new events and reactions to players' decisions. This television program is used today at the Naval War College to stimulate discussion on problems in crisis management in that part of the world.

- You may remember the novel *Red Storm Rising*, which begins with the Soviet occupation of Iceland. The novel starts that way because in about 1983, Tom Clancy and his coauthor Larry Bond had war-gamed a superpower war in the North Atlantic a number of times as part of their research in preparation for writing the book. They concluded from their war games that the Russians could not win so long as *we* held Iceland. They postulated that the Russians would come to the same conclusion in *their* war games, and therefore they resolved to have the Soviets capture Iceland at the outset of the war in the book they wrote.

At this point, instead of defining for you the term war game, I will illustrate a war game by an example. Before I begin, I should at least tell you what falls outside the definition of war games. I would not include:

- reenactments of battles using miniature soldiers,
- field and fleet exercises using live forces, or
- campaign analyses, which involve calculations of outcomes.

Let me illustrate the term war game by the use of chess. As a game of strategy and tactics, chess has long been associated with warfare, and sometimes it has been used to keep alive the mental skills that are thought to be required for warfare. It was the transition from military chess or war chess, played on chessboards, to games played on maps and charts that marked the start of war gaming in the modern sense.

Suppose we wanted to convert the game of chess into a war game. What changes would we have to make?

First, we would have to decide what objectives the players are to pursue. We could decide to leave the objective unchanged, that is, that each player seeks to attain a position that would threaten his opponent's king. We could give players other objectives—to occupy certain parts of the board, or to capture as many of his opponent's chessmen as possible, for example. And the objectives might not be the same for players on both sides. In any case, these player objectives would become part of the initial disclosure to the players.

We would then have to decide how much information each player would be given. At present, chess is an "open" game, that is, each player has complete information on the location of all the pieces on both sides, and each player can predict the exact outcome of any move where one chessman lands on a square already occupied by an opposing chessman. In a war, neither of these

things is true—it is not always known where enemy forces are, nor is it clear what the outcomes of engagements will be. We might therefore consider denying players access to some of the information about the location of their opponent's pieces. We could do this by withholding information from each player about the location and moves of his opponent's chessmen, except perhaps when one chessman captures another or when an opposing chessman is on an adjacent square (if we thought it might be reasonable for real forces to know this). Games where information is withheld from the players would require three separated chessboards—one for each player and one on which the umpires would keep track of "ground truth." Computers can be used to maintain this ground truth for umpires, and to disclose portions of it to players.

In chess, each player controls his chessmen directly. In real life, commanders at the upper end of the chain of command exercise their control over the equivalents of chessmen—ships, planes, tanks, infantry battalions—through subordinate commanders. Players could be made to exercise control of their forces indirectly rather than directly. Thus, in a war game, players might be able to task directly only two subordinate task force commanders, each of whom might have direct control over, say, one bishop, one knight, one rook, and two or three pawns. The game would then reflect a chain of command approach, and would require players to get their decisions executed through umpires acting as their subordinate commanders.

Most of the rules of chess deal with the movement of chessmen. The relative strength of chessmen is reflected in the range of movements they are able to make. In a war game, the movement and strength of forces are constrained by rules based on the capabilities of real-life ships, aircraft, and ground forces, reduced if appropriate by the effects of weather, terrain, and damage previously suffered. Hence, we might want to adopt special rules of movement; and we might want to depart from the conventional rule that when a chessman moves to a square occupied by an opposing chessman, it "captures" that opponent. We might prefer a rule that would resolve these engagements in a different way, taking into account the relative strength of each chessman, and perhaps providing some edge to the chessman exercising initiative (to the extent that we believe that exercising the initiative confers an advantage in a real battle). We might, for example, adopt a rule that if a bishop moves onto a square occupied by an opposing pawn, the probability that the bishop will capture the pawn is 85 percent, while the likelihood that the pawn will capture the bishop is 15 percent; but if the pawn moves onto a square occupied by an opposing bishop, the pawn will capture the bishop 40 percent of the time, and be captured by the opposing bishop 60 percent of the time. (Umpires are able to convert such probabilities into yes/no decisions for discrete events by pulling a number from a table of random numbers from zero to ninety-nine. If the random number drawn is less than

the probability number, the event is judged to have taken place; but if the random number is equal to or greater than the probability number, the event is judged not to have happened.)

Sets of Rules

As you can see, a war game requires at least five sets of rules:

- Objective Rules, by which the performance of players will be judged.
- Knowledge Rules, that determine how much information will be made available to players, both initially and during play.
- Execution Rules, that describe whether the pieces on the board are to be controlled by the players directly, or indirectly by umpires acting on behalf of players.
- Movement Rules, that tell the players when they may move, that describe the mobility of their units, and that identify which factors might reduce mobility.
- Engagement Outcome Rules, that govern how umpires or computers determine the outcomes of interactions or how—in some seminar games—players are expected to reach a consensus on the outcomes.

Game Design

There are some choices that need to be made before a war game can be designed.

First, there is the purpose for which the game is to be played. Some games are played for educational purposes: to provide players experience, to develop their skills, or to provide them insight about the dynamics of combat. Other games are played for research purposes: to analyze a concept or validate a plan. The sponsor of the game determines the purpose for which a game is to be played and such other details as:

- The number of sides. In one-sided games, the opposing side is played by someone in the control group; in a two-sided game there are players on both sides.
- How much information will be made available to players, i.e., whether the game is to be open (like chess) or closed (like poker, where some of the information is withheld).
- The level at which the players will act—tactical, theater, or strategic.
- The level at which the interactions will take place. Will the pieces on the board (used by umpires to establish results) be individual aircraft and ships or will they be entire task groups?
- Whether outcomes will be assessed in a top-down fashion, where umpires will decide first on the major results and then work out details, or in a bottom-up method, where small interactions will be assessed first and

then aggregated. Human umpires are able to assess in either fashion, but computers tend to be better at making bottom-up assessments.

During a lecture at the War College in 1960, Admiral Nimitz remarked that "the war with Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people, and in so many different ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war; we had not visualized these."

In a letter to the War College president five years later, Admiral Nimitz wrote that "nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected."

These statements are a heavy burden to carry, because war games are not really intended to be predictions of future events, but as the admiral pointed out, they can reduce surprise.

War games here from 1919 to 1941 deserve some special comment. It is possible to trace the evolution in U.S. naval thought during those years by noting that during the annual war games, the naval officers that played them:

- shifted from the view that a war between the United States and Japan would last only for 60 to 90 days to a view that such a war might last from 3 to 5 years;

- shifted from the view that such a war would be mainly a fleet transit followed by a fleet action to the view that successive amphibious landings would be required and so would a logistics buildup that was until then unimagined; and

- shifted from believing that such a war would be decided by a decisive fleet action to a realization that such a war would end as a result of a sea blockade of Japan combined with an aerial bombing campaign.

Early classes at the Naval War College devoted much of their study time to developing a war plan against a specific country. Each country had a color—the United States was always Blue, Japan was Orange, and the first Orange plan was written before World War I. War games based on Orange plans were played very often in the 1920s and 1930s, but so were games based on Red plans (against Great Britain), Black (against Germany), or Silver (against Italy). A number of games since World War II have been played by students and others with the Soviet Union as the opposition. Such games have been set in the Norwegian Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Northwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. The Maritime Strategy is the modern equivalent of the Orange plan, and the color Orange—no longer referring to Japan—is often the color of the major opponent, while Blue remains the color of the home team.

Each summer for the past eleven years, a superpower war called the Global War Game has been played, usually for three weeks, at the Naval War College. It is a two-sided game, and most of the players come from Washington and the major unified command headquarters around the world.

For a five-year period, 1984-1988, the game was continued from year to year, so the war, in effect, lasted 10 or 11 weeks. (Some overlaps account for the game not having progressed further.)

In a manuscript published by the U.S. Army's Historical Division in 1952, a German general, D. Rudolf Hofman, reports an example of a war game becoming reality in early November 1944. Field Marshal Walther Model was conducting a war game at his headquarters to explore with his major commanders the defensive measures that they might take against a possible American attack along the boundary between two German armies. During the game, which was a map exercise, the players received word that the 28th Division of the U.S. Fifth Corps had indeed attacked. Model ordered the war game to continue, but to use actual reports as additional game disclosures. Within a few hours, the situation both at the front and in the map exercise became so critical that Model's reserve, the 116th Panzer Division, was committed. The division commander, who was playing in the map exercise, received his orders directly—first from the army group commander, then the army commander, and then the corps commander, all of whom were also players at the game. The division commander set his division into motion in the shortest conceivable time, and in the event the attack by the U.S. 28th Division was repulsed.

One aspect of war gaming that deserves consideration is the question of who should "play" the opposition. There are two schools of thought. One is that for educational games, it is all right to have some U.S. students play the opposition because by doing so, they will come to appreciate the capabilities and limitations of opposition forces. The second view is that a U.S. player playing opposition forces will probably make his decisions like a U.S. player, but it is important that students playing Blue confront an opposition player who is closer to what the opposition would really do. Therefore, a Naval Operational Intelligence Center Detachment has been formed here to play the opposition in most war games. The members of this detachment try hard to give the players a true representation of the way the intelligence community feels that the Soviets (or other game opponents) will operate their forces.

Nowadays we have computers to support war games at several levels of interaction. Ships have a computer game call Navtag (for Naval Tactical Game) to sharpen the tactical skills of surface warfare officers—usually in simulated close tactical situations between U.S. and potential enemy ships and aircraft. The war-gaming computer here and at the tactical training groups can play more units than Navtag can, but they are still played at the detail level: individual ships and aircraft, together with their weapon systems, including individual missiles and torpedoes.

At the highest level is a computer called the RAND Strategy Assessment System that for ground warfare uses entire divisions as the basic pieces on

the board. The game was developed only after computer programs had been developed to play the roles of policymakers of the Soviet Union and the United States, each in a doctrinal way, using programs called Ivan and Sam. After Ivan and Sam were developed, it was discovered that no computer game existed where the forces were aggregated at a high enough level, so the RAND game was developed.

Recreational computer games seem to be useful for educational purposes, but they do raise the question as to whether the extent of the game designer's wisdom places a ceiling on how much a player can learn. I am inclined to think that players can really learn more than the designer put into the game, but this may be a controversial view. We have experimented a little with such games. While some are based on past battles or current military situations set, for example, in the North Atlantic and using relatively simple models, others are more abstract. One involves the capturing of flags and will play an opposition that replicates the decision-making style of Napoleon, Genghis Khan, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu—your choice.

What conclusions can be drawn from all this?

First, the great utility of gaming is that it permits us to see events "longitudinally," that is, to follow a long sequence of decisions and actions in a way that our minds are usually unable to grasp without some such aid.

Second, gaming can undermine one's sense of the inevitability of historic outcomes—that the British will always win at the Falklands, that the Soviets will always back down in a Cuban Missile Crisis, and so forth. At the War College some of the games are played ten to twelve times. Starting from the same initial disclosure, using the same forces, playing by the same rules, often with the identical umpires in opposition, the games result in widely varying outcomes. During these games we can sometimes sense the shift in momentum, the different turning points, and realize that history is only one pass through events; there could have been many other outcomes, things could well have turned out quite differently.

Third, the value of computers in war gaming is not entirely clear. Computers are indeed proving useful by keeping track of things, by generating graphic displays, and by saving calculation time, but they can also consume a lot of time for inputs. They also allow us to restart or repeat scenarios and give us an ability to do some reconstruction of actual engagements. The speed and repeatability of computers can be very useful. But we are stuck with whatever limitations exist in either the data or the programs, and there is an understandable uneasiness that we might not agree with the data or programs if we ever really learned everything they contain. These problems are not dissimilar from problems of computer applications generally. The real concern about computers, I suppose, is that they drive us into details. A great deal of effort is often made to achieve "fidelity" between the capabilities

of forces being played and the capabilities of real forces. Yet much more variability exists in the way that decisions are being made at the several levels and on both sides.

Finally, and this should be no surprise, human beings still dominate in war gaming—people are the players, people are the umpires, and people program the computers. The psychology of combat—the determination and leadership of commanders at all levels—really determines outcomes. Good war games emphasize these factors. A war game is, after all, a bit of theater. A good umpire will make reports to the players that emphasize uncertainties. I once overheard an umpire reporting to the players in the landing force commander's cell as follows: "My company commanders keep reporting that they're being shot at by some 155's. I don't know, shells always look bigger when they're coming at you. Anyway, that's what they're reporting."

Let me close by quoting from Stephen Vincent Benet's *John Brown's Body* on the difference between war games and real war:

If you take a flat map
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.
The science of war is moving live men like blocks.
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks
And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies
Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush,
They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries,
And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them.
—A string of blocks curling smoothly around the left
Of another string of blocks and crunching it up—
It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind,
But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow
To move, when they start they take too long on the way—
The General loses his stars and the block-men die
In unstrategic defiance of martial law
Because still used to just being men, not block-parts.

¹This article is adapted from a talk given by Captain Snyder to the Quindecim Club of Newport, Rhode Island on 21 March 1989.

Ethics Instruction in the Military: Teach Them Plato or Hammer It into Their Heads

Joseph G. Brennan

How should ethics instruction be incorporated into military education and how can it be implemented at all levels of the military? What are the military virtues and how can they be inculcated? These two questions, proposed as themes for discussion at the 1987 Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE), raise some questions of their own. A tiresome pedant might be heard complaining that the first question begs itself, for it assumes what is to be proven: that ethics instruction *should* be incorporated into military education and, further, that it *should* be included at all levels of the military. It may be that ethics *qua* ethics should not be incorporated into military education or perhaps only at some levels of the profession. Or it may be that whatever is denoted by the term "ethics" should follow from the very nature and character of competent military education and training at all levels of the services, and should not be inserted as a separate unit of instruction.

The second question, "What are the military virtues and can they be inculcated?" has two parts, each legitimate, at least by tradition. Military virtues commonly cited include courage, skill, honor, obedience, loyalty, and integrity. Audacity and cunning are not usually listed, though they appear to be qualities of successful commanders, from Nelson to Rommel, the latter not called "the Desert Fox" for nothing. Perhaps they are not moral virtues. In any case, traditional military virtues—courage, honor, obedience, and loyalty—are also found in civilian life, though without the corporate character and tension lent by military commitment.

Tradition tells us that while it is possible to teach virtues, it is difficult to do. Aristotle reminds us that we are not born with virtues but are fitted

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by nature to receive them, and that habit, the result of practice, completes and fulfills this ability.¹ Plato is more skeptical, at least in the *Meno*. There he says that the question "Can virtue be taught?" cannot be answered at present, and we had better concede, for the moment at least, that virtue is a quality divinely endowed, that some have it and some do not.² But we know that the *Meno* is only a curtain raiser to the *Republic*, in which Plato constructs a model state. Its purpose is to look closely at human nature and to illumine the meaning of Justice, the virtue of virtues. Such a paradigm, Plato tells us, is incomplete without a program of education and training in the virtues or excellences, including the philosophical, the political, and the military.

Thomas Jefferson believed that we are indeed endowed by nature with a moral sense. In a letter written from Paris in 1787 to his nephew Peter Carr, the great Virginian asserted that we come into the world equipped with a moral sense just as we are born with muscles and sinews. Some humans, by constitution, have greater physical strength than others. So, too, we possess moral discrimination in greater or lesser degree. But, he adds, strong or weak, our moral sense can be developed, strengthened by exercise, just as we can build up our muscles by using them.³

Our century has seen the growth of positivist distrust of pretensions to ethical instruction. In his little book of 1938, *Language, Truth, and Logic*—a book that scared the daylights out of the philosophical profession—the late A.J. Ayer declared that morality is not a subject like geology or art history; that there is no such thing as an authoritative guide to moral judgment of which the philosopher can acquire mastery; that as far as the conduct of life is concerned, he has no professional advantage over anyone else.⁴

But leaders of public affairs in the United States today almost unanimously insist that virtue can and should be taught, particularly in the nation's public schools. They call it instruction in "values," by which they mean moral values. "Values" alone will not do, for we entertain many values that have nothing directly to do with ethics or morality. As long ago as 1925, in his novel *Babbitt*, Sinclair Lewis demonstrated that to the average American male, a supreme value is his automobile.

Assuming instruction in values to mean moral values, we find that everyone in authority today, including the U.S. military, is for it. In August 1986, Governor Mario Cuomo of New York declared that the nation's public schools had abandoned this important responsibility and that he was drawing up proposals to restore the teaching of "values."⁵ Two weeks later the *New York Times* carried a lengthy front page story announcing that American public schools are indeed putting new emphasis on the teaching of moral values.⁶ The values cited ranged from patriotism to "how to be a winner." A teacher in Oxford, Ohio's Talawanda High School calls her pupils' attention to the line of Polonius in *Hamlet*, "To thine own self be true. . . ." (possibly omitting the caution that no man was ever truer to himself than Genghis Khan).⁷

There is considerable data available on the teaching of "values," data based on the research of psychologists investigating the moral realm. For years the late Professor Kohlberg of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, following Piaget, maintained that children learn moral behavior in stages.⁸ Nothing appeals more to American readership than things that happen in "stages," whether it be explanation of the onset of adolescence or resigning oneself to one's final fate. More recently, another Harvard psychologist, Professor Jerome Kagan, stated that brain development guides the moral sense of a child, that children distinguish right from wrong shortly before the age of two. A toddler who has been bashing playmates, Professor Kagan holds, generally quits before age two when "empathy" for others is first felt.⁹ Two centuries before Professor Kagan's finding, that old cognitive psychologist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, noticed the same thing, thus supporting Kagan's belief that we come into the world with two inborn tendencies, one to self-love, the other to sympathy for those not ourselves.

Turning to the U.S. military, we find that the highest authorities have declared themselves in favor of ethics education for those under their command. Chief of Staff John Wickham, Jr., U.S. Army, announced the Army theme for 1986 to be simply "Values." Making clear that this enterprise should not be lightly regarded, however difficult it might be to achieve, the army's leadership set forth the purpose of this theme as follows:

To reaffirm to the American public our commitment to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

To reaffirm the professional Army ethic . . . which supports our national values.

To increase understanding and commitment to the professional Army ethic and personal values which support the Army way of life.

To stress the ethical elements of leadership.

To foster a common bond built on service to our nation and our Army.¹⁰

Throughout 1986, Admiral James B. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, devoted much of his time and energy in that last year of his tour to advocating and implementing a comprehensive upgrading of the navy's commitment to excellence, including personal ethical awareness. Under the banner of excellence, Admiral Watkins aimed to upgrade the quality of professional skill and moral consciousness of the navy at all levels. This project emerged from his commitment to strengthen the ethical fibre of the navy, which would in turn strengthen the nation it serves.

In the spring of 1986, Admiral Watkins sent a delegation of officers to the Naval War College for advice and help in preparing a "Code of Ethics" suitable for all navy personnel. The president of the college appointed a committee of senior faculty members, both military and civilian, to render

advice and support for this project. At the outset, the committee expressed its reluctance to draw up a "code" of ethics for the navy. Many student officers expressed the conviction that too many codes were already in effect. In this they reflected the views of Captain Richard Stratton, U.S. Navy, a former Vietnam POW: "We are a people with a rich naval tradition and history of war at sea. We already have the basic elements of our code in the naval oath and commission, the military Code of Conduct, the Code of Ethics for Government Service, the Secretary of the Navy's Standards of Conduct, and the Navy Military Personnel Manual."¹¹

Nevertheless, the committee accepted its assignment as a matter of duty, insisting only that the product not include the word "code" in its title. The finished document, "The Navy Uniform" (attached to this paper as Appendix A), did not become the CNO's final choice. A simpler (and better) product was selected: "The Sailor's Creed." (See Appendix B.)

The call for teaching ethics in the U.S. military services puzzles many in the military services of other nations. When questioned on the matter, a representative of Britain's Royal Navy replied, "Above all, don't write anything down." A naval officer of a prominent Middle East country recently asked the writer, "What is this thing—ethics?" He had a perfectly good command of the English language and did not want to be treated to a dictionary definition. What he was looking for was some clue as to why the armed services of the most powerful nation in the world needed training in ethics. The officer came from a strict and highly structured religious background which governed even the details of his daily life. By contrast, the call to encourage and teach ethics in the U.S. military is due, in part, to the weakened structure of religion and the family unit in our society.

There are some nations that do not have this problem, at least not so acutely. In a recent seminar discussion section of the Naval War College's elective course "Foundations of Moral Obligation," an officer of the Royal Danish Navy was asked what his service did to support ethical standards and values. Was there, perhaps, a Danish naval or military honor code? The officer replied that his service expected no more than the common decency that new naval personnel, officers and enlisted alike, brought with them from Danish civilian life. He summarized the basic rules: "Don't lie. Don't steal. Don't get drunk—more than once a week." He was, of course, making his point by simplification. There is, he said, training in the tradition of the Danish navy, but this is standard instruction. He recalled no separate attempt to inculcate ethical values or to formulate honor codes. We can see why the Danish officer's navy could dispense with anxiety about ethics. His country and culture are, respectively, small and homogeneous, backed by a strong national tradition. The Danish flag, with its white cross on a red field, first appeared to King Waldemar in the 13th century and is meaningful to every Danish citizen (though they seem not to think or talk about it much).

By contrast, we Americans live in a very large country with a great and variegated population representing an ever-increasing ethnic mix that is, in large part, though not entirely, urban. Large segments of this mix, through no fault of their own, are poor, semiliterate, of single-parent family or no family at all. Many of these completely lack a sense of social cohesiveness, save for those characteristics of an underclass which must make do with only a primitive instinct for survival. But this section of the U.S. population is not the only one in which serious erosion of national cohesiveness is apparent. Many segments of the middle class feel the effects of diminution or outright cancellation of family and religious ties. With no disrespect to his Roman Catholic upbringing and loyalty, a retired naval officer, now pursuing the life of a scholar, answered a question posed to him at a cocktail party: "What sort of man would you want to have beside you in combat today?" His answer: "A Marine who is a Southern Baptist."

It is not the responsibility of the U.S. military, however, to set right the social ills of American society. We have experienced disruptive troubles before and have survived them pretty well. No prophecy of doom, then. Nor should the military services be expected to be "character factories," such as those described by Michael Rosenthal in his book of that title about the founding of the Boy Scout movement (wherein Lord Robert Baden Powell, its founder, set up a remarkably effective program for "character development," which meant inculcating British youth of the lower classes with the public school ideals of honor, duty, self-sacrifice, and obedience to authority).¹²

Yet, we do expect that the military services will do *something* for the young men and women whom they have in their charge, albeit for a limited time. Even the long outmoded choice of "Jail or the army!" held a thorn of truth. A tour in the service, however rough the attendant knocks, promised structure and discipline to a life that knew nothing of them. In 1900 a prominent citizen of Yonkers, Dr. Benjamin Stilwell, learned that his son Warren was one of a group of boys who raided the senior dance of Yonkers High School. Young Stilwell and his comrades had made off with tubs of ice cream and cake after repelling the defense, in the course of which action the high school principal was inadvertently slugged. Dr. Stilwell had chosen Yale for his son, but this incident convinced him that discipline was needed and that his son must go into the army. So Warren Joseph Stilwell was sent not to Yale but to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Thus, the nation gained a general who made a name in a theatre of war where there was little ice cream and less cake.¹³

An army officer who served in the army studies group that, among other duties, advised General John A. Wickham, Jr. on the 1986 Army White Paper, "Values: The Bedrock of our Profession," writes, "A great deal of what is going on has to do with our senior leadership being struck by a blinding flash

of the obvious. They seem to have figured out that when the Army brings 135,000 youngsters in each year and sends almost the same number away each year, the issue of what those youngsters value has significance with respect to how they serve, how they learn, and how they remember their Army service." He adds that there is absolute sincerity and concern by the army chief of staff and the secretary of the army, and that there is great benefit in having the army discuss and teach moral values.¹⁴

There is, of course, this difficulty: How do you teach ethical values within the education and training system of the military services? How do we avoid preaching, decked out as ethical instruction, much of which consists in reiterating good words like "integrity"? How to avoid the boredom that comes rolling in like a Newport fog when the beleaguered instructor is told that he must insert a unit on "ethics" into his leadership course? "Ethics," writes Captain Dick Stratton, "do not lend themselves to print like ordnance instructions or training manuals."¹⁵ How does one avoid the free-for-all bull sessions that so often result when the method of ethics instruction consists of "case studies"?

How does one avoid presenting ethics as if it were a branch of psychology or an appendix to a business or management course? The *reductio ad absurdum* of the latter may be nicely illustrated by the statement of a corporation executive (who shall be nameless), alumnus of an "ethics" seminar laid on by his conscientious company: "We got a lot of mileage out of Kant's categorical imperative; since we've tightened up on treating our employees as ends, not as means, our productivity has increased twenty percent."

To shift gears, let us admit that there is no such thing as free-floating ethics. Except for the madness of anarchic armed conflict in the world today—and that is a large exception—there is a fair amount of agreement among humans about basic decencies. Those who say that morality is simply the expression of the values of a culture (and a lot of it is, but not all of it) should remember that the two greatest moral teachers of the West—Jesus and Socrates¹⁶—were indicted, tried, and condemned to death on the charge that they endangered the moral and religious values of their respective cultures. "Free-floating ethics" does not mean some sort of ethical relativism but rather the attempt to present instruction in moral values without grounding those values in something more comprehensive than themselves, some tradition, some complex of beliefs wider than the ethical doctrine itself.¹⁷ One may object that this denies the sovereignty of the moral realm—a position Kant so ably defended—the unconditioned Ought, doing one's duty not in hope of reward but because it is one's duty. But Kant himself drew his teaching of moral autonomy from his belief in the existence of a universally shared rationality and his conviction of the absolute nature of good will.

The Kantian doctrine is admirable and has always had an appeal for the military. Count Gerhard von Scharnhorst, founder of the Prussian General Staff,

made the study of Kant compulsory in L'Ecole Militaire, the Prussian war college he founded. But here again, what we have is a small, relatively homogeneous body—the Prussian officer corps, which, before its breakup in World War II and the years immediately preceding, numbered a majority of strict Christian Protestants who viewed the ethic of duty for duty's sake as the superior opposite of the merchant ethic, which they believed held the right and the good to be that which led to commercial profit.

For an individual who is not a member of a dedicated body of some kind, it requires a highly pulled-together Self to do one's duty simply for duty's sake. For such integrated characters as Socrates and William James, to know the good was to do it. The rest of us need a push, a little support, more than a little, and the most effective way of getting this backup is real, not nominal, membership in a corporate body, a commitment to some belief, some faith deeply held, a unity of some larger whole that has our trust and loyalty. So for a U.S. Marine, it is useless to shoehorn a two-lesson ethics unit into his training program in the belief that it will significantly increase his awareness of the evils of stealing or of shooting unarmed prisoners or civilians. If he brings to the corps his Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, conservative Jewish, even secular humanist convictions, deeply held, we will not have to worry much about him. But whether he is one of that sort or not, the training he receives as a marine tells him that he is a member of a coherent corporate body and that certain stern expectations as to how he is to carry himself follow from this membership. "A marine does not steal. You're a marine! Do you get it, mister, or do I have to hit you over the head?" Back of the baleful glare of the drill instructor stands the tradition of the corps. When a smart young recruit or second lieutenant asks his mentor if this or that rule of the Code of Conduct has the force of law or is just a guideline, he is brusquely informed that such distinctions are not the issue at this point in his training: "You're a marine! Do it! Understand?"

Here again, we find in the Marine Corps a relatively small body, which is an advantage conducive to a dynamic esprit de corps not entirely enjoyed by the other services. Consider the many avenues by which a man or woman can enter the officer corps of the navy and the consequent uncertainty of their commanders as to what they have brought with them by way of ethical ballast. The Naval Academy, OCS, NROTC—all are routes to commissions for qualified men and women, in addition to various gateways open to staff: chaplains, judge advocates, doctors, plus certain administrative positions that carry a commission with them. Will 16 weeks of navy indoctrination, or even 16 months, make a proper naval officer out of a male gynecologist who hates women?

The Army White Paper of 1986, "Values: The Bedrock of the Profession," may have its preachy side, but it is nevertheless one of many signs that the army is working hard to forge some sense of unity out of a bewildering

plurality, a unity needed to make its youngsters good soldiers and maybe better citizens than they were before they entered the service. The rusty old notion that sending a boy into the military may improve his character has a bit of folk wisdom behind it which is still applicable today. For the kid who has lived only within a social environment without structure, the idea that he might profit by military service has substantial merit. So too, *mutatis mutandis*, does Admiral Watkins' farewell effort toward an all-navy excellence in which the moral dimension will not be forgotten in the striving for professional/technical competence. The sensible Swiss (Switzerland does not have an army; it is an army!) see that their offspring, whether sons of bankers or Alpine peasants, do their annual military service and do it well. "It doesn't do a young man of good family any harm," says a high ranking Swiss officer, "to get shouted at a little."¹⁸

In the end, the argument of this paper amounts to this: Military service, though no moral panacea, has done and will continue to do something of benefit to the character of those who serve. Benefit of ethical quality will follow from well-organized, well-planned, well-staffed education and training. Even more will it follow from the total experience we call service in the armed forces. What measure of ethical value we can hope for—be it small or great—will take care of itself by way of transmission from the general to the particular, from the more to the less comprehensive, from the good of the service's mission as a whole to the good of its parts. What will *not* succeed is separate instruction in ethics that is compulsory, that has an official character. This brings puzzlement and boredom. At undergraduate academies and in the service graduate schools like the war colleges, courses in ethics *qua* ethics may do much good, may fulfill a need long felt on the part of many officers, provided that these courses remain elective and not required. Such courses will be particularly effective if they are broadly grounded in the tradition of the humanities as a whole, not tied to psychology or business management as appendices, not simply offered as abstract ethical distinctions or free-for-all case studies. A problem here may be where to find instructors who are military and humanists, the latter in the old sense of the word; but they do exist. Philosophy—*a fortiori*, moral philosophy—comes from the mind and heart of a man or woman experiencing the world, confronting moral choice. Whether it be Socrates, Augustine, Wittgenstein, or Simone Weil, moral philosophy is not simply doctrine and precept, but a lived life, and that should, if at all possible, not be neglected in its presentation.

By way of epilogue we might remember the caution of G.E. Moore, one of the three most influential philosophers of the Anglo-American tradition of our century: "It appears to me that in Ethics as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which history is full, are due to a very simple cause, namely to the attempt to answer questions without first discovering *what* question it is which you desire to answer."¹⁹

What questions are we raising when we talk about education in ethics for the military profession? Is our concern limited to personal ethics—one does not lie, cheat, steal; one strives for personal honesty and authenticity; one avoids bad faith? Or do we also raise the question of the commensurability or incommensurability of personal ethics with that of the nation—any nation, including our own—conducting its foreign policy? We do not need Barbara Tuchman to tell us what we know already—that throughout history, nations have rarely conducted their foreign policy according to the rules of personal morality. How do we justify injunctions not to lie or deceive as soldiers or sailors when deception is a standard tool in working to ensure a nation's security, its value a function of its success in protecting this security?

If we do not know *what* questions we are asking about ethics and the teaching of ethics, our inquiry into it may have a shaky foundation or none at all. Then we will be like the legendary Irishman who, carried to a banquet in his honor in a sedan chair with no bottom, said, "Faith, if it wasn't for the honor of the thing, I might as well have come on foot."

Appendix A

The Navy Uniform

You wear the Navy uniform.

That means a lot to your country, your service, yourself.

It means **KNOWING THE JOB**.

Professional competence comes first. Without skilled men and women, the Navy cannot carry out its mission. That mission is to defend the nation at the risk of death.

It means **COMMITMENT TO DUTY**.

To serve for pay is good.

To serve for travel, education, and training is better.

To serve for love of country and comrades is best.

It means **COMMITMENT TO LEADERSHIP**.

Leadership consists of those qualities of skill and character that command respect and cause others to follow loyally and willingly. It, in turn, requires fairness, a reluctance to ask more than you yourself would give, a sense of justice.

It means **HONESTY**.

If you wear the Navy uniform, you don't lie; you don't cheat; you don't steal. If you lead others, those in charge are watching you and noting your example. The way you act, officer or enlisted, means "I'm saying that everybody should do this. I'm not making an exception of myself."

It means **COURAGE**.

You must also have courage, both moral and physical, for it is the virtue on which the exercise of all other virtues depends. You must have the courage to fight. You must have the strength of character to say "no" to what is wrong, to persevere in what is right no matter how difficult the task becomes, and, even to face pain and death in defense of the things you value and love, should honor and duty demand. Yours is not an easy commitment, but a worthy and noble one.

It means **LOYALTY**.

To let those over you know that they have your support. To show those in your charge you will go to bat for them, never asking them to do something you would not do yourself.

Sometimes loyalties conflict. You must choose. Never mistake loyalty for doing wrong to help someone out, even if he is your superior.

It means **OBEDIENCE**.

Obedience requires that you carry out the lawful orders of your superiors, as we are all pledged to do, with pride and determination.

It means COMMITMENT TO THE BEST. For the Navy, for comrades, for self. We give what we have. We do what we can. We commit the highest in us to the service.

For the Navy, only the best is enough.

Always to excel.

Always to be the best.

Appendix B

The Sailor's Creed

I have chosen to serve in the United States Navy. America depends on my performance for her survival, and I accept the challenge to set my standards high, placing my country's well-being above self-interest.

- I will be loyal to my country, its Constitution and laws, and to my shipmates.
- I will be honest in my personal and professional life and encourage my shipmates to do the same.
- I will, to the best of my ability, do the right thing for its own sake, and I am prepared to face pain or death in defense of my country.
- I will be a professional, wearing my uniform with pride and accepting responsibility for my actions.
- I will set excellence as my standard and always strive for ways to make me a better sailor and my crew a better crew.

Notes

1. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. II, pp. 1, 18-26.
2. Plato, *Meno*, pp. 70a; 99c-100c.
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, Paris, 10 August 1787, in M.D. Peterson, ed., *The Portable Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Viking, 1975), pp. 424-425.
4. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, rev. ed. (London: Gollannz, 1948), ch. VI, "Critique of Ethics and Theology." But the actual passage cited is taken from Ayer's *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1982, p. 15.
5. Jefferson Schmalz, "Cuomo Plans Effort to Get Schools to Return to Teaching of Values." *The New York Times*, 29 August 1986, pp. 1, 88.
6. Edward S. Fiske, "U.S. Schools Put More Stress on Teaching of Moral Values," *The New York Times*, 15 September 1986, p. 1, 88. See also Education Supplement, *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 1987, "Moral Education: Has 'Values Neutrality' Left Students Adrift?"
7. The Spring 1988 presidential election campaign in France was carried on in the vocabulary of "values" [*valeurs*]. President Francois Mitterand said, "The love of France should invite us to reunite around the values that are ours—those of the people in its immense majority." Ultraconservative candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen said, "The political center of gravity has strongly moved toward our values." Interior Minister Charles Pasqua urged support of "a strong France, big families, the respect for moral values. . . ." *The New York Times*, 4 May 1988, p. A14. In the first of two television debates between U.S. presidential candidates Vice President George Bush and Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis (25 September 1988), the Vice President referred to the "deterioration of values" in the nation, adding "And one of the things that I think we should do about it in terms of cause is to instill values into the young people in our schools." *The New York Times*, 26 September 1988, p. A16.
8. Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981). See also Barry Chazan, *Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education*, (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University), pp. 71-75.
9. Jerome Kagan, *The Nature of the Child*, New York: Basic Books, 1984. See review in *Time*, 22 October 1984, p. 97.
10. *Army Game Plan*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1986, p. 1.
11. Captain Richard A. Stratton, U.S. Navy (Ret.) "Where's Our Code of Ethics?" *Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1986, p. 83.
12. Michael Rosenthal, *Character Factory: Baden Powell's Boy Scouts and the Imperatives of Empire* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
13. Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1941-45* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 12-13.

14. "Values: The Bedrock of Our Profession," *Army White Paper*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1986.


15. Stratton, p. 83.

16. Objection: this flat statement ignores Mohammed and the powerful moral teaching of Islam based on the Qur'an. True, but the author takes refuge in the ambiguity of the term "West," knowing well that Christianity, as well as Islam, had an "Eastern" origin.

17. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

18. John A. McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde Suisse* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1984), p. 67.

19. G.E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, (1903), (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951), p. viii.



"If your morals make you dreary, depend upon it, they are wrong. I do not say give them up, for they may be all you have, but conceal them like a vice lest they should spoil the lives of better and simpler people."

Robert Louis Stevenson
Across the Plains (1892)

The Public and National Security Policy

Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, U.S. Army (Retired)

My aims are, first, to set in perspective the role of the public in the national security policy-making process; second, using available polling data, to summarize the substance of public attitudes toward major national security issues just prior to the Bush presidency; and finally, to draw together process and substance in the form of observations and unanswered questions as we view an uncertain future.

A good way to begin is to summarize the diverse elements involved in the process of national security policy-making.¹ Then we can examine a relevant historical case: the Eisenhower administration and the New Look. Granted that all historical analogies are unique, they still give a bedrock of reality on which to discuss the present and to conjecture on the future.

There are, moreover, other compelling reasons for using the Eisenhower period in discussing the process of policy-making. The case is comparatively recent, the 1950s; yet it is well documented—much more so than the Reagan period will be for years to come. It is also more applicable than are comparable cases in the 1960s and 1970s, which were driven by the Vietnam War. Most important, the case is concerned explicitly with national security policy formulation that emphasizes budgetary constraints, a vital consideration for military and civilian policymakers alike in the 1990s.

This is followed by a discussion of the Congress' changing role in national security policy-making. It is dramatically different from what it was in the Eisenhower period and is still changing. The way that Congress, beginning in the 1970s, resurged in the policy-making process is stunning, both in pace and breadth. Whether viewed as good or ill, this aggressive role raises important issues as to the future role of the public because of the public's symbiotic relationship with Congress.

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An Overview

In the process of national security policy-making, there are four participating elements: presidential, bureaucratic, congressional, and nonelected. The latter includes the media, special-interest groups, and the public, or more precisely, the publics.

Responsibility and authority for formulating and implementing national security policy begins with the president. This stems, of course, from his constitutional authority, whether explicit, implied, or prerogative. Other sources of presidential power depend in degree on the president himself and the times in which he serves, for example, his participation in the legislative process, his political skills, and his ability to capture public attention and support through the media.

The president's immediate staff and advisers constitute another presidential power center. Though their power is derived from the president and depends on his support, they obviously exercise power in their own right. Of particular interest here for our purposes are the Assistant for National Security Affairs and the director of the Office of Management and Budget.

In the area of national security policy the key presidential appointees are the secretaries of Defense and State and, in a different way, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. These officials are both presidential and cabinet officers in the sense that they simultaneously represent the president and their departments or agencies. Their power, though again derived from the president, also exists by virtue of the offices they hold and the bureaucracies over which they preside. If they are able to win over their own fiefdoms, their power will be commensurately greater. The bureaucracies themselves also wield power by making policy—for example, they interpret legislation as well as assist the president in formulating and proposing legislation.

The struggle between the president and Congress over who has the dominant position in determining policy and conducting foreign and national security affairs is as old as the Constitution. There have been periods when one or the other branch was dominant. During the Eisenhower administration, the case to be described shortly, one would conclude after analysis that Congress had only a negligible role in forming national security policy. This judgment would be wide of the mark in today's polity. Hence, following a description of the Eisenhower case is a section relevant to present political realities, entitled "A Changing Congressional Role."

As for nonelected participants in the policy-making process, I am restricting my comments to two: the media and the public.² We are primarily concerned here with only that news media, such as *The New York Times*, that both select the news to be reported and comment upon it. They play a significant role by first defining the agenda of the political process and then helping to form

public attitudes. Besides forming public opinion, the news media play other roles with regard to the executive branch: they carry its message to the public, and they keep the president in public view.³

The public itself is an element in national security policy formulation. Everyday citizens influence and are influenced by the president, Congress, and the media. Although public opinion tends to be tentative and defers to the judgment of government leaders in national security affairs more than in domestic issues, it does react to international events and sometimes even leads policy-makers, as in the case of Vietnam.

Though we cannot treat them separately in this article, there are, in fact, many publics in the area of national security; in increasing size and decreasing knowledge, they can be described as the influential public, the knowledgeable public, and the general public. Presumably the influential and knowledgeable publics are of greatest influence.

A Historical Case: The Eisenhower Administration

During his 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower made two major promises: to end the Korean War and to reduce the budget. The two were related because ending the war, which he did within six months of taking office, was a prerequisite for reducing the budget. But he needed to do more. To reduce the overall budget from \$74 billion during the fiscal year he took office to \$70 billion the next year and to \$60 billion the following year, he had to pare the defense budget further. This meant taking a close look at the kind of strategy the United States was going to pursue in the post-Korean War period.

In his memoirs Eisenhower tells us what his concepts were when he came to the Oval Office. He wanted to rely on deterrence and to rule out preventive war; to stress the role of nuclear technology, reducing reliance on U.S. conventional force; to place heavy reliance on Allied land forces around the Soviet periphery; to stress economic strength, especially through reduced defense budgets; and to be prepared to continue the struggle with the U.S.S.R. over decades.⁴ His problem was to blend these strategic views into a credible strategy that could be implemented at a fairly low cost and be sold both to the American public and to America's allies. To accomplish this objective the president used organizational means, careful selection of key appointees, his long experience in handling bureaucracies, and his great rapport with the American people, on which he depended during major challenges to his policies.

At the apex of the defense and foreign policy process, Eisenhower restructured the National Security Council, transforming it into a formal organization with formal procedures, but balancing this with informal organization and procedure. In practice, he placed even more emphasis on

informal meetings and briefings on defense-related matters, and the number of such meetings was rather substantial.

By July 1953, Eisenhower felt that it was time for his newly appointed service Chiefs to take a look at U.S. strategic policy. He asked them to come up with an agreed-upon paper on overall defense policy for the indefinite future. This paper was the first step toward what subsequently became known as the New Look, which the president later defined as "first a reallocation of resources among the five categories of forces, and second, the placing of greater emphasis than formerly on the deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, better means of delivery, and effective air-defense units."⁵

The Chiefs of Staff were able to agree on a basic paper of strategic premises and guidelines, but translating these generalities into specifics for the fiscal year 1955 defense budget was another matter. Reasoning that there was no change in the perceived threat, or in alliance commitments, and no new guidance on the employment of nuclear weapons, they decided that no substantial changes could be made in the defense budget of \$42 billion.

It fell to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, to defend the service Chiefs' premises before the National Security Council (NSC). Radford centered his presentation at the 13 October 1953 NSC meeting on the nature of presidential guidance for employment of nuclear weapons. His message, which was to have very significant results, was that if the use of nuclear weapons from the outset of a conflict was accepted as a planning premise, then a less costly force structure could be developed.

Admiral Radford's premise led to a subsequent NSC session on 29 October, at which the president approved NSC-162/2, the policy basis of the New Look. The paper placed maximum reliance on nuclear weapons from the outset of a conflict. Radford's talk of 13 October had been entirely on his own; neither the army nor the navy had agreed with the new NSC policy on nuclear war. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, with Radford's help, was able to get qualified agreement from Army Chief Matthew B. Ridgway and Navy Chief Robert B. Carney, and to use the new policy to get the defense budget down to a level acceptable to Eisenhower and the secretary of the treasury.

Congress examined the New Look during hearings on the fiscal year 1955 defense budget. Members offered no challenge to the concept and almost none to the particulars. The administration's image of unanimity on the Eisenhower strategy remained intact during the hearings, despite the misgivings Army Chief Ridgway voiced about the administration's lack of emphasis on land forces. Floor debate was neither systematic nor informed. With the defense appropriation cleared, Eisenhower had his strategic policy.⁶

By early 1956 Congress was pressuring the administration to raise the level of defense expenditures in fiscal year 1957. No extraordinary event had occurred, but 1956 was an election year and some members of Congress wanted to impress the voters with their zeal for a greater defense effort. Pressures also came from the air force in an effort to secure additional funds for their strategic bomber force. Senator Stuart Symington, an air force proponent, obliged that spring with airpower hearings by his subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

It was in this atmosphere that Eisenhower met with Defense Secretary Charles Wilson and Chairman Radford concerning congressional probes and possible air force testimony. Ike's message to the senior military went beyond the immediate question of the air force budget, however. The president maintained that "a Chief of Staff of one service should not present just the picture of his own service . . . each man testifying must think of what other services contribute. If he can't bring himself to do this, he doesn't belong in the position he holds."⁷

In early October 1957, the Soviets orbited the first earth satellite, *Sputnik*. Its psychological and strategic impact brought on congressional and, to some extent, public pressure to increase the size of the fiscal year 1959 defense budget. The president, however, was not one to overreact, especially when it came to defense spending. To help counter public anxiety over the Soviet launchings and the attendant public commentary, the president decided to give three "confidence" speeches to the American public. His major points were that the overall military strength of the free world was greater than that of the communist countries and that the United States must be selective in expending its resources. In the end, Ike's wide public support was key, and his views on the defense budget prevailed.

As the executive preparation of the fiscal year 1960 defense budget reached its final stages, the president met in late November 1958 with his civilian defense advisers and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Nathan F. Twining. His new Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy developed the major issues and pointed out that he had reduced the service estimates by almost a billion dollars in recent months. The director of the Bureau of the Budget, Maurice Stans, agreed that the Defense Department had made substantial cuts, but said more cuts were needed in the vicinity of \$3 to \$4 billion. The president asked McElroy to look over the budget again to make additional cuts, which he did.⁸

However, by then the climate was right for Congress to try to intervene more forcefully in defense matters. Technology was in a state of flux, raising many technical and strategic questions, and few people seemed certain of the answers. The goals of the services were sufficiently far apart that it was not difficult for Congress to find points of conflict between services or between a service and the administration. Finally, the political climate created by the

congressional elections just past and the presidential election on the horizon encouraged Congress to take on the administration.

Committees in the House and Senate asked the usual questions about hardware and strategy, as well as the unusual question about who had played what part in the development of the defense budget, including the guidelines on which it was based. In these hearings, the senior military began showing in public their lack of consensus regarding the particulars of the defense budget. The most spectacular hearings that spring, though, were not those related directly to the appropriations process, but rather those conducted by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson's subcommittee.

Under the heading "Four Military Chiefs List Objections to Budget Limits," the *New York Times* of 9 March 1959 carried the story of the Chiefs' testimony before Johnson's subcommittee, as well as the written texts of their memoranda. "General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Army's Chief of Staff," it reported, "was most vehement in his comments." Meeting that same morning with JCS Chairman Twining, President Eisenhower brought up the article, which he had read. The President instructed Twining "to caution the Joint Chiefs that the military in this country is a tool and not a policy-making body; the Joint Chiefs are not responsible for high-level political decisions."⁹

Undoubtedly, these hearings were designed to be politically embarrassing to the administration, and they were. Nor was there any question as to the breakdown in consensus within the senior military. In retrospect, however, the effect of these hearings on the Eisenhower strategy and defense budget can be seen as negligible. The 1960 presidential campaign was probably the primary motivation for the hearings and from that perspective, perhaps, they were successful in setting the stage for the defense debate during the approaching national electoral struggle.

Eisenhower's basic power lay in his wide public support and, as it pertained to defense issues, the American public's perception that he was the most important military figure of that time. His success in making this power effective lay in part in the considerable time he spent as president on military matters, not because they interested him, which they did, but because he perceived them to be a vital element in carrying out his overall presidential goals and he was willing and able to carry his argument to the American public over the heads of Congress.

One of Eisenhower's successful approaches to leadership was exemplified in his dealings with the Joint Chiefs: the avoidance of public confrontation. Specifically, he sought prior agreement on issues to prevent their becoming matters of debate among the general public. In particular, his key political and military appointees had to undergo a kind of loyalty test to convince him of their willingness to support his policies.

This is one reason why Eisenhower was able to permit vigorous debate in the NSC forum and still expect support for his decisions. His decisions

had, in many cases, already been made in smaller, informal meetings. The NSC served, however, the function of simultaneously widening the base of support for Eisenhower's decisions while clarifying his rationale to his key appointees. His employment of organizational process can be understood only in the context of an interplay between formal and small, informal groups.

One of the principal issues was the distribution of influence over the policy-fiscal dialogue between the senior military and key civilian appointees. Eisenhower solved this problem through his predilection to be, in effect, his own secretary of defense. He accomplished this operationally by dealing directly with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on strategic matters and, as is normal, directly with the secretary of defense on budgetary matters. Thus, the president became the first civilian official who dealt with all aspects of strategy and management. This will be recognized as one of the roles of the secretary of defense.

In sum, presidential-Pentagon relations in the Eisenhower administration had these characteristics: a president superbly equipped both in fact, and in his public image, to deal with military matters; a chief executive who thoroughly dominated the relationship; a continuing strengthening, through reorganization and practice, of the civilian hand, thus setting the stage for an all-powerful secretary of defense in the next administration; and a lessening influence of the senior military on major policy decisions, which began a trend that was to continue during the next decade and beyond.

From the Eisenhower case, we can infer the following conclusions that still have relevance today:

- The defense budget drives national security policy formulation, not vice versa.
- In developing the defense budget, the domestic context is more important than the external context in time of peace.
- Process is more important in developing national security policies than are the rational arguments for the policies. In this process, the president is the prime mover, and is the key to mobilizing public opinion on national security issues.

A Changing Congressional Role¹⁰

The Founding Fathers envisioned a Congress deeply involved in foreign and national security problems, although they left the precise nature of this involvement to be decided by events. The cyclical nature of congressional participation vis-à-vis the president has been an interesting topic to observers and historians ever since. For example, during the 1930s the neutralist stance of Congress in foreign affairs frustrated Roosevelt's inclination toward greater U.S. involvement in world affairs. Then, following World War II,

the powers of the president in national security affairs swelled significantly with relatively little challenge by Congress.

Executive power expanded well into the period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The high point was undoubtedly the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 7 August 1964, in which Congress voted 502 to 2, approving and supporting the determination of the president as commander in chief to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to prevent further aggression in that area. This congressional support gradually waned until Nixon's May 1970 Cambodian incursion, when the tide reversed. Then the war became the impetus for congressional resurgence in national security affairs.

Public alienation and congressional frustration over the war, combined with Nixon's Watergate-related problems, led to a large number of statutes such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which implemented greater congressional control over the budget. Their net effect was to inject Congress into national security affairs, curtailing some of the previously accepted presidential hegemony.

At the same time, other developments contributed to this congressional resurgence and its resulting complexity. For a variety of reasons a new generation arrived, especially in the House of Representatives. They were unimpressed by established procedures that emphasized party discipline and members' seniority. There was also an enormous growth in congressional staffs, permitting Congress to intrude into details in a way that had not been possible previously.¹¹ All this occurred at a time when détente between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to be eroding the previous public consensus of the cold war. The questions of what national security goals to pursue and of how to allot resources were now left open for debate.

The implications of all this for the role of Congress in national security policy-making were many and led to as yet unanswered questions. Because this body has disaggregated into a member-centered organization with a concomitant loss of party loyalty and committee leadership, and the individual members have become the recipients of enhanced resources and influence, the question of who really represents Congress and can arrive at understandings in its name, *vis-à-vis* the executive, is moot.

Through legislation that began in the 1970s, the chief processes of the congress—authorization, appropriation, and oversight—have become much more detailed and more intrusive into heretofore strictly executive procedures. Now the White House is much more accountable to Capitol Hill. The reaction of the executive branch has been ambivalent. On the one hand, the executive now has problems of coordination that are often uncomfortable; on the other hand, the question of who is responsible for given actions can be papered over. When results are less than desired, the public cannot be sure which branch should be held accountable. Each side can insist, "We didn't do it! They did."

As for the relationship of the public and Congress in national security policy-making, let us acknowledge that public opinion can play an important role. In keeping with the concept that Congress is the most representative branch of our government, many legislators believe that, by virtue of their continuous contact with the people, they have "served not only to ensure democratic control over the foreign policy-making process, but have also been the conveyors of sometimes ambivalent and occasionally vociferous public opinion."¹² This outlook provides Congress with opportunity and incentive to intrude into national security affairs on behalf of the public. Given today's resurgent Congress, the chief executive needs all the more to stay in touch with the public and should not be impressed by the congressional belief that its viewpoints are more authoritative than his on matters of public opinion.

A New Security Environment

Having looked at process, we are now ready for substance; but before considering current attitudes of the American public on security issues, we should appreciate, in an impressionistic way, the national security environment as it might be viewed by executive and legislative decision makers at the beginning of the Bush administration.

Because Moscow has achieved nuclear parity with the United States, a balance exists that makes a nuclear arms race unattractive and counterproductive. While the Soviet Union continues to pose a serious military threat, it cannot compete seriously with the West in other areas, such as economic.

The American people are gradually becoming aware that communism is not the root of all the nation's external problems. In this regard the containment concept has stopped being a unifying force in domestic politics. Replacing it is a desire for a peaceful end to the cold war, including, if possible, the solution of long-standing problems, particularly in the arms control area.

While the U.S.S.R. remains America's chief military rival, the diffusion of military technology is a growing threat to U.S. interests. It comes from several directions: China, and perhaps in time Japan, will become major military powers; even smaller countries will acquire advanced weapons and so decrease the relative military advantage of the major powers.

The postwar American economic hegemony has been replaced by a much more competitive world economy in which the U.S. position is in relative decline. Americans see this economic competition, which is primarily from their allies, as more threatening than communist ideology.

Perhaps the most important issue on the present national security agenda is Nato. Though strains and uncertainties are not unusual for that alliance, such recent events as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Gorbachev's troop reduction initiatives make current tensions in the

alliance unprecedented. These events have set countervailing forces in motion even though the basic alliance goal of deterring the Warsaw Pact remains. Gorbachev's announced cuts will put Nato leaders under increased pressure from their home fronts to make cuts in their own forces and will accelerate Western Europe's interest in détente over deterrence.

From the American point of view, the current serious budgetary crisis and worldwide security commitments, combined with the trends in Nato, will understandably bring domestic pressure to reduce the large American military forces in Western Europe. Such a condition would allow continued support of navy and air force deployments on a flexible, worldwide basis and, while not diminishing American interest in Nato, would change the way in which Nato obligations are met as one element of America's worldwide global commitments.

Public Attitudes on National Security in an Uncertain Environment

The American public appears to link American national security objectives with American economic strength and competitiveness during this beginning of the Bush administration. Furthermore, this perception is one that seems to focus less than previously upon the Soviet Union and its threat to the United States. The changing domestic and international environments have influenced these modifications. American public opinion on national security issues, however, is frequently ambivalent, highly fluid, and often contradictory, as the following discussion reflects.¹³

The Economy. The American public is emphasizing the "economic well-being" of the United States and is expressing serious doubts about the future "competitiveness" of the United States in a perceived hostile international economic environment. When asked, in November of 1988, to identify how important it was to make the United States more "competitive" in the world economy, 35 percent felt that this was "extremely important," 48 percent felt that it was "very important," and 12 percent felt that it was "somewhat important." Only 3 percent felt that it was not important.¹⁴ Americans see the U.S. economy as basically healthy, but not up to competing with other, more vigorous Western economies, especially those of West Germany and Japan. One survey found a full 50 percent of the respondents holding that the U.S. economy was "slipping dangerously" when compared to the economies of other industrialized nations.¹⁵

The public has a somewhat skeptical view of continued good economic relations between the United States and our "economic competitors." In a March 1988 survey, 68 percent felt that Japan was a "strong competitor," whereas only 36 percent felt that the United States could be described as such

an economic competitor.¹⁶ When Americans were asked whether competition from West Germany and Japan represented more of a "threat" to our future than did "communism," 45 percent of the respondents felt that it did, while 48 percent still continued to view "communism" as the main threat to U.S. national security.¹⁷ Looking specifically at the Japanese-U.S. relationship, one May 1988 survey found, significantly, that 57 percent of the respondents felt that Japan would become the "preeminent" economic power in the world.¹⁸

The public increasingly defines a strong and dynamic economy as an essential element of national security. One November 1988 survey found that 72 percent of the respondents "strongly approved" of the notion that the United States should "devote as much attention to America's economic strength as to its military strength."¹⁹ Americans also seem to view the heavy emphasis upon the military component of national security, as demonstrated in the Reagan era, as harmful to the economic side. Economic vitality is viewed by the public as having been "sacrificed." In 1983, 41 percent of the respondents of one survey felt that defense spending hurt the economy, whereas in March of 1988, 53 percent felt that this was true.²⁰ This same 1988 survey showed that large numbers of Americans associated military spending with budget deficits, tax increases, and lower spending on health and social programs.

The Military. The public appears to be having a difficult time justifying high defense spending in a "hostile" international economic environment. The public seems to be asking both the President and Congress to use shortcuts where possible, in order to keep military costs down without hurting U.S. military preparedness. Approving of the buildup of the Reagan era, Americans seem to believe, nevertheless, that this buildup to date is sufficient. It is noteworthy that, though more aware of the economic imperative, the public is not yet demanding decreases in defense spending.

There is a feeling that the United States pays too much for the defense of its allies and that the reliance of allies upon American support is simply "not just." And there is a corollary to this feeling: because of the American allies' "inadequate" efforts on their own behalf, they are reaping substantial economic benefits from their low level of spending. This, in turn, hurts the economic national security interest of the United States by giving the "economic competitor" a further advantage. In terms of persuading American allies to pay a greater share of their own defense, a November 1988 survey found that 35 percent of the respondents felt that this was "extremely important," 44 percent felt that it was "very important," and 15 percent felt that this was only "somewhat important."²¹

Negotiations and arms-control agreements, according to the American public, may afford an acceptable means of reducing the size of the defense budget. With certain qualifications, arms control is a very popular issue with

the American public. One qualification is that such agreements be "testing exercises," allowing the United States to judge Soviet intentions over the course of time.²² Success or failure of these testing agreements would figure strongly in the negotiation of future agreements. These testing agreements are to be cautious in their nature; that is, they are not to be built upon "trust," but rather upon a direct and unambiguous "verification," such as could be obtained by having American inspectors working within Soviet territory.²³ With this said, Americans seem to be seeking substantial gains from this process. A recent survey found that 61 percent of the respondents strongly approved of an American effort to "negotiate with [the] Soviets to eliminate all nuclear weapons," a further 21 percent "somewhat approved" of this effort, while only 14 percent expressed negative attitudes towards such an effort.²⁴ One survey found that, by a margin of 81 percent to 12 percent, the respondents wanted the strategic nuclear forces of both superpowers to be cut in half.²⁵

The Soviet Union. It is perhaps the Soviet-American relationship that will most fundamentally affect U.S. national security. The American public seems to be aware of the changing nature of the Soviet threat but is expressing great caution as to the prospect of another *détente*. Americans do not want to be fooled again and any new "*détente*" must be founded upon a more secure basis. Although continuing to express distrust of the Soviet system, Americans seem to have an increasingly positive impression of the leader of that system, General Secretary and President Mikhail Gorbachev. Changes occurring in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev have not gone unnoticed by the American public, who sees them as positive developments that, if continued, could lead to a fundamentally new relationship between the two nations.

Central to this continued warming of superpower relations is Gorbachev himself. His unprecedented popularity within the United States has generated significant public optimism concerning the Soviet-U.S. relationship, and this popularity grows with time. A late June/early July 1988 survey found that 31 percent of the respondents had a "very favorable" opinion of him, and an additional 52 percent had a "somewhat favorable" opinion of him. Only 11 percent had an unfavorable opinion.²⁶ As Gorbachev is seen as primarily responsible for the changes that have occurred in the Soviet system, he is frequently viewed as somehow at odds with this system; his struggle with it seems to increase his popularity with Americans. Significantly, a March 1988 survey found that 52 percent of the respondents felt that Soviet-U.S. relations would be adversely affected were Gorbachev to lose power within the Soviet Union.²⁷

The American public still greatly mistrusts the Soviet system itself and continues to believe that the Reagan military buildup was critical both in improving superpower relations and in protecting the United States from

potential Soviet attacks. In one survey, conducted in February 1988, 65 percent of the respondents felt that the Soviet Union "continues aggressively in pursuit of furthering the cause of communism."²⁸

For many Americans the nature of the Soviet threat has changed significantly from what it was in the early 1980s. The U.S. military buildup, the superpower summits, and the Gorbachev initiatives have brought about much of this change in the public's mind. The Soviet threat seems to have decreased significantly for the American public. ATS 5, a survey conducted between 25 April and 1 May 1988, found that 17 percent viewed the Soviet Union as a "very serious" threat to the United States, 36 percent as a "serious" threat, 32 percent as a "minor" threat, and 12 percent as "not a threat"; however, ATS 12, which was conducted at the end of 1988, found only 9 percent viewing the Soviet Union as a "very serious" threat.²⁹

A new relationship could be encouraged by common efforts made jointly by both nations to resolve common problems. Certain efforts have particularly strong public support. Three such areas are environmental pollution, the illicit drug trade, and international terrorism. Additional areas in which both nations could also cooperate include: regional trouble spots (such as the Middle East), cultural exchange programs, and the elimination of excess nuclear weapons.³⁰ Joint cooperation in these areas could, with time and other positive accomplishments, provide a more secure foundation upon which to build a new superpower relationship.

Some Observations and Questions

In considering the public and national security policy, the approach has been one of first examining the policy process itself and then the substance of relevant public views in the present environment. It is now time to bring these two strands together by way of observations and questions.

In doing this I shall restate the conclusions of the Eisenhower case as hypotheses for the present national security policy-making environment and then comment under each in terms of process and substance as appropriate. It will be useful to begin by restating in summary fashion public attitudes at the end of the Reagan period on national security issues.

- The American public recognizes that important changes are occurring in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, but their outlook remains cautious on this development.
- They approve of the defense buildup accomplished during the Reagan period but consider that to be sufficient.
- They are of the opinion that nuclear weapons are more likely to be used by terrorists or Third World states than by the superpowers.
- There is increasing public concern over American economic competitiveness.

- Finally, they no longer think primarily in terms of East-West problems, but rather of global, diffuse problems involving such matters as the demise of American economic hegemony, the deterioration of the environment, and random terrorist activities.

The defense budget drives national security policy formulation, not vice versa. This proposition says that the means (the defense budget) determines the ends (national security policy). While this should evoke no great surprise on the part of any student of the subject, it is at variance with the established process model.

Theoretically, the president and his senior advisers begin the process of the budget cycle by deciding what national security policy should be. This policy is then translated into military requirements and budgets by the executive branch and, after approval by the president, is sent to Congress for its action and eventual appropriation of funds. In actual practice, the size of the executive budget request is not related to policy directly but to budgetary ceilings the president approves. This is not wholly without logic as, in fact, national security policy is rarely defined with such precision that there can be only one interpretation of the means needed to carry it out.

Thus, in the initial Bush defense budget, the debate was not over strategy at all but over whether the defense budget should reflect a 2 percent real growth (after inflation) as President Reagan proposed, or a zero real growth (after inflation) as President Bush proposed, or some lesser figure.

When the military chiefs make their case for continued real growth, they do so in two ways. The first is to make the case for forces meeting their interpretation of policy goals. However, they also make a case addressed to the political arena in which the budget is really decided. I will take this up in the next proposition to be considered.

In developing the defense budget, the domestic context is more important than the external context in time of peace. The notion that the domestic context influences policies directed toward external events is not a new one. Thucydides noted how the external behavior of the Greek city states was frequently shaped more by what was happening at home than by actions of the other city states. This concept is particularly relevant to our own country, whose form of government encourages open debate among officials and active involvement of the people.

The present views of the American people give little reason to believe that external matters will take precedence over domestic problems. In fact, Americans today seem worried whether too great attention to national security may be hurting the economy itself. In 1983, 53 percent of Americans felt that the Reagan defense buildup had been good for the overall economy, while by 1988, the same number felt that the buildup had harmed the economy.

How does all of this square with the 40 years of cold war vigilance the United States has been through? While it would be premature to say that the public feels that the cold war is over, there is little question that most Americans think a growth in defense spending is unnecessary.

Continuing now the discussion in the previous proposition as to the service chiefs' case for continued growth of the defense budget, several public comments attributed to Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch, challenging the public views previously described, are relevant. Welch assailed "the unwarranted but still pervasive belief that defense spending is a major cause of the budget deficit." He lamented what he saw in America as two changing perceptions: that "economic competitors pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than do military adversaries," and "the military and expansionist policies of the Soviet Union have been moderated."³¹

Whether service chiefs have enough political clout today to be effective in swaying the public on defense budgets is debatable. They do, however, have their bureaucratic forums with the president and the Congress. Their effectiveness here is a question of process, to which we now turn.

Process is more important in developing national security policies than are the rational arguments for the policies. In this process the president is the prime mover and is the key to mobilizing public opinion on national security issues. Let us begin by acknowledging that, given the differences in personalities and the times and the resurgent role of Congress, no president in the foreseeable future is going to play the role on national security policy and defense budgets that Eisenhower did in the 1950s. In particular, it is unlikely that any president will have the public image or support on defense issues that General/President Eisenhower did during his White House years.

But any president is pivotal in the defense process. It is he who must make the policy and budgetary case with the Congress and, more importantly, with the public.

Effective process will also require that the Bush administration establish a genuine dialogue with Congress on the assumptions and analyses of defense issues as well as upon the policies and budgets themselves. Not an easy task, this involves restructuring the national security process at the most basic level, for example, moving economic and security decisions onto the same track.

How this will be accomplished depends at the present on George Bush. His speeches make clear that he considers Congress to have eroded presidential authority, especially on national security process. Whether he has the political power and public support to change this, or the will to accommodate, remains to be seen.

Notes

1. The policy-making process for national security, as used here, involves the functioning and relationships of governmental authorities and agencies responsible for national security policy formulation. It includes the participation of nongovernmental groups as well, such as the media, special interests, and the public itself. The process has intellectual, interpersonal, and bureaucratic components. A representative sampling of current publications summarizing the process of defense and foreign policy-making and containing detailed references would include: Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy-making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1987); John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1985).

2. Space does not allow developing the role of special-interest groups in formulating national security policy. Such groups can be defined as "any organization or coalition of organizations that attempts to influence public policy at any of the branches or levels of government," Hilsman, p. 204.

3. Doris A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), p. 238. Considering the tremendous influence wielded by the media as agenda-setters, and to some extent judges, of the political process, it is interesting to note that the really influential members constitute only nine organizations: three national television network news organizations, ABC, CBS, and NBC; two national news magazines, *Newsweek* and *Time*; the Associated Press; and three major newspapers, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*.

4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Vol. I, Mandate for Change* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 445-447.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 457.

6. NATO was brought on board at the December 1954 ministerial meeting when the NATO Council approved MC 48, making NATO's primary strategy dependent upon nuclear weapons.

7. Memorandum of Conference with the President (MCP), 5 April 1956. Pressure by the air force and its supporters had some success in securing an increase in the air force budget for fiscal year 1957, above the president's request. The army's efforts, the so-called "revolt of the colonels," involved press releases of position papers critical of the air force. Largely because of Wilson's response, this attempt to give a greater role to the army was abortive; and with the reassignment of the principals outside Washington, army tactics of this sort ceased. See E. Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon* (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 136-138.

8. MCP, 28 November 1958.

9. MCP, 9 March 1959.

10. For representative literature on this subject, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989); James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961 to 1986," *Armed Forces and Society*, no. 13, pp. 371-401; and Wallace Earl Walker, "Congressional Resurgence and the Destabilization of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Parameters*, September 1988, pp. 54-67.

11. Representative Les Aspin, as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is particularly prone to lecture the executive on both the process and substance of national security policy. See his *Searching for a Defense Strategy*, House of Representatives, September 1987 and his *What the Next President Should Know about National Defense* remarks delivered at the Science Applications International Corporation, 8 December 1988.

12. House Committee on International Relations, *Congress and Foreign Policy*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 19.

13. The explication and analysis of public attitudes in this section were done by Brent Lollis of the University of Oklahoma. He used as a basis 12 surveys done by the Americans Talk Security (ATS) project between October 1987 and December 1988. The ATS surveys were conducted by telephone and usually included about 1,000 respondents. The surveys were conducted by four organizations: Market Opinion Research, Marttila and Kiley Inc., the Daniel Yankelovich Group Inc., and the Public Agenda Foundation. Each survey was conducted by one of the organizations and reviewed by the others.

14. Americans Talk Security (ATS) 11, a survey conducted from 4-7 November 1988 and published in December 1988, p. 232.

15. ATS 3, a survey conducted from 17-24 February 1988 and published in March 1988, p. 82.

16. ATS 4, a survey conducted from 22-27 March 1988 and published in April 1988, p. 81.

17. ATS 6, a survey conducted from 24-27 May 1988 and published in June 1988, p. 143.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

19. ATS 11, p. 266.

20. ATS 3, pp. 21, 53

21. ATS 11, p. 238.

22. Daniel Yaukelovich and Richard Smoke, "America's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1988, p. 16. This article is based upon the ATS project and a Public Agenda Foundation (PAF) and Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University joint project. This latter project was conducted in five U.S. cities in "laboratories" which brought together about 200 people per city and subjected them to about three hours of professionally moderated exposure to four broad "futures" for U.S. national security policy.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

24. ATS 11, p. 262.

25. ATS 2, a survey conducted from 7-14 January 1988 and published in January 1988, p. 19.

26. ATS 7, a survey conducted from 25 June-7 July 1988 and published in July 1988, p. 115.

27. ATS 4, p. 99.

28. ATS 3, p. 25.

29. ATS 5, a survey conducted from 25 April-1 May 1988 and published in May 1988, p. 90. ATS 12, which was conducted from 10-13 December 1988 and published in January of 1989, also includes related information.

30. Yaukelovich and Smoke, p. 3; and ATS 7, p. 25.

31. *New York Times*, 30 November 1988, p. 13.

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"Democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time."

E.B. White
The Wild Flag (1946)

Nonmilitarization of the Antarctic: The Interplay of Law and Geopolitics

Christopher C. Joyner

Antarctica is the only continent on which all military activities, including tests and troop maneuvers, are formally prohibited. These extraordinary conditions effectively denote a regional zone of nonmilitarization which extends northward to encompass all circumpolar islands, ice formations, and ocean space south of 60° south latitude.¹ Consequently, not only has the continent of Antarctica—representing 10 percent (14.3 million square kilometers) of the earth's land surface—been formally declared by national governments to be an internationally nonmilitarized zone; so, too, have some 27.3 million square kilometers of circumpolar seas in the Southern Ocean been set aside as a neutralized peace preserve.² This condition of nonmilitarization in the Antarctic has prevailed for nearly three decades, sustained and upheld by uniform state practice.³

This study has three main objectives. First, it reviews the traditional geostrategic stakes associated with the Antarctic to evaluate why governments were convinced that nonmilitarization of the region was desirable and how denial of military ambitions has served mutual national interests. Second, it examines those provisions of the Antarctic Treaty that nourish nonmilitarization in order to clarify how nonmilitarization has been legally stipulated and operationally maintained. Third, it discusses the factors that have significantly contributed to making these nonmilitarization provisions function so effectively in order to extract particular lessons from the treaty's successful experience—lessons relevant for international law in general and arms control and disarmament measures in particular. The analysis concludes by addressing certain political and legal challenges which

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could unsettle the present legal regime that supports the nonmilitarization of the Antarctic.


Strategic Considerations in the Antarctic

For most states, the geopolitical and strategic value of the Antarctic has been nugatory or of only marginal significance. For certain governments, however, the Antarctic has been given prominent consideration in national security and foreign policy calculations as a result of three particular issues.



First, the southern seas have been regarded as important for transoceanic shipping. Particularly salient has been concern for preserving free transit through the Drake Passage, the main sea-lane separating Tierra del Fuego from the Antarctic Peninsula.⁴ The crucial geostrategic value of this waterway can be highlighted by imagining a scenario wherein the Panama Canal is either closed or access through it is denied to all transoceanic commerce.⁵ This concern surfaced as a prominent geopolitical theme during World Wars I and II.⁶ More recently concern rose again during and after various Suez Canal crises beginning in 1956. Thus, safeguarding the high seas right of free passage through northern Antarctic waters has traditionally received high priority from Latin American states, especially Argentina and Chile.⁷ In addition, the United Kingdom, which makes historical claims to islands in the region,⁸ and the United States, whose vessels exercise extensive transoceanic transit throughout the Western Hemisphere,⁹ have regarded unimpeded access through the Drake Passage as an important freedom of international maritime navigation.

A second issue pertains to the national claims situation in Antarctica and the fact that three of these claims substantially overlap. Seven states have asserted claims of national sovereignty to portions of the continent: the United Kingdom in 1908 and 1917;¹⁰ New Zealand in 1923;¹¹ France in 1924;¹² Australia in 1933;¹³ Norway in 1939;¹⁴ Chile in 1940¹⁵ and Argentina in 1946.¹⁶ Significantly, however, no nonclaimant government has ever acknowledged the lawful permissibility of these seven states to make claims in Antarctica or given formal recognition to the validity of these purported sovereign titles. Importantly, the claims asserted by Chile (south of 60° south latitude at longitudes 90° to 53° west) and Argentina (south of 60° south latitude at longitudes 74° to 25° west) severely encroach upon each other; and the Chilean and Argentinian claims are overlapped in large part by the United Kingdom's claim (particularly the portion running south of 50° south latitude at longitudes 80° to 20° west).¹⁷ The fact that the Chilean, Argentine and British claims overrun and conflict with each other has historically underscored not only the legal complexity and political sensitivity of the situation but also the latent potential for confrontation in the Southern Ocean region.¹⁸

Antarctica: Claims and Jurisdictions in the Southern Ocean



Legend:

-  200 Nautical Mile Zones
 Ice Shelves

* Christopher C. Joyner
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 1987

The third issue concerns traditional anxieties over geopolitical rivalries in the region. Both Argentina and Chile have shared long-standing security apprehensions over their exposed southern flanks,¹⁹ which contributed early on to their respective decisions to assert territorial claims to parts of Antarctica.²⁰ Historically, Antarctica has been regarded by Latin geopoliticians as a dagger pointed at their soft national underbellies. Certainly, this consideration figured prominently in the historical antagonisms between Argentina and Chile,²¹ and more particularly, recently fueled these two governments' protracted dispute over legal rights to three islands in the Beagle Channel.²² Likewise, since the 1830s, Argentina and the United Kingdom have experienced strained diplomatic relations regarding rightful jurisdiction over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.²³ This tense relationship has been exacerbated by conflicting jurisdictional claims over several other island groups in the region, including South Georgia, the South Orkneys, and the South Shetlands.²⁴ These disputed claims to the continent, coupled with unresolved competing jurisdictions over sub-Antarctic islands, undercut opportunities for securing political stability in the region until the late 1950s.

During the 1950s, heightened Soviet interest and activity in the Antarctic prompted concern in the United States over the geostrategic designs motivating Soviet involvement there.²⁵ Growing out of cold war anxieties, speculation in the United States centered on Antarctica's geostrategic value and what the implications would be if U.S.-Soviet rivalry were to spill over to the region. Walter Sullivan, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1957, well expressed these concerns when he opined that Antarctica "... is a continent of such mighty dimensions that, even though largely ice-covered, it cannot be ignored. Its vastness provides a sanctuary from which aircraft could dominate the waters that, apart from the vulnerable Panama and Suez Canals, provide the only ready links between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans."²⁶ Sullivan went on to assert that: "The chief strategic interest of nations down under, such as Australia, is to deny Antarctica to a hostile power. The first military force to get ashore there would have a great advantage, for there are extremely few harbors. Almost the entire coast is made inaccessible, first by the offshore pack ice, and then by uniform ice cliffs that mark the margins of the continental ice sheet where it has slipped off the continent and become waterborne. There are virtually no invasion beaches."²⁷ In retrospect, the most ominous strategic consideration perceived at that time concerned Antarctica's potential use as a launching site for intercontinental ballistic missiles. As Sullivan posited, "It has also been suggested that, once ballistic missiles have sufficient range to reach any part of our planet, Antarctica would provide an advantageous base from which to launch thermonuclear weapons. Mobile launching sites would be hard to locate in that vast continent, yet a considerable part of the retaliatory power of the nation attacked might have

to be devoted to destroying these sites at very little cost to the attacker. Even with manned nuclear airplanes, Antarctica might offer advantages as an air base over more populous areas."²⁸

Throughout the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly turned their attention to the poles. This activity was viewed with concern on both sides; it appeared as though East-West rivalry, with all its political tensions, might come to dominate the situation in the Antarctic. This development obviously would complicate the already complex geopolitical problems associated with sovereignty disputes and overlapping claims. More disturbing, it was feared that rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union over the south pole could precipitate an arms race in the Antarctic, leading ultimately to implanting or testing nuclear weapons there.²⁹

The Antarctic Treaty and Nonmilitarization

These geostrategic concerns, particularly the new active role by the Soviet Union, made interested Western governments increasingly aware that international accommodation was necessary if cold war tensions were to be averted from the cold continent. It was the gratifying experience of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) (1957-58) that supplied the vehicle for that accommodation and laid the diplomatic foundation for negotiations that culminated in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.³⁰

From the outset of preliminary treaty negotiations in 1958, insuring that Antarctica would be used for peaceful purposes only was considered a priority objective. It was a prominent feature of the United States' note of invitation to convene these discussions,³¹ and it gained significance with the explicit inclusion of the Soviet Union in the negotiation process.³² The principal lesson gleaned from the IGY experience was clear: Political accommodation in Antarctic affairs was possible, notwithstanding conflicting national interests and the geostrategic stakes perceived to be at risk. The establishment and preservation of a nonmilitarized zone was deemed essential for promoting successful scientific cooperation in the region.³³ To the credit of the negotiators who constructed the substantive diplomatic framework for the treaty, an acceptable agreement was produced that has worked remarkably well over three decades.³⁴ Treaty membership has grown from 12 in 1959—called the original Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)—to 39 parties in 1989; and the treaty has expanded into a multifaceted systemic arrangement comprised of several ancillary agreements dealing with issues unaddressed in the Antarctic Treaty.³⁵ The twin pivots on which this treaty system turns are the nonmilitarization of the continent and its dedication to peaceful uses only.

In the treaty preamble's first paragraph, this objective is clearly articulated: ". . . Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful

purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord."³⁶ This general security-oriented goal has become an overriding consideration of national interest for the treaty parties—one which subsequently has prompted them to cooperate on potentially destabilizing matters, such as legal complications arising from sovereignty claims and issues regarding access to natural resources.³⁷ For example, the preamble of the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources specifically reaffirms the parties' belief that, "[I]t is in the interest of all mankind to preserve the waters surrounding the Antarctic continent for peaceful purposes only and to prevent their becoming the scene or object of international discord."³⁸

The Antarctic Treaty is a nonarmament agreement. Three provisions directly relate to nonmilitarization of the region. Article I dedicates the Antarctic area exclusively to peaceful purposes. It flatly directs that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only." Article I goes on to assert the prohibition of "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons."³⁹ This provision seeks to preclude militarization of the Antarctic area. A caveat, however, is applicable to actions undertaken for individual or collective self-defense, arising from some situation in the Western Hemisphere, which could intrude into the area covered by the treaty—that is, south of 60° south latitude.⁴⁰ Provision for self-defense clearly is permissible under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,⁴¹ a guarantee specifically preserved throughout the security zone created in 1947 by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty).⁴² In fact, the United States, Chile, and Argentina affixed declarations to this effect when they signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.⁴³ This caveat aside, the Antarctic Treaty goes on to list as an initial reason for convening Consultative Party Meetings the perceived need to discuss measures pertaining to the "use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only."⁴⁴ This statement unmistakably complements and underscores the fundamental intention of Article I.

The second nonmilitarization provision establishes the Antarctic as a nuclear weapon-free zone. Article V bans nuclear explosions for any purpose and forbids the dumping of radioactive waste materials there. In terse language, Article V asserts that, "Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive wastes shall be prohibited."⁴⁵ Nonmilitary, atmospheric and subterranean nuclear tests are all forbidden, although the ban does not extend to the use of radioactive materials in Antarctica.⁴⁶ Parties to the Convention on Marine Living Resources are likewise committed to nonmilitarization and nonnuclearization. Article III of that instrument provides in full that, "Contracting Parties, whether or not they are Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, agree that they will not engage in any activities in the Antarctic Treaty area contrary to the principles and purposes of the

Treaty, and that, in their relations with each other, they are bound by the obligations contained in Articles I and V of the Antarctic Treaty."⁴⁷

The third treaty provision promoting nonmilitarization in the Antarctic is Article VII, which stipulates the right of each Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party to appoint observers who may carry out unannounced, on-site inspections. This stipulation was inserted into the treaty to monitor compliance with Articles I and V. It seeks to insure that the Antarctic region is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, in the absence of nuclear explosions or radioactive waste disposal. As Article VII declares, "All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated. . . ."⁴⁸ Further, the inspection provision applies to facilities and equipment used for land-based development and commercial activities, for example, those associated with minerals exploitation;⁴⁹ and it affirms the specific right of unlimited aerial inspection,⁵⁰ which reinforces an earlier stipulation that guarantees to each observer "freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica."⁵¹ The direct inference may be drawn that unlimited aerial inspection likewise carries with it the right of access for scientific purposes, similar to the "open skies" policy adopted in the late 1950s by the United States.⁵²

In addition, Article VII sets out requirements for notification and exchange of information regarding expeditions to the continent, stations to be established there, and military personnel or equipment to be "introduced" by a party into Antarctica.⁵³ This provision is intended to support the nonmilitarization objectives of the regime: Information exchange has occurred on a wide range of subjects, including some which might be construed to have military relevance (e.g., activities relating to logistics problems, the use and applications of nuclear equipment, and telecommunication operations). By keeping treaty parties apprised, governments have been reassured about the nonmilitary intent of these activities.

The Antarctic Treaty contains provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes. Article XI calls upon contracting parties to "consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice."⁵⁴ Should resolution of a dispute through these means prove elusive, Article XI goes on to suggest that the dispute should be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement, pending consent of all parties to the dispute.⁵⁵ During the 28 years since the Antarctic Treaty entered into force, no major dispute has occurred among the treaty's Consultative Parties to warrant invocation of these dispute settlement

procedures. That is a record of achievement that few, if indeed any, international arms control and disarmament agreements can claim to equal.

The Antarctic Treaty unequivocally mandates that the Antarctic remain free from any activities of a military character. Moreover, nuclear weapons are banned from the region, and rights for unlimited, unannounced on-site inspections are guaranteed to maintain this nonmilitarized condition. That these overriding security objectives have been sustained for three decades makes the Antarctic Treaty a conspicuous success in curbing military and geopolitical ambitions in the region. More accurately, this treaty stands out as the most successful regional arms control agreement negotiated in the post-World War II era.

Nonmilitarization in the Antarctic: Practice and Performance

Nonmilitarization involves a process designed to minimize chances of conflict and armed hostilities among states, and its value as a policy lies in the behavior of states. As nonmilitarization is consistently practiced by some governments, this in turn encourages like-minded performance by other governments.⁵⁶ When states abide by set policies of nonmilitarization, they perforce contribute to bolstering the confidence of other states that this regional policy really works. Multilateral confidence in the situation thus generates greater adherence to the policy's effectiveness throughout the area.

National security remains a primary, permanent national interest for all governments. As a result, states often adopt exclusive strategies designed to attain geostrategic advantage in order to improve and strengthen their national security position.⁵⁷ In the Antarctic, the converse policy is being pursued towards the same end. Unilateral security strategies have been transformed into a collective functional strategy. The fundamental purpose of that strategy is to promote mutual security through the common policy of not engaging in military activities of any kind, on or around the Antarctic continent.⁵⁸

Nonmilitarization in the Antarctic thus emerges as a process organized around the goal of maintaining military balance in the region—a balance premised on the absence of military activity there. In realpolitik terms, nonmilitarization in the Antarctic establishes a balance of power among the Antarctic Treaty parties in general and the 12 original members (the ATCPs) in particular. No state has a preponderance of military power over any other in the region. All activities there are equally nonmilitarized. They represent no military threat to any other party, or nonparty for that matter. The balancing agent in this situation is the absence of any military activity. The disturber of that equilibrium would be the introduction of some military activity.⁵⁹

The Antarctic Treaty supplies the specific framework within which arms control, deterrence, geostrategic preferences, and regulation on use of force in the south polar region have been effected. To preserve nonmilitarization in the Antarctic, the process must be performed continuously as a collective effort by all involved parties. Responsibility rests with governments themselves to guarantee, monitor, and practice nonmilitarization within the region. The Antarctic Treaty promotes trustworthy conduct and attitudes by making the behavior of members predictable, and it provides diplomatic opportunities and policy intercourse from which the parties benefit. What results from the treaty relationship is the evolution of institutionalized trust.⁶⁰

Nonmilitarization reserves the Antarctic for "peaceful purposes only."⁶¹ It should not be inferred, however, that states have wholly renounced the use of force in the region. They have not. As noted earlier, the legal right to use force in the Antarctic is still preserved for all states through Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; moreover, for parties in the Western Hemisphere, this right is further sanctioned by the Rio Pact of 1947.⁶² Likewise, ambiguity exists regarding the use of nuclear devices in the region. Although Article V of the Antarctic Treaty clearly prohibits nuclear explosive devices, its implications remain vague with regard to the operation of nuclear-armed surface vessels and submarines in the region south of 60° south latitude.⁶³ In view of recent diplomatic problems involving the United States, New Zealand and Japan over port visitation rights of vessels possibly armed with nuclear weapons, similar difficulties among these ATCP states could occur in Antarctic waters.⁶⁴

Successful operation of the Antarctic Treaty remains dependent upon the political will of governments in general and the ATCP states in particular to work towards that end. Should that political will erode, the nonmilitarized character of the Antarctic would likely weaken. State practice thus far has demonstrated that sustained political will can effect nonmilitarization, that governments are capable of pursuing such policies, and that significant rewards can be reaped for all parties in the process. The task is to keep this policy commitment on course.

Nonmilitarization in the Antarctic is not maintained exclusively through enforcement measures or verification devices. Rather, its efficacy rests largely in "multilateral symbiotic deterrence." If one party fails to adhere to the nonmilitarization policy—i.e., should a government decide to engage in some unauthorized militarized activity in the region—then it is possible that other parties will act in like fashion.⁶⁵ Nonmilitarization functions in the Antarctic because it embodies the quality of universal constructive deterrence in which nonmilitary presence for all is viewed as more desirable than any military presence for one, some or many. The treaty serves as the legal vehicle through which that process is performed.

The key to the process of nonmilitarization lies in the mutual relations of the parties. The essential principle is stability. As one commentator well put it, "The Antarctic Treaty presupposes that through the development of cooperation and peaceful purposes demilitarization will be stabilized, and while its provisions are not 'mandatory,' they offer a framework and guidelines that the parties have adopted to ensure order and security on the continent."⁶⁶

The Antarctic Treaty is a preventive treaty, designed to discourage activities which might produce conflict. Thus it contains several features that engender confidence-building: scientific exchange and nonmilitary cooperation are given preference over rivalry and competition;⁶⁷ a specifically defined neutralized zone is set out for the region;⁶⁸ free access and open inspection is granted to all facilities of all governments there;⁶⁹ and particular provisions are supplied for dispute settlement if the need should ever arise.⁷⁰ These features promote trust and confidence among the parties in the operation of the treaty.

Much of the success in preserving nonmilitarization in the Antarctic can be attributed to communications among the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. These governments have been able to communicate effectively and forthrightly with each other on Antarctic matters such that their exchanges "meet the high standards of reliability and trustworthiness, as well as timeliness and completeness."⁷¹ This self-sustaining trust and confidence among those governments further clarifies their policy expectations vis-à-vis each other. In this way, international law is made operational.

One factor encouraging legal compliance has been the very limited attraction that the region presents for ballistic missile use. The emphasis on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles, and outer space trajectories has diverted the military attention of the United States and the Soviet Union away from the Antarctic.⁷² It seems unlikely that other governments will be enthusiastic about allocating any of their scarce military resources to the Antarctic. Little strategic advantage would be gained, at the high risk of causing international tension and instability in the region. Restraint in rivalry among the ATCPs remains the key to the preservation of the nonmilitarization process in the Antarctic.

The treaty is not alone in promoting nonmilitarization of the Antarctic region. Other international arms control instruments hold direct legal relevance for the Antarctic because of their universal global application. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water⁷³ mandates that parties prohibit any nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control, "in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas."⁷⁴ The last reference obviously encompasses the Antarctic/Southern Ocean region. The 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the

Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil⁷⁵ also applies to Antarctic ocean space. As provided for in Article I, states party to this instrument "undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the limit of a seabed zone . . . any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons."⁷⁶ This treaty, coupled with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, neatly complements the prohibitions contained in Article V of the Antarctic Treaty for the ocean space south of 60° south latitude.

Two other international conventions contribute to nonmilitarization in the Antarctic. In the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,⁷⁷ Article IV stipulates in relevant part that "Each State Party . . . shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of [microbial or other] agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery . . . , within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere."⁷⁸ The notion of "anywhere" obviously renders the convention applicable to the Antarctic; consequently, it would pertain to appropriate state activities there. Similarly, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques⁷⁹ forbids parties from undertaking military or other hostile environmental techniques against any other party. As mandated in Article IV, each party is charged with the responsibility of taking measures to prohibit and prevent violations of this convention, ". . . anywhere under its jurisdiction or control."⁸⁰ Once again, designation of the area of application as "anywhere" makes it unmistakable that Antarctica and its circumpolar waters are drawn within the legal jurisdictional ambit of this multilateral accord.

Despite the broad scope of these four international instruments, it should be pointed out that not all parties to the Antarctic Treaty, nor even all the ATCP governments for that matter, have signed or ratified these agreements.⁸¹ One might consequently conclude that these states would not be bound by their provisions. This might hold true, save for one overriding fact: To violate these provisions would in effect violate the peaceful uses only and nonmilitarization provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, to which all parties are formally obligated. These four arms control conventions thus serve to reinforce the Antarctic Treaty's general obligation to practice nonmilitarization in the region, rather than to create any new legal duties specifically attendant to the conventions.

Multilateral adherence to nonmilitarization in the Antarctic is motivated by one overwhelming objective: to preserve public order, because that public order best serves the national interests of those states. As a community's lawmaking actions attain substantial formality, uniformity, and stability, those actions become institutionalized.⁸² So it has been in the case of nonmilitarization in the Antarctic and the patterns of expectations that have developed since 1959. It is the Antarctic Treaty that has supplied the legal structure for the ATCPs to assimilate those patterns of expectations.

The temptation may be to conclude, therefore, that consistent state practice regarding nonmilitarization of Antarctica and its circumpolar waters has evolved sufficiently to consider that condition *jus cogens*. That is, preservation of the Antarctic as a nuclear weapon-free zone of peace has acquired, through persistent state practice, the status of a peremptory norm for the region, undergirded by an international treaty to that effect.⁸³ This position suggests that even should the Antarctic Treaty one day disappear, the nonmilitarized, neutralized, zone-of-peace status for the Antarctic has become so firmly established in state practice that governments would still be obligated to observe that norm in their activities in the region. Such a peremptory norm would have contemporary applicability as well because under *jus cogens*, all states would be bound (even those not party to the treaty) legally to abide by the nonmilitarization prescription. Such a situation would undoubtedly support greater legal order among states and contribute to strengthening opportunities for international cooperation.

The logic of these presumptions notwithstanding, to conclude that the nonmilitarized status of the Antarctic has attained the legal threshold of *jus cogens* is premature. For *jus cogens* to be acquired, universal recognition of the desirability of that particular norm must be evident. The fact that sovereign claims persist to portions of Antarctica indicates that nonmilitarization might be compromised by claimant states to sustain or defend their titles to those continental lands. Thus, should the Antarctic Treaty System collapse, one might reasonably predict that the claimant states would hasten to shore up and protect their claims, and even resort to military means if necessary. For overlapping claimants especially, military activities in the wake of the treaty's collapse cannot be discounted, given pre-treaty periods of tensions among those states.⁸⁴ In short, strict application of *jus cogens* to the Antarctic falls short because of political complications arising from the disputed claims situation on the continent.

As a status quo nonmilitarized region, Antarctica presently offers no reason for states to compete there militarily. However, if governments perceive their national security interests in the Antarctic to be at risk or consider military actions taken in their own self-defense to be required, the nonmilitarized situation would become vulnerable to breakdown. Should the future produce more intensified political ideologies, more competitive economic ambitions,

and more exaggerated disparities in international military capabilities, the preservation of the Antarctic as a nonmilitarized zone dedicated to peaceful purposes will likely require a greater share of statesmen's attention, with more complications in the way of success.

Challenges to Nonmilitarization in the Antarctic

While nonmilitarization has worked effectively in the Antarctic for nearly 30 years, the prospects for its successful future operation must be viewed with realism. A noteworthy legacy of past accomplishment does not ensure success in coming years. There are at least five potential challenges to the present Antarctic Treaty System, each of which might upset the balance of nonmilitarization in the region.

The first challenge is that the Antarctic Treaty might collapse or founder on its own accord. Two specific possibilities come to mind. First, in Article XII of the treaty there is a provision for the convening of a special review conference in 1991 or thereafter⁸⁵ if any one of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, including the 10 new entrants since 1961,⁸⁶ decides that a treaty review should be conducted. If such a review conference were to meet, it could open the door to disagreement over suggestions to amend or modify the treaty—disagreements which might become aggravated into open cleavages, resulting in the deterioration of ATCP unity and consensus. Should this happen, some dissatisfied ATCP state might then pursue military activities in the Antarctic. However, the prevailing opinion among ATCPs is that such developments are unlikely.

The second possibility for treaty breakdown stems from the disruptive potential of competing economic interests in the Antarctic, especially fallout from the recently completed Antarctic Minerals negotiations. In 1982, the ATCPs began negotiations to design a special regime to administer and regulate the prospecting, exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the Antarctic area.⁸⁷ During 10 special negotiating sessions, several draft texts were produced by the chairman of the special minerals meetings, Sir Christopher Beeby of New Zealand.⁸⁸ These negotiations culminated on 2 June 1988 with adoption by the ATCPs of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities.⁸⁹ Promulgation of this treaty, however, neither resolved all problems associated with minerals activities in Antarctica nor fully satisfied all interests of the participants.

Certain issues of contention during the negotiations left residues of resentment. One division occurred between claimant and nonclaimant states. The claimant states (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom) espouse sovereign rights to portions of the continent and wanted special considerations for their "territorial rights" included in the new minerals regime. Conversely, nonclaimant states, who

do not recognize the legal validity of these claims, refused to grant any special rights because to do so would have tacitly acknowledged the claims themselves.⁹⁰ While claimant states do receive special voting designation in the Convention, they are guaranteed neither taxes nor royalties for mineral activities conducted in their claimed sectors. A second major schism developed between the industrialized and the developing states. The latter—including Brazil, India, the People's Republic of China and Uruguay—wanted to secure concessionary privileges and special opportunities (e.g., rights of technology transfer and mandatory participation in joint venture arrangements) in light of their less developed economic conditions.⁹¹ The industrialized states—the United States, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan—rejected concessions of this type. As a result, the Minerals Convention stops short of giving developing ATCPs concessionary rights or privileges in the new exploration and development regime.

Recent developments have produced serious strains among the ATCPs over the future of a minerals regime on the continent. On 23 May 1989, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke effectively vetoed the possibility of the Antarctic Mineral Convention's entry into force by officially announcing refusal to sign the accord. For the minerals agreement to enter into force, all seven Antarctic claimant states would have to ratify it. Without Australia's participation, that essential prerequisite could not be fulfilled. (France subsequently joined Australia in refusing to sign the minerals treaty.) Important also is that the Hawke government simultaneously announced its commitment to promote an Environmental Protection Convention creating an Antarctic Wilderness Park, with prohibitions on all mining activities, including oil drilling.⁹²

What Australia's recent pro-environmentalist initiative means for the political future of the Antarctic Treaty system is as yet unclear, but fundamental questions have arisen: What will happen to the consensus-based treaty system now that Australia and France have decided that the Antarctic Minerals Convention is contrary to their national interests? What strains and pressures might be imposed upon the treaty system should certain ATCPs now decide that failure to secure an agreed upon minerals convention invites their pursuit of Antarctic minerals activities unilaterally, outside the legal ambit of the Antarctic Treaty? While this scenario does not yet appear in the offing, clearly if it were to occur, the results would hardly bode well for the stability of the treaty system or for the prospects of maintaining the nonmilitarized character of the region. Failure to secure entry into force of the Antarctic minerals regime in 1989 may be gratifying to environmentalists, but it does not ipso facto mean the demise of the Antarctic Treaty system. This development, however, might signal the rise of disruptive economic competition among ATCPs for Antarctic mineral resources in the future, as well as the breakdown of trust and cooperation among those governments responsible for maintaining nonmilitarization in the Antarctic.

The third major challenge to the Antarctic Treaty System is the possibility that ATPC rivalries elsewhere might spill over into the Antarctic region. Clearly, the most serious threat of this occurring in recent years was the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, involving Argentina and the United Kingdom,⁹³ but other rivalries also exist which provoke important concern between ATPC states. There has been the historical friction between Argentina and Chile, a large part of which may be attributed to disputes over their borders, especially in the Beagle Channel area of Tierra del Fuego.⁹⁴ Certain political-ideological competition also exists between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China,⁹⁵ Brazil and Argentina,⁹⁶ and of course, between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁹⁷ Still, the governments involved remain plainly convinced that, for the foreseeable future, their interests are best served by preserving the nonmilitarized situation provided by the Antarctic Treaty. If any competitive forays are to be made against rivals, it appears that they will be pursued in other international arenas, under other circumstances.

A fourth broad challenge to the contemporary Antarctic Treaty System lies in the possible application of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" concept to Antarctica and the movement since 1983 in the United Nations General Assembly aimed towards attaining this end.⁹⁸ The implications of this seem clear enough: Were Antarctica to be accepted by the international community as part of the "common heritage," the ATPCs would lose substantial legal justification for securing their accessibility to both living and nonliving resources in the region. Under such a regime, these resources would become the patrimony of all peoples, immune from national or corporate appropriation, with any revenues derived from their exploitation being allocated to enhance the developmental ambitions of the "New International Economic Order."⁹⁹

During discussions of the Antarctic question since 1983 at the United Nations, two new issues have entered the debate which complicate the political situation between ATPCs and nonparties to the treaty. First, there is the apartheid conundrum, which concerns whether the present white minority government of South Africa should continue to play a viable role as a member of the Consultative Party group.¹⁰⁰ Second, there is the criticism of alleged iniquity—or a two-tiered, undemocratic system—in the treaty structure itself. This criticism alleges that decision-making power resides in a select group (the ATPCs), and that the other 16 members to the treaty (the acceding states, or nonconsultative parties) have little real influence and at best are only permitted to participate in ATPC meetings as observers.¹⁰¹ While these disparities are real and important, particularly to the states most affected by their political ramifications, the question remains whether radical alteration of the Antarctic Treaty System, with its proven legacy of successful nonmilitarization, is worth the risk of possible disruption and disintegration.

Should the system collapse, it might precipitate a land grab on the continent by those states who possess the requisite technology to do so. Such a development would find very few in the international community capable of sharing in the rewards.¹⁰²

Political realism suggests that changes within the Antarctic Treaty System will have to come from the membership itself, in particular from the ATCPs.¹⁰³ External pressure from the United Nations, given the experience of General Assembly sessions since 1984, seems more likely to produce resentment among the ATCPs towards that body than to foster any political or legal improvements in Antarctic affairs.¹⁰⁴

Finally, there is the possibility that some government might decide to engage in military-related activities in the Antarctic. Recent reports from New Zealand have alleged that military activities may be associated with operational uses of certain countries' Antarctic stations, and these could constitute violations of at least the spirit if not the letter of the nonmilitarization provisions of the treaty.¹⁰⁵ These allegations remain speculative, unsubstantiated, and may very well be politically motivated in their own right; but if it were conclusively proven that some ATCP state had consciously violated the treaty's nonmilitarization provisions, that revelation would surely impugn the credibility of that government's Antarctic policies in the future. Very likely, it would also produce reverberations throughout the entire treaty system. Such a development would be unfortunate indeed, and it might even encourage destabilizing rivalries to emerge within the region.¹⁰⁶

The geopolitical realities of the current Antarctic Treaty System are clear. The regime governing activities in the Antarctic is lawful and binding upon those states who have subscribed to it. The Consultative Parties to the treaty include the superpowers, all the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, and all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, these 22 states represent the population of nearly three-quarters of all mankind.

For almost 30 years the Antarctic Treaty System has functioned exceedingly well as an institutional framework for preserving peace and stability, fostering scientific cooperation, and promoting standards for environmental preservation and conservation. It has well served the international community's general interests by responsibly accommodating geopolitical concerns in the south polar region and by preserving the condition of nonmilitarization and peaceful uses only of the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean. The Antarctic Treaty is the preeminent international legal instrument embodying the twin processes of nonmilitarization and peaceful uses only. As such, the treaty stands as an exemplar for international cooperation and constructive diplomacy, particularly for promoting the reduction of military activities on a regional basis.

Notes

1. As provided for in Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty, done 1 December 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961). See note 3. Rather than "demilitarization," the term "nonmilitarization" is used in this study because Antarctica never has been actually militarized. That is, the continent never has been the site for military bases, armies, or major armed engagements. While shooting incidents occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s, those were isolated episodes, not military clashes. See David W. Haron, "Antarctic Claims," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 32, 1954, pp. 661-667. This tension led to a tripartite naval declaration by Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom in early 1949 not to send warships south of 60° south latitude during the 1948-49 Antarctic season. Significantly, this agreement has been renewed annually. See Marjorie Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963), p. 1238.

2. This figure was computed by subtracting the sum of Antarctica's land area and the area of ocean space within 60° south latitude from the total area of the earth's surface.

3. Deborah Shapley, "Pax Antarctica," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June-July 1984, pp. 30-34.

4. Christopher C. Joyner, "Security Issues and the Law of the Sea: The Southern Ocean," *Ocean Development and International Law*, no. 15, 1985, pp. 171, 179.

5. See James L. Busey, *Political Aspects of the Panama Canal: The Problem of Location* (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1974).

6. See generally Walter La Feber, *The Panama Canal: The Crises in Historical Perspective* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978).

7. Raul Rey Balmaceda, "Otra cuestion de Limites con Chile?" *Estrategia*, no. 69, 1981, p. 106; and Jorge Atencio, *Que es la Geopolitica?* (Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 339.

8. See generally Julius Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1927).

9. See Walter D. Jacobs, *The Panama Canal: Its Role in Hemispheric Security* (New York: American Emergency Committee on the Panama Canal, 1968).

10. British letters patent, appointing the Governor of the Colony of the Falkland Islands to be Governor of South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the Sandwich Islands, and Graham's Land, and providing for the Government thereof as Dependencies of the Colony—Westminster, 21 July 1908, reprinted in *British Foreign and State Papers*, v. 101, 1909, p. 76; British letters patent, passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, providing for the further Definition and Administration of certain Islands and Territories as Dependencies of the Colony of the Falkland Islands—Westminster, 28 March 1917, reprinted in *British Foreign and State Papers*, v. 101, 1919, p. 19. In 1962, the United Kingdom divided their original claim into two separate territories. The area south of 60° south latitude was designated the British Antarctic Territory, and the remainder above the Antarctic Treaty area retained the original designation of the Falkland Islands Dependency.

11. British Order in Council providing for the Government of the Ross Dependency—London, 30 July 1923, reprinted in *British Foreign and State Papers*, v. 117, 1923, p. 91.

12. Decree Attaching French Antarctic Territories to the Government General Antarctic, Paris, 21 November 1924, reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, no. 46, *International Law Documents (1948-49)*, pp. 229-230.

13. Order in Council Placing Certain Territory in the Antarctic Seas under the Authority of the Commonwealth of Australia—7 February 1933, reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, no. 46, *International Law Documents (1948-49)*, p. 236.

14. National Sovereignty in the Antarctic (proclamation of King Haakon of Norway, 14 January 1939), reprinted in *American Journal of International Law*, no. 40, Supplement, 1940, p. 83.

15. Decree No. 1747 Declaring the Limits of the Chilean Antarctic Territory, reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, no. 46, *International Law Documents (1948-49)*, p. 224.

16. Argentine Note to the United Kingdom concerning the Issue of British Stamps for the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Dependencies, Showing as British, Territory Claimed by Argentina, 16 June 1946, reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, no. 46 *International Law Documents (1948-49)*, pp. 222-223.

17. See map in text. In connection with the claims situation, it should also be noted that one-fifth of the continent remains unclaimed, that Australia's sector is divided by the French claim, and that Norway's claim has no defined terminal demarcations. As mentioned earlier in the text, the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty extends to 60° south latitude (solid line). The Living Resources Convention (mentioned later in the text) applies to the area inside the Antarctic Convergence as defined in Article I of the treaty (dotted line), which corresponds to the area of the natural Antarctic Convergence (dot-dash line). (The natural Antarctic Convergence is a shifting natural boundary formed by the cold waters around the continent and the warmer waters to the north.) The 200-nautical-mile zones extending seaward from islands and South America (dotted areas) indicate states' declared fishing or economic jurisdictions.

18. In 1947, 1951, and 1953, Great Britain formally suggested to Argentina and Chile that they submit this disputed claims situation to the International Court of Justice, but the latter refused. In May 1955, the British Government submitted a unilateral application to the Court, but Argentina and Chile refused to accept the Court's jurisdiction in the matter. See *Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina) (United Kingdom v. Chile)* 1956 International Court of Justice Pleadings, pp. 11, ff.

19. Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors* (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 45-47, 82-84; and Jorge A. Fraga, "El Mar y La Antartida en la Geopolitica Argentina," *Revista de la Escuela Guerra Nacional*, February 1979, pp. 36-40, 46-47.

20. On Argentina, see generally Fernando A. Milia, *La Atlantartida: Un Espacio Geopolitico* (Buenos Aires, 1978). For Chile, see generally Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, *La Antartida Chilena*, 4th ed. (Santiago, 1976).

21. Child, pp. 77-85.

22. Andres Ruggieri, "Canal de Beagle. Algunas Rfleciones sobre el Laudo Austral," *Estrategia*, March 1977, pp. 48-61; Siego Villalobos, *El Beagle: Historia de una Controversia* (Santiago, 1979).

23. See generally Raphael Perl, *The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics* (New York: Oceana, 1983).

24. Child, pp. 122-130; Milia, p. 250.

25. This concern about the Soviet Union's intentions for Antarctica was expressed as early as 1948 by the U.S. Department of State. See "Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, 9 June 1948," in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, v. 1, part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Information Service, 1980), pp. 977-987.

26. Walter Sullivan, "Antarctica in a Two-Power World," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 36, 1957, p. 162.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. For insightful treatment of the IGY, see Walter Sullivan, *Assault on the Unknown: The International Geophysical Year* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961). The announced intention of the Soviet Union to remain in the Antarctic after the conclusion of the IGY increased anxiety among the claimant states both for the potential superpower competition in the region and for the undermining of their own positions on territorial claims that would ensue.

31. For the background, see John Hanessian, "The Antarctic Treaty of 1959," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, no. 9, 1960, pp. 432-468.

32. For elaboration of this point, see Christopher C. Joyner, "Cooperative Diplomacy: The Case of Antarctica," in Nishi Jaingotch, ed., *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation: An Untold Story* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 39-61.

33. Paul C. Daniels, "The Antarctic Treaty," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., *Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica*, (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), pp. 38-39.

34. For a revealing discussion of the preliminary proceedings (May 1958-June 1959), see Peter J. Beck, "Preparatory Meetings for the Antarctic Treaty, 1958-59," *Polar Record*, no. 22, 1985, pp. 653-661. The official record of the conference proceedings is contained in U.S. Department of State, *Conference on Antarctica* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960).

35. This arrangement is often referred to as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). In early 1989, 22 states comprised the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), the core decision-making group of the regime. The original 12 members of the ATCP group included Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States. Since 1959, 10 other states have been granted ATCP status: Poland (1977), Federal Republic of Germany (1981), Brazil (1983), India (1983), People's Republic of China (1985), Uruguay (1985), Italy (1987), German Democratic Republic (1987), Spain (1988) and Sweden (1988). As part of the ATS, ATCPs have passed by consensus 160 recommendations which serve as guidelines for policy within the Antarctic Treaty area. Seventeen other states (the nonconsultative parties) have acceded to the treaty: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Hungary, South Korea, North Korea, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Peru, and Rumania. Supplementing the 1959 treaty, the ATS includes other instruments which have been negotiated to fill certain needs as they have become apparent. These include: The 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, done 2-13 June 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, 998, T.I.A.S. No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692 (1973); F. M. Auburn, *Antarctic Law & Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982) pp. 270-273; The 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, done 1 June 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force 11 March 1978); The 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), done 20 May 1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force 7 April 1982). For discussion, see Ronald Frank, "The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources," *Ocean Development & International Law*, no. 13, 1983, pp. 293-328; and most recently, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, done at Wellington 2 June 1988,

opened for signature 25 November 1988, Doc. AMR/SCM/88/78 (2 June 1988), reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, July 1988, pp. 859-900. For discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, "The 1988 Antarctic Minerals Convention," *Marine Policy Reports*, no. 1, 1989, pp. 81-98; Christopher C. Joyner, "The Evolving Antarctic Minerals Regime," *Ocean Development and International Law*, no. 19, 1988, pp. 73-95; and Christopher C. Joyner & Peter Lipperman, "Conflicting Jurisdictions in the Southern Ocean: The Case of an Antarctic Minerals Regime," *Virginia Journal of International Law*, Fall, 1986, pp. 1-39. In addition to these instruments, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), established under the International Council of Scientific Unions, serves the ATS in an important scientific advisory capacity. For a recent treatment, see generally Polar Research Board, *Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment, Proceedings of a Workshop Held at Beardmore South Field Camp, Antarctica* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986).

36. Antarctic Treaty, preamble.

37. See generally Joyner, "Cooperative Diplomacy."

38. Antarctic Living Resources Convention, preamble.

39. Antarctic Treaty, Article I (1).

40. Antarctic Treaty, Article VI.

41. Article 51 provides in relevant part that: "[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." United Nations Charter, Article 51.

42. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, done 2 September 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.

43. "Declaration Concerning the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Made by Argentina, Chile and the United States in Signing the Antarctic Treaty," in Whiteman, p. 1238.

44. Antarctic Treaty, Article IX, paragraph (a).

45. Antarctic Treaty, Article V.

46. The United States operated a nuclear power plant at its McMurdo station from 1962-1972, but it has since been dismantled and removed. Central Intelligence Agency, *Polar Regions Atlas* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1978), p. 48.

47. Antarctic Living Resources Convention, Article III.

48. Antarctic Treaty, Article VII, paragraph 3.

49. *Ibid.*, paragraph 5. Inspection opportunities have also been included for mineral resource activities. As provided for in the recent Antarctic Minerals Convention, "All stations, installations and equipment, in the Antarctic Treaty area, relating to Antarctic mineral resource activities, as well as ships and aircraft supporting such activities at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel at such stations and installations, shall be open at all times to inspection by observers designated under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty for purposes of that Treaty." Antarctic Minerals Convention, Article 12.

50. Antarctic Treaty, Article VII, paragraph 4.

51. Antarctic Treaty, Article VII, paragraph 2.

52. The "Open Skies" policy, advocating the free and open collection of information, originated under the Eisenhower administration and was initially designed to promote arms control verification through aerial surveillance. It evolved in tandem with nondiscriminatory data policies developed for U.S. earth satellite experimentation during the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year. *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 37, 1957, p. 673.

53. Antarctic Treaty, Article VII, paragraph 5.

54. *Ibid.*, Article XI, paragraph 1.

55. *Ibid.*, paragraph 2.

56. This process is largely dependent upon successful confidence-building among the parties. See Ralph M. Goldman, *Arms Control and Peacekeeping: Feeling Safe in this World* (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 105-134.

57. In this respect, perception of geopolitical advantages is a key consideration. According to some experts, "Although the threat to a nation's security is influenced by the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies, it is the perception of the threat that causes policy responses. . . . The degree of accuracy with which we can determine the level of threat will, in turn, determine how closely perceptions can match reality, as well as the optimality of the response." Daniel J. Kaufman et al., eds., *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), p. 8.

58. This situation in effect entails a collective security strategy of mutual nonmilitarization.

59. See notes 104 and 105.

60. See the discussion in Goldman, pp. 114-124.

61. Antarctic Treaty, Article I.

62. See note 42.

63. Since the circumpolar Southern Ocean is properly regarded as part of the high seas, provisions in the Antarctic Treaty cannot intrude upon those freedoms, among which is included the freedom of navigation for vessels powered by nuclear energy. Indeed, the treaty specifically preserves this freedom as it asserts in full: "The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° south latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area." Antarctic Treaty, Article VI.

64. See *New York Times*, 12 August 1986, sec. I, p. 10, col. 1; *New York Times*, 25 August 1986, sec. I, p. 3, col. 3.

65. In this scenario, introduction of military means into the Antarctic by one ATCP state could prompt the breakdown of institutionalized trust and precipitate a scramble by other ATCPs to balance the military equation. Taken to the logical extreme, the cascading effects of this situation could easily lead to total collapse of nonmilitarization in the region.

66. Harry Almond, "Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica," *Case Western Journal of International Law*, no. 17, 1985, p. 232 (footnote omitted).

67. These conditions are specifically provided for in Articles I, II, and III of the Antarctic Treaty.

68. That is, the area south of 60° south latitude, inclusive of all lands, seas and ice formations.

69. As provided for in Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty. See the text at notes 48-53.

70. As provided for in Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty. See notes 54-55.

71. Almond, p. 238.

72. Antarctica is generally regarded as being of minimal strategic significance. Peter Beck has even asserted that Articles I, V, and VII of the Antarctic Treaty have "transformed the continent into a strategic irrelevance . . . and a strategic non-fact." Peter J. Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), p. 87.

73. Done 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433. 480 U.N.T.S. 43.

74. *Ibid.*, Article I, paragraph 1.1.

75. Done 11 February 1971, entered into force 18 May 1972, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.

76. *Ibid.*, Article I.

77. Done 10 April 1972, entered into force 26 March 1975, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062.

78. *Ibid.*, Article IV.

79. Done 18 May 1977, entered into force 5 October 1978. 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614.

80. *Ibid.*, Article IV.

81. Among the states that are party to the Antarctic Treaty, the following are *not* parties to these arms control accords: For the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—People's Republic of China, Cuba, France, and North Korea. U.S. Department of State, *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989), p. 347. For the Seabeds Treaty—People's Republic of China, Chile, France, Papua New Guinea, Peru, North Korea, and Uruguay, *Ibid.*, pp. 367-368. For the Biological Weapons Treaty—Chile, *Ibid.*, pp. 284-285. For the ENMOD Treaty—Chile, People's Republic of China, France, Peru, South Africa, and Uruguay, *Ibid.*, pp. 301-302.

82. See generally Myres McDougal and F. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961).

83. On this application of *jus cogens*, see Christos L. Rozakis, *The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976).

84. See the sources cited in note 1.

85. Article XII provides in relevant part: "If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty [i.e., in 1991], any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the Treaty." Antarctic Treaty, Article XII, paragraph 2(a).

86. That is, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Brazil, People's Republic of China, Uruguay, Italy, Germany Democratic Republic, Spain, and Sweden. See note 35. As this article goes to press, at the XV Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meeting scheduled for Paris in October 1989, five states reportedly have applied for ATCP status: Netherlands, Peru, South Korea, Ecuador, and Finland. Of the five, South Korea and the Netherlands appear the most likely to qualify as ATCPs.

87. Christopher C. Joyner, "The Evolving Antarctic Minerals Regime," in Christopher C. Joyner and Sudhir Chopra, eds., *The Antarctic Legal Regime* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), pp. 129-159 and sources cited in note 35.

88. For early drafts of the Beeby texts, see "The Antarctic Minerals Regime: The Beeby Draft," reprinted in Greenpeace International, *The Future of the Antarctic: Background for a U.N. Debate*, Appendix

8, 1983 and "Beeby Draft II," reprinted in Greenpeace International, *The Future of the Antarctic: Background for a 2nd U.N. Debate*, Appendix 8, 1984. "Beeby III," though not published, was entitled "MR 17 REVISION II Annex to Chairman's Informal Personal Report Antarctic Minerals Convention: Draft Articles," September, 1986. Compare "Antarctic Mineral Resources: Chairman's Informal Personal Report: MR/17 Rev. III (1987)."

89. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, done 2 June 1988, Doc. AMR/SCM/88/78 (2 June 1988), reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, July 1988, pp. 859-900. See Joyner, "1988 Antarctic Minerals Convention," pp. 81-98.

90. The Antarctica Project, "Status of Antarctic Minerals Negotiations," Antarctica Briefing, no. 13, 30 June 1987, pp. 3-5.

91. *Ibid.*

92. Australia's motivations for withdrawing support from the minerals convention were several. For one, recent oil spills in Antarctica (the *Bahia Paraiso* in January 1989) and in Alaska (the *Exxon Valdez* in March 1989) underscored the high environmental risks associated with minerals and oil exploitation in frigid climes. The rise of independent environmental political parties also demonstrated unexpected clout in May elections held earlier in the Australian state of Tasmania, enough to control the balance of power in that local parliament. Third, increasing publicity about ozone depletion in the Antarctic has heightened health warnings and concern about skin cancer in Australia. Nonetheless, environmental motives were not alone in prompting the Hawke government to redirect its policy. Clearly, as indicated by Australia's treasurer, Paul Keating, strong motivation stemmed from the fact that such a minerals regime would perforce undermine Australia's sovereignty claims to the continent and deny Australia royalties from minerals extracted in its claimed territory. See David Scott, "Australia Advocates 'Wilderness' Status for Antarctica," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 May 1989; Paul Brown, Australia vetoes Antarctic mining," *Guardian*, 25 May 1989; and Robert Cockburn and Andrew Morgan, "Australia blocks Antarctic mining operation," *The Times*, 23 May 1989.

93. See Christopher C. Joyner, "Anglo-Argentine Rivalry after the Falklands: On the Road to Antarctica?" in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend, eds., *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 189-211.

94. See sources cited in note 22.

95. See generally Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1982) and Richard Solomon, ed., *The China Factor: Sino-Soviet Relations and the Global Scene* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981).

96. Child, pp. 98-105.

97. See, e.g., Adam Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II* (New York: Viking, 1971) and Raymond Gartoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

98. Kimball, pp. 1-4 and Peter J. Beck, "The Antarctic Treaty System after 25 Years," *The World Today*, November 1986, pp. 196-199.

99. "Remarks by Christopher C. Joyner," in American Society of International Law, 1985 *Proceedings of the 79th Meeting*, 1987, pp. 62-67. Also see Christopher C. Joyner, "The Evolving Antarctic Regime," *American Journal of International Law*, July 1989, pp. 605, 622-626.

100. Ambassador Jacobs of Antigua and Barbuda pointedly summed up this view during the First Committee debate on Antarctica in 1983 when he averred: "Most unacceptable for us, however, is the fact that the racist regime of South Africa is one of the original Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. The international community has condemned the racist policies of South Africa. South Africa has been forced to vacate its seat in the United Nations. Every decent and respectable organization has shunned South Africa like the plague. Why was South Africa allowed to participate with the other Consultative Parties? '... We condemn those who give acceptability to South Africa in this regard, and we demand its immediate expulsion from membership in the Consultative Group.'" U.N. General Assembly, 38th Session, *Official Records*, First Committee, 42nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.42, 29 December 1983, p. 7. (Statement of Ambassador Jacobs).

101. See U.N. General Assembly, *Question of Antarctica; Study Requested under General Assembly Resolution 38/77, Report of the Secretary-General, PART TWO, Views of States*, v. III, U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (Part II), 9 November 1984 (Statement of Pakistan), p. 35.

102. See generally M.J. Peterson, "Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush on Earth," *International Organization*, Summer, 1980, pp. 377-403.

103. Nongovernmental organizations have enjoyed some success in promoting change in the Antarctic Treaty process. See Lee Kimball, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Antarctic Affairs," in Joyner and Chopra, *The Antarctic Legal Regime*, pp. 33-63.

104. See Richard Woolcott, "The Legitimacy of the UN to Challenge International Treaties," in Rudiger Wolfrum, ed., *The Antarctic Challenge III: Conflicting Interests, Cooperation, Environmental Protection*,


Economic Development (Berlin: Drucker Pub., 1988), forthcoming; and *Report of the Secretary General: Views of States* (Australia), pp. 88-91.

105. These allegations are aimed at the United States and assert that U.S. Antarctic stations are being used for certain military inproprieties, among them the following: testing low-frequency radio transmissions for submarine navigation; research into geomagnetic forces affecting missile guidance; low-temperature basic military training; and computer testing of military facilities during Operation Deep Freeze. See Pat Florence and Matthew O'Hallaron, "Operation Deep Freeze: Militarizing the Frozen South," *Direct Action—Newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party and Resistance* (New Zealand), 11 February 1987; and "Deep Freeze Role 'Proven Military,'" *New Zealand Herald*, 19 January 1987.

106. See the sources cited in notes 92-96.

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Pacem In Maribus XV Conference held in Malta, 7-12 September 1987. The author wishes to acknowledge that this research was supported by the J. N. Pew, Jr. Charitable Trust and the Marine Policy Center of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. WHOI Contribution No. 6650.

The author would also like to express his appreciation to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.



Call for Papers World War II—A 50-Year Perspective

Siena College is sponsoring its fifth annual multidisciplinary conference on World War II, to be held on 31 May-1 June 1990. The conference will focus on the year 1940—although papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years are welcome. Requested topics include: Fascism and Naziism; the War in Asia; Spain; Literature; Art; Film; Diplomatic, Political and Military History; Popular Culture; and Women's and Jewish studies dealing with the era. Obviously, the Blitzkreig, England under the Blitz, Dunkirk, Vichy, Quisling, etc., will be particularly appropriate. Asian, African, Latin American and Near Eastern topics of relevance are also solicited. Please direct replies and inquiries to Professor Thomas O. Kelly, II, Department of History, Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y. 12211.

The Naval War College Foundation

Just before they graduate next June, the students of the Naval War College will participate in the Current Strategy Forum, along with several hundred guests. The latter, from all over the United States and from many different fields of endeavor, will share with the students a number of lectures given by prominent officers and civilians. Then, in seminars, they and the students will wrestle with the issues raised by the speakers.

Later, at graduation, a number of students will be awarded prizes for the excellence of their work. Several people who have written for this journal will also be recognized and rewarded.

Activities and awards such as these serve the Navy and the nation. Yet, because the federal government often is at cross purposes with itself, the Navy cannot always pay for them. Still, these things and many other good works at the Naval War College are made to happen. How do they happen?

In most instances, it is the members of the Naval War College Foundation who make such things happen.

Who are these people? How many of them are there? Who started this foundation? Who presides over it now, and who runs its day-by-day activities?

It was 20 years ago this autumn when the President of the College, Vice Admiral Richard M. Colbert, along with Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, John Nicholas Brown (a prominent Rhode Island citizen who once had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air), and a few other people (who saw both the need and the opportunity to do more for the College) created the Naval War College Foundation.

At first this nonprofit organization was intended merely to permit interested people to give historic artifacts to the College. But the founders, particularly Mr. Brown and Admiral Bates, also saw that the new organization had the potential of supporting financially much more than the acquisition of artifacts. They enrolled 176 founding members, each of whom gave \$1,000 or more in order to provide a critical mass around which the new foundation could grow.

Though the Foundation is still modest in scale and assets, the evidence of its work is all about the College. Without the works of art which the Foundation arranged to adorn the hallways, without the historic documents available for scholars' use in the archives, without the various evening lectures to which all citizens are invited, and without the prizes we have mentioned, the College would be a sterile, uninviting place.

The Foundation has not stopped there. It has provided a TV satellite dish so students can receive up-to-the-minute news of world events, it provides for alumni and Naval Command College conferences, and it helps support the research of faculty members.

The Foundation has now grown to 1,550 members and has a capital of about \$545,000, which it hopes to increase substantially. It is the interest and dividend income from this capital, added to dues and assorted donations, which permit the Foundation to do its work. These funds have allowed the Foundation to support the Naval War College with about \$100,000 annually.

The Foundation is headed by a vigorous and energetic group of twenty unpaid trustees, all but two of whom are civilians. They come from various fields of endeavor, and some have served in the Navy. What they have in common is a strong general interest in the security of the country and a strong particular interest in the role of the Naval War College in assuring that security. The other two members of the board are serving War College officers: the deputy to the president and the staff judge advocate. The latter also serves as the Foundation's treasurer.

Captain Walter B. Woodson, USN (Retired) is the executive director of the Foundation and runs day-to-day operations. He ensures that the Foundation remains carefully tuned to the needs of the College.

Once the College announces these needs and the trustees decide to what extent the Foundation can support the proposed projects, the gift must be accepted by the Secretary of the Navy.

Here are the projects the Foundation supports, with some recent examples of how the funds are employed.

Research. Foundation funds enable members of the faculty to travel to research sites and to participate in professional conferences and symposia related to their particular scholarly disciplines. As examples, in the recent past Professor Jack Grunawalt, holder of the Stockton Chair of International Law, took part in a conference sponsored by the Law of the Sea Institute on "International Implications of Extended Maritime Jurisdiction in the Pacific"; Professor Joe Brennan presented a paper before the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics; and Dr. Don Daniel of the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies took part in the annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Additionally, funds are provided annually from the estate of the late Captain Rexford V. Wheeler, Jr., for the purchase of reference volumes for the Naval Command College professional library. A long-running project undertaken by members of the Yale University faculty will result in a comprehensive index and catalogue of the papers of the late Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles in the fields of strategy, tactics, and logistics.

Prizes. The array of prizes which the Foundation awards annually at graduation is an important stimulus to original research and writing by officers enrolled in the College. Most involve a \$1,000 cash prize for exceptionally thoughtful essays selected by a faculty selection committee from among dozens of essay contest entrants. A few of the prizes are designed to recognize noteworthy achievement by students enrolled in the College's off-campus Command and Staff curriculum either through correspondence or the evening seminar program at one of a number of sites around the country. The Foundation also sponsors the Hugh G. Nott awards for the best articles published the previous year in the *Naval War College Review* by authors who have written not in the line of duty.

Conferences. The Foundation provides substantial support to such College-sponsored activities as the Professional Ethics Conference and a series of smaller conferences sponsored by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the College's research arm, which have explored subjects dealing with theater and campaign warfighting issues. One of the most recent conferences sponsored by the Foundation for the benefit of the students dealt with the growing involvement of the Congress with the Executive Branch in determining national security policy. In addition, the Foundation underwrites conferences for the international Naval Command College in an effort to foster a close and continued association among the graduates of this course, who form a significant part of the leadership of over 40 of the world's navies.

Alumni Affairs. The alumni program is undertaken by the Foundation to enable graduates and former members of the staff and faculty to remain in contact with the College and its various activities. The principal vehicles to this end are the newsletter *Foundation Briefs* and the alumni conferences sponsored each fall in Newport and each spring at another location where there is a concentration of alumni—such as Norfolk, San Diego or Washington.

Lectures, Fellowships and Professorships. One of the most popular and visible manifestations of the Foundation's activity is the Contemporary Civilization lecture series, which enables the College to host evening programs open to the public and featuring a wide variety of nationally known speakers addressing an equally wide array of subjects. Speakers have included Dr. Robert Ballard, discoverer of the wreck of the *Titanic*; strategic analyst Dr. Edward Luttwak; and the "running doctor," Dr. George Sheehan.

Two other annual lectures are also sponsored by the Foundation. These are the Admiral Raymond A. Spruance memorial lecture, funded by the Harry and Flora D. Freund Foundation, and the International Lecture. Speakers who have come to the College for these events include Dr. Henry Kissinger,

Barbara Tuchman, Thomas J. Watson, Senator Sam Nunn, Herman Wouk, Professor Michael Howard, and General Sir John Hackett.

Honoring the memory of a former president of the Foundation, the Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates Fellowship brings eminent retired officers or civilian officials to the College for research, writing, and meeting with student seminars. Among those whom the Foundation has supported in their work here are Admirals Horacio Rivero, U. S. Grant Sharp, Worth H. Bagley, and John P. Weinel; former advisor to the Secretary of State Helmut Sonnenfeldt; and former Under Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey. Alternating on a yearly basis with the Bates Fellowship is the Forrest Sherman Lectureship, which has brought similarly distinguished leaders to the campus such as Admiral Robert L. J. Long and Admiral Sir John Woodward, commander of British forces in the Falklands campaign.

Naval War College Press. With Foundation support, the College Press has been able to publish individual scholarly works by members of the faculty. Recent examples are a series of International Law studies; *A Bibliography of the Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan* by Professor John B. Hattendorf and Lynn C. Hattendorf; and most recently, *SDI: A Policy Analysis*, by Professor Stephen Fought. A substantial grant by the late Mr. Robert M. Akin, Jr., a former Foundation president and trustee emeritus, enabled the publication of the centennial history of the College, *Sailors and Scholars*, written by Professor Hattendorf, Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh, and former faculty member Dr. B. Mitchell Simpson.

Student/Faculty Support. Modest funds are made available each year to enable the President to take advantage of emergent, unanticipated opportunities to invite guest lecturers to the College, or to schedule events which will enrich the curriculum and for which government funds are not available. Similarly, the Foundation has supplemented the costs of a few student-programmed activities which serve to enhance student morale, esprit and athletic competition.

Museum and Archives. A key area of Foundation interest and support, almost since its founding, has been the College museum and its historical archives. The Foundation has enabled the museum to acquire artifacts and to prepare displays related to its core themes of the history of naval warfare as studied at the College and the history of the Navy in Narragansett Bay. Similarly, the Foundation has acquired, or accepted as gifts-in-kind, historic reference materials for the College's historical collections. Among its valuable holdings are important oral histories, original manuscripts concerning naval warfare, and the notebooks and letters of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Related to

these collections is a project which will provide suitable preservation and restoration of these valued documents.

Museum Gift Shop. As a service to the College, the Foundation has operated a small gift shop in the lobby of the museum for four years. The shop features memorabilia and gift items related to the themes of the museum and to the history of the College.

Additionally, the Foundation provides indirect support through an initiative begun two years ago, the Long Range Strategic Studies Project. This new and important project is an outgrowth of a proposal developed by Professor Stephen Rosen, then a Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow and now a member of the College's faculty, while he was teaching at Harvard in 1985. As a result of his conceptual thinking, and the fact that there is an exceptionally talented faculty assembled at the College, several major charitable foundations offered to aid the research of faculty members who are seeking to articulate an array of strategies by which the nation might cope with likely future security environments.

The project became a reality in 1986 when the Foundation's trustees approved a proposal that the Foundation coordinate the project by managing the grants offered by these other foundations. These grants support seminars on strategic issues in concert with other research institutes and underwrite a program whereby a few highly select postgraduate civilian research fellows spend a year in residence at the College, studying under the supervision of members of the faculty. The project coordinator and his secretary are members of the Foundation staff.

The Foundation's president and trustees are examining new opportunities for growth and new objectives in support of the College, its students and its research activities.

The reputation of the Naval War College has never been better than it is today. The Foundation's aim is to further strengthen the College's performance in education and research, to the benefit of the U.S. Navy and our country.

Clearly, the work of the Foundation has played a major role in the development of the War College. The relationship is close and the support of the Foundation is constantly apparent.

Those who wish to visit the offices of the Foundation will find them in Luce Hall at the College. Those who wish to write may address the Foundation at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02841.



IN MY VIEW . . .

The American Century

Sir,

This is still the American century. The paradox, however, is that the influence of the United States now is a function, not of its military or economic power, and not even of its political leadership, but of its willingness to tolerate competition from nations once dependent on it. American influence also springs from the fact that, of all major nations, the United States has become the first to deal with the major social dilemma of the end of the 20th century: the reconciling of individual freedom with the demand for prosperity. The key to prosperity in a world of relatively open, competitive markets is disciplined innovation, yet it is clear that prosperity, the product of that innovation, is coupled with demands for individual freedom of choice that run counter to the discipline required to keep a whole industry or nation competitive.

The United States did something right after World War II: fostering the reconstruction of Europe and Japan. As a result, the world is now divided into three camps economically: (1) prosperous nations, with economies that benefit most of their citizens, (2) command economies that are stagnant or faltering, and (3) potentially prosperous nations whose leaders have not yet figured out that their long-term benefit is intimately tied to that of the majority of their fellow countrymen. All three camps are dominated by the United States, but not in ways which we or they seem willing to acknowledge.

For example, Japan is terribly dependent on the United States because the United States is the prime market for Japan's products, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Put another way, we are the golden goose they dare not kill. As the Soviet Union admits to its own economic problems, on the other hand the United States and Western Europe—with their pluralistic and materialistic popular cultures—serve as prime alternatives to the authoritarian socialism of the Communist party. Khrushchev was wrong, 30 years ago, when he said that the confrontation was

between communism and capitalism. It was, instead, between the developing, tumultuous unofficial culture of the Western Alliance and the repressive official culture of the U.S.S.R. The first has proved more adaptable and resilient than the second. Finally, even nations such as Brazil and Saudi Arabia are driven by the United States and its allies. The United States, Japan, and Western Europe provide the ruling oligarchies of such "third-world" countries with models of economic development and nightmares of what kinds of popular pressures development will unleash. The oligarchies now dominant in most third-world nations are still having trouble learning that such popular pressures are almost impossible to control, but they haven't much choice in the matter. The American model, with its Asian variations, is driving the world. It cannot be resisted. Even Iran will acknowledge it someday.

Yet the success of the American model was never assured. It was the product of determined human action in a setting that permitted (sometimes barely) a level of pluralism that allowed space for both discipline and freedom. In short, it was a near thing, and it will remain—always—a near thing. This has been the difference between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the distinction between historical success and failure. Despite an ocean of words to the contrary, the United States is never sure where it's going or how to get there; the Soviet Union has been certain of both. But it is important to remember that the game has been tough and go. Russia looked pretty attractive to lots of Americans in the mid-1930s, and for good reason.

This country is now in the midst of a quiet constitutional crisis. Power is spread around enough so that many different kinds of social and economic groups can (and do) claim the benefits which the government, acting for the whole community and controlling community-wide resources, dispenses. The result has been a creeping fiscal crisis, with groups pushing for and receiving benefits that have been paid for by borrowing. The problem has become constitutional in nature because it has generated a debate over which branch of government should decide who should receive the benefits which public agencies hand out. A more fundamental issue—rarely addressed—is whether government should have such benefits under its control at all.

The real problem, however, reaches beyond the United States and its constitutional traditions. People everywhere want choices, but they also want guarantees against the risks that making choices entails. Choice implies a kind of discipline. If you choose badly, you're stuck with the consequences; you have to accept them. What the American model has held out is an expansion of choice *and* ways around unpleasant consequences of choice. Expanded services and a strong national defense are paid for with borrowed money, placing convenience ahead of discipline. People all over the world now sense that they can have choices and prosperity and still avoid conflict between the two. The United States has led the way along this road, and it is the United States that is wrestling with this problem now. Reconciling choice and prosperity is the greatest task the United States faces. Put another way, it will be the United States that will test the possibility that a free society can discipline itself. Now the weakness of the Soviet model gives the United States an excuse for avoiding the issue. That state of affairs cannot continue forever.

The paradox of the American century is that it has come despite a plan or a grand design. Indeed, the success of the American model is due to the fact that it rests not

on control but on the freedom to choose. However, prosperity is equal in stature to freedom in the American model, and the two ideals conflict. Prosperity demands productivity, innovation, and improvisation, and these, in turn, require self-discipline. But self-discipline is undermined by a political order which permits exceptions to it. Yet to arbitrarily close that political order would be to destroy the very freedom which is the key to an open, innovative society.

Paradoxes are the worst kinds of dilemmas. The United States is powerful because its social model is so unstructured and uncontrollable. The social model requires an open politics which is then vulnerable to pressures that reduce the competitiveness of the American economy. The economy, to be an agent of choice, must be open, placing American industries in a fiercely competitive international market which produces demands on the U.S. Government to shield domestic industries and individuals from overseas competition. Individual Americans, to be productive, must be willing to learn and shift skills as the world economy changes, but that requires a degree of self-discipline which individuals will find hard to bear and for which they will want "fair" compensation. Despite these problems, however, it is still the American century. The paradoxes arising from trying to combine freedom with prosperity must be solved by every society which follows or succumbs to the American model. The century is American not because we steer the boat but because we built it. No one steers it. That's the whole point.

Thomas C. Hone
Defense Systems Management College
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

"We Are Entering a Dangerous Era"

Sir,

In the debate about "glasnost," "perestroyka" and "defensive military doctrine," we are missing a key point vital to our future: The communist approach to government is bankrupt, and we are entering a dangerous era.

The danger lies, paradoxically, in the attempts by both the Soviet and Chinese leaders to deal with their own failed totalitarian and centralized forms of government. In the excitement of coming to grips with new Soviet initiatives, we should remember that the *sine qua non* of any communist government is party control. If that control is threatened, as we saw recently in Beijing and are seeing now in the Soviet Baltic Republics, the party will always opt to reestablish it. What happened in Tien An Men square this June had already occurred inside the Soviet Union, but without the international media in attendance. In both countries, military force has been used to "restore order" and quell demands for self-determination and plurality of government. "Openness" and the free flow of information with the outside world appear to lead inevitably to a desire for political freedom, the antithesis of communist party rule, and yet progress seems impossible without it.

A friend, who had escaped from Hungary in 1956, once told me that "there is one thing that we should always remember about communists: you can vote them in but you can't vote them out." This statement is at the heart of the current Soviet

dilemma, and the question is whether communism, as a political methodology, can or will tolerate any competition. With the sole and tenuous exception of Poland, the answer appears to be no.

Lenin and his successors have long recognized that control and manipulation of information is the key to continued control by the communist party—even to the point of rewriting history, often several times, as party policies change. In the words of George Orwell (1984), “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present, controls the past” (with the operative word being *control*). The importance of this communist dictum is nowhere more evident now than in the Soviet Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. By admitting that Soviet control of these formerly independent states was the subject of secret protocols of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939—a fact long denied by Stalin’s successors—the Gorbachev regime has opened Pandora’s box and thoroughly undermined Soviet claims of legitimate rule with both the populations of these states and the world public. In this case, “glasnost” does not extend to openly discussing self-determination by hostage nationalities.

Gorbachev is walking a fine line between the need for progress and the bureaucratic need to maintain communist party control. His unilateral arms reductions and proposals for arms control have gained him international credibility. At his back, however, is a bureaucracy whose very existence depends on maintaining party dominance in all things. A serious misstep, or even a sequence of events that goes beyond his control in Eastern Europe or any of the several “captive” nationalities that comprise the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, could result in either a reversion to classic totalitarian policies or internal revolution. In both cases the West, and the United States in particular, would figure prominently as the external “bogeyman” that had caused Soviet problems, with all the dangers to our own security interests that that entails.

There is a third option, but one that the history of communism seems to belie. That is the acceptance of some form of pluralism in the governing of communist states. No one denies that most of the Soviet and Chinese people are better off now than under the tsars or the war lords. In that sense, at least, communism, as a form of political organization, has worked. The question that faces all of us in the coming years is, Can communism evolve into a form of government that allows freedom of thought and speech, that allows real representation of minorities, and that allows the formulation and open discussion of alternative approaches to the future?

For us, this should be a time to reflect thoughtfully on our own progress and to watch carefully what is occurring in the communist states. The dangers inherent in a communist swing back to repression or in policies that lead to anarchy or internal revolution should be in all of our minds as we watch the Soviet and Chinese leaders try to deal with modern reality. Their answers to these questions will affect all of us.

E. D. Smith, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Dial 911-U.S.S.R. for Arctic Rescue Assistance

Sir,

In the wake of the "Save the Whales" incident which occurred off the Arctic coast near Barrow, Alaska during October 1988, there have been considerable afterthoughts about the merits of interrupting a natural process which has probably been taking place throughout eons of time. National and international opinion has both supported and opposed the decision to invest over \$1 million in an effort to save three, later two, California grey whales. The real benefit of the public and private funds that were expended in this Arctic drama was not in saving some stranded behemoths of the deep, or at least it should not be. Rather, the true beneficiaries were the nations of the world who were provided with a demonstration of recent technological changes that have now opened the Arctic Ocean to maritime commerce and other uses. It also showed the wide disparity in technological capabilities between the Soviet Union and all other countries for utilizing the Arctic Ocean in the twilight of the 20th century.

It is worth contemplating how much more money might have been spent by the United States and other countries if the Soviets had not come to the rescue. It is also worth speculating as to whether any amount of money could have saved the whales were it not for a true icebreaking capability by reliable surface ships. It is gratifying that these now gold-plated whales may be happily basking in the warm waters off the coasts of southern California and Mexico. Meanwhile, much more valuable and important assets are silently patrolling the depths of the Arctic Ocean in the name of freedom, and they routinely pass under the multiyear ice cap which blankets the top of the world.

In 1958, the U.S. submarine *Nautilus* became the first vessel to reach the geographical North Pole—a feat that was possible only because of the technological advancements in nuclear propulsion incorporated into the *Nautilus*. Subsequently, a number of other countries began sending submarines into the Arctic Ocean. Still, throughout most of the 1970s, the Arctic Ocean remained of limited importance to the submarines of the world. That situation changed dramatically, however, when a shift in Soviet strategy initiated the deployment of their ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) under the protective blanket of the Arctic ice, thereby forcing the United States and other Nato powers to begin routinely deploying state-of-the-art, nuclear-powered attack submarines under the Arctic ice as well. The past decade has witnessed a headlong rush by the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, as well as the Soviet Union, to send submarine patrols to the Arctic Ocean.

For all of the countries now involved, modern, nuclear-powered submarines are tremendously expensive ships, equipped with some of the most advanced technological secrets that their sponsors are capable of putting on board. They are also much larger than the typical submarine of the World War II era and have much larger crews. Reflecting on all of this, as well as on the West's flailings in trying to save a couple of whales a few hundred yards off Alaska's north coast, raises the question: What then happens if a "friendly" submarine becomes disabled under the ice? At that point, not only are many lives at risk, but also a \$1 billion investment in current technology.

Before the Soviets began routinely deploying their SSBNs under the polar ice, they had already developed the capability to conduct deep-sea salvage operations in the Arctic Ocean. Their ever-expanding fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers has steamed to the North Pole and has conducted extensive operations within the multiyear ice pack. In addition to their icebreakers, they have an extensive fleet of ice-strengthened salvage ships; and their ice-strengthened fishing vessels, many as large as medium-sized freighters, also have considerable salvage capabilities. This allows the U.S.S.R. an almost inexhaustible number of options to rescue or salvage one of their underwater boats should the need arise.

On the other hand, the United States and its Nato partners may have only a few, if any, viable options for conducting the rescue or salvage of a disabled submarine in the Arctic. In the hostile Arctic environment, a lack of options can be fatal, not only for grey whales trapped under the ice but for people and equipment as well. As mentioned previously, Nato attack submarines are in the Arctic Ocean in increasing numbers, primarily in response to Soviet SSBN deployments. While the Russians began deploying their SSBNs to the Arctic only after they were reasonably certain that they could retrieve a disabled boat, it appears that the West has had neither the time nor interest to develop a similar capability. Now, as the number of Nato submarines operating in the Arctic continues to increase, so too does the likelihood that one of these boats will eventually experience disablement.

If the title of the recent incident near Point Barrow could be changed from "Save the Whales" to "Grey Lady Down," perhaps this incident would serve to highlight the sad state of affairs in U.S. Arctic research and operational capabilities, thereby making the expenditure of money much more worthwhile. However, if the incident is forgotten, and there is no follow-up on that initial investment, then, when one of those "friendly" grey ladies does go down beneath the Arctic ice, perhaps we will have to dial 911-U.S.S.R. for a true Arctic rescue capability. They would love it . . . can we afford it?

David W. Orr
Major, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Anchorage, Alaska

Keeping Blue Honest

Sir,

The following articles in the *Naval War College Review* have as a premise that various complex aspects of warfighting can be examined through wargaming: Frank C. Mahncke, "From Technology to Tactics: Finding the Missing Link," Spring 1989, pp. 98-107; Peter P. Perla, "War Games, Analyses, and Exercises," Spring 1987, pp. 44-52; Michael Vlahos, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942," March-April 1986, pp. 7-22; and Peter P. Perla and LCDR Raymond T. Barrett, USN, "What Wargaming Is and Is Not," September-October 1985, pp. 70-78.

Each of these articles has a particular theme: Mahncke—tactics and technology must go hand in hand; Perla—"wargaming . . . allows for the continual adjustments of strategy and tactics by both sides in response to developing results and events not

seen in campaign analysis"; Vlahos—use of wargaming in developing strategy; Perla and Barrett—"the true value of wargaming lies in its unique ability to illuminate the impact of the human factor in warfare."

All these aspects will help the R&D scientist, the technologist, and the warfighter to better appreciate and understand the complexities of an uncertain future engagement. However, another critical dimension that must be considered is the creativity of the opposition.

In the typical wargame setup, a Blue and a Red team, as well as consideration of neutrals and nonbelligerents, are modeled. The Blue team is usually given the future "bag of tricks": new technology options and a range or set of possible future concepts that may be feasible in the time frame of the game. These concepts may be tailored to a particular theme or cluster of technologies or may be drawn from a broad spectrum.

The Red side is most likely to be projections based upon certain evidence or predictions. This, however, only forms the baseline for Red. A key ingredient that must be addressed and included in any wargaming scenario is to allow the opposition the same ability to be creative as is given to the Blue side. This does not mean that Red should replicate Blue's way of thinking or approach to warfighting, merely that Red must be allowed to "do its own thing."

Recent examples remind us that creativity does not necessarily mean new technology. In 1967, Nasser closed the Gulf of Eilat to Israeli shipping using a circa 1908 vintage British gun. In Korea, General MacArthur was faced with a plethora of circa 1910-type mines. In Vietnam, our superior bombing forces were held at bay by a vigorous opponent who used geography, terrain, and weather to his advantage.

Thus, in a technology wargame setting, it is imperative to model Red to include its brain. A straightforward approach of an "unthinking" Red, using only projections of Red capabilities, can and will lead to an unsatisfactory and unrealistic modeling of Red's dynamic wartime warfighting capability. This in turn can cause Blue to believe it has answered, or at least addressed, the issues of concern and has obtained a feel for the "correct" direction or course of action to pursue. To a degree this is true, but it must be tempered by the realization that Red may not do what Blue expects.

In order to develop this aspect of playing Red, a cadre of personnel who are irascible and cantankerous need to be a component of the Red team. They will keep Blue honest. They will make the Red team a more dynamic and unpredictable opponent and will provide alternative insights into how to "think Red."

The Red team must be capable of conducting business as usual, but in addition, technology wargames need to take into account intangibles, uncertainty, and creativity. If Blue is allowed to play "what if," then Red must be given the option "so what." This option can provide for negating our advanced technology through new tactics, new combinations of future weaponry, using old weaponry in unexpected ways, using Blue's ROEs to Blue's disadvantage, or using Red weaponry in ways not anticipated by Blue.

We must keep foremost in our warfighting simulation the fact that our opponents, whoever they may be, have the resources of the human mind; and that can be as deadly as the most advanced technology.

Alan S. Victor
Warminster, Pennsylvania

More on Bumps in the Black Sea

Sir,

In your Spring 1989 issue, Professor Harry H. Almond, Jr. presents a long legal analysis of rights of innocent passage, attempting to support the American position in the February 1988 bumping incident in Crimean territorial waters. But his arguments are very difficult to follow. He asserts the U.S. position in the *Pueblo* incident of 1968 to be that given in an American statement uttered on 8 February 1968, immediately after the *Pueblo* was seized by North Korea (62 *Am. J. of Int'l L.* 756 (1968)). But that statement was reversed by many others in the months that followed. The key documents, with the final exchange of correspondence, were published in 60 *Dept. State Bulletin* 1-3 on 6 January 1969, reproduced in 8(1) *Int'l Legal Materials* 198 (1969). I analyzed the situation with quotations in an article, "Some Legal Implications of the *Pueblo* Incident" (18 *Int'l & Comparative Law Quarterly* 961 (1969)) and see no need to repeat the quotations or analysis here.


Further, Professor Almond persists in regarding the 1949 *Corfu Channel Case* as determinative of legal rights of innocent passage in Crimean waters without mentioning that the International Court of Justice in that case specifically restricted its assertions of the rights of innocent passage through territorial waters as follows: "It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is *innocent* [emphasis sic]."

Are the Crimean waters part of a "strait"? Are they "used for international navigation"? Was the passage "innocent"? I know of no definition of "strait" that fits the waters in which the incident occurred. I know of no figures for Crimean waters comparable to the 2,884 ships cited by the Court as using the Corfu Channel and visited by Corfu Customs in a period of one year and nine months, or to the historical usage by British warships extending back 80 years. As to the innocence of our passage, whether it is in the interest of the navy or not, President Reagan accepted the general law of the sea terms of the 1982 United Nations Convention as binding on us by unilateral declaration in 1982. If that declaration is given effect, then the key term restricting passive intelligence gathering does not mean whatever we can argue it means; it means what the parties to the Convention intended. It seems significant that at the negotiation it was called "the *Pueblo* Clause." I do not understand how passive intelligence reception can be construed to be "innocent" within that context. If our unilateral declaration is legally ineffective, as I believe, then the general law most persuasively stated in the *Pueblo* correspondence applies, and we are still wrong.

Therefore, I see no point in carrying on a highly technical legal discussion and will leave Professor Almond the last word in this forum, if he wants it. In the wider forum of maritime powers, the last word will, in my opinion, rest on other factors; and by taking a legalistic approach that notoriously distorts the facts and misstates

the law, we have already lost. That is the usual result of presenting an adversary argument as if it were a legal analysis.

Alfred P. Rubin
Professor of International Law
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University



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
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PROFESSIONAL READING



A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

Robert B. Bathurst

Herrick, Robert Waring. *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1988. 318pp. \$9.50 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.)

Applying Isaiah Berlin's brilliant typology from his essay "The Hedgehog and The Fox," we must classify Robert Herrick as a hedgehog, one who ranges narrowly but who knows his territory exceedingly well. Although Soviet military theory and policy emphasize its political subordination and combined nature—there could be no purely naval strategy, it would argue—Herrick plots the stages and development of Soviet naval thought as a subject largely independent of the other services, the Marxist ideology and the savage domestic politics.

There is ample justification for this approach. Interpreting Sovietspeak has meant translating a code with strange symbols and arcane references. If that were not inhibiting enough, there are branches of Sovietspeak requiring specialized interpreters. We need one for the Soviet navy.

For example, when an article in *Military Thought* referred to "successively concentrating superior forces in individual directions," Herrick immediately knew that the German invasion of Norway was being discussed; or, when a naval commentator may call for "selective command of the sea," Herrick

Just as Dr. Herrick, Robert B. Bathurst served both as assistant naval attaché in Moscow and at the Naval War College. He teaches now at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

can estimate the degree to which he is testing the power of the ground forces marshals.

Without a guide on this tortuous road, few of us could have made sense of the basic pronouncements, and even fewer of our minds could have continued to function after the massive injections of numbing Soviet prose. Herrick has accomplished the monumental task of establishing the hierarchy of the authorities and the chronology of important pronouncements, the discarding of mountains of chaff, and the cross-referencing and lucid translating of the essential texts. He has done so much of our suffering for us that he has disguised the extent of his achievement.

In *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy*, the author outlines in meticulous detail the dominant themes that emerge from his seminal work published in 1968, *Soviet Naval Strategy*: the search since the Revolution for the correct mix of forces and a correct naval theory for a great scientific and industrial state. The bulk of the arguments, Herrick explains, can roughly be grouped around the "Old School," more or less big-ship Mahanian; the "Young School," more or less near-zone, mosquito fleet, naval guerrilla war, à la Admiral Makarov; or, with neat dialecticism, around the emergent eclecticism of the "Soviet" school.

Herrick's careful survey of the literature is, by itself, an act of dedication and endurance for which all interested in Soviet security studies are indebted. As the Soviet regime grew increasingly estranged from both military and political reality, the prose in which it expressed itself became increasingly bowdlerized and incomprehensible. There was a text, a subtext and a metatext. If the text was about tactical command of the sea, the subtext was about the supremacy of the ground force-dominated general staff in strategic decisions and the metatext was about the Soviet policy of rejecting, for the time being, the export of revolution.

Although aware of the dangers of mirror imaging, Herrick (perhaps subconsciously) organizes the material around three main preconceptions. He has his own subtext in which the Soviets are treated with suspenseful condescension: when, like Americans, will the Soviets admit that they must have an aircraft carrier; when, like us, will their navy understand that it requires "command of the sea;" and when will the Soviet navy be able to assert, in competition with the ground forces, that it is independent and equal? So much of American military analysis is influenced by such preconceptions (that they should be like us) that it is perhaps unfair to single out Herrick's work for special criticism, especially since there has certainly been important evidence for each topic in the Soviet Union. But there is a subtle problem to be faced: that of context.

It is the sad fate of hedgehogs, who like best a narrow range, to be interpreted by foxes, whose seeming superficiality they justifiably resent; but the larger context is the business of a review. And here, that is a problem.

What Herrick has produced is a semiotic study. He has dealt almost entirely with Soviet texts and has chosen to de-emphasize the cataclysmic events surrounding them. The Red terror, Kirov's murder, the slaughter of the military leadership, the fear of U.S. nuclear attack—all recede into the background in a way that invites comparison with Jane Austen's ability to decide the fate of generations in exquisitely described parlors into which no sound of the French Revolution intruded.

Similarly, in Herrick's study the violent events of Soviet history hover far in the background. The justification for such an approach is that there can be a theory of naval warfare abstracted from such concerns as mundane terror. The argument is for Plato versus Gorky, the idealized image without warts. Still, it is difficult to ignore the piquancy of the gladiatorial overtones of the debate, that those whose arguments displeased the dictator were executed, imprisoned or disgraced. Such consequences would surely add depth to the pages of any journal, including this *Review*.

"Aircraft carriers," "command of the sea," and "naval strategy" do not have the same meaning in the Russian as in the American setting, even when the words are the same. In American thought, such ideas are often discussed in the abstract, separate from a larger context like the Maritime Strategy. Russian thought does not normally operate that way, and, in any case, the Soviet state has not had the luxury of being able to do this.

The Russian and Soviet military debates have nearly always had to deal with forces in a "catch-up" position, facing a threat over relatively short distances from nations with a technologically superior base. For the navy, an abstract maritime theory has been nearly impossible. The naval zones, while extensive, are all radically different: what is adequate for the Baltic is insufficient for the Pacific. Thus, an essential part of the Russian debate must necessarily relate to the perception of the threat, the geographical factors involved, the economic constraints, and, more than anything else, the political dictates. (For example, arguing for a big-ship navy became in the early thirties (ex post facto) a Trotskyite deviation with deadly consequences because it implied that the Soviet Union should export revolution and that was a criticism of Stalin.)

As a result, the military debate which appeared on the pages of Soviet periodicals, especially in the thirties and fifties, reflected the shadows in the cave, shadows which flicker in the background of Herrick's study. His next volume, dealing with the Gorshkov years, will suffer less from such contextual complications, for after Stalin's death the prose, while still baroque, became somewhat less Aesopian. The penalty for disagreement was not death; and that introduced a more varied, if less consequential, element into the debates. Secondly, the Brezhnev years were for the military years of comparative affluence, which (coupled with reliable espionage) meant that the Soviets had relatively fewer problems knowing what to plan for. (As we apparently have

no secrets, had they wanted to build the *Eisenhower* they almost certainly could have done it.) And thirdly, the tables had turned. The Soviets could make the West dance to some of their tunes.

We can expect the sequel to this book, then, to be a fascinating study, for the kinds of ships the Soviets built, what they wrote and what action they took was almost certainly the direct result of a world view freed from many of the savage constraints of the pre-Brezhnev years. But without this first volume we would not be in a position to understand the next, especially in this country, where the collective historical memory cannot be expected to reach back more than half a generation. As it is, we can look forward with confidence to having the main texts for a cultural history of formal Soviet naval thought.

Leitenberg, Milton. *Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters, 1980-1986*. New York: Praeger, 1987. 199pp. \$31.95

Milton Leitenberg has produced an exhaustive account of the continuous series of violations of Sweden's coastal waters by foreign (assumed to be Soviet) submarines which occurred during the first seven years of this decade. The book, however, is much more than simply an annotated chronology of these incursions. Leitenberg enriches his text by examining the domestic and international political contexts within which the operations were construed, and by subjecting every possible explanation of the Soviets' motives to rigorous analysis on the basis of all the available evidence.

Most importantly, the author exposes the contradictions and weaknesses inherent in the Swedish government's policy regarding these submarine operations by consistently and convincingly comparing govern-

ment statements with the acknowledged facts, only to find that the former come up short every time.

One of the book's strengths is Leitenberg's obvious knowledge of the complex workings of Sweden's military and political structures—knowledge gained, no doubt, while he was a research associate at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs between 1979 and 1987. The author's in-depth knowledge of his field is exemplified by the broad range of Swedish military and political sources upon which he draws to illustrate his thesis.

Leitenberg exploits these sources to greatest effect in his discussion of the weakness demonstrated by the Swedish government in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Soviet Union was routinely violating (neutral) Sweden's territorial waters and had on occasion sent submarines deep into the heart of her most important naval bases. This aspect of the submarine crisis is documented so

exhaustively by the author that the reader unfamiliar with the Swedish political situation is left dumbfounded by the (at best) sheer naiveté exhibited by the Swedish authorities, or (at worst) their apparent unwillingness to recognize the submarine threat for what it was and to take effective action against it.

Although the Swedish government admits to at least 150 "probable violations" of Swedish territorial waters by foreign submarines during the years covered in the book, only twice were the submarines involved positively identified by the government as Soviet vessels (a fact Leitenberg partially attributes to the paucity of Swedish anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and to official rules of engagement which inhibited Swedish naval commanders from either forcing the submarines to the surface or sinking them).

One of these two incidents was the infamous "Whiskey-on-the-Rocks" case in October 1981, when a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine accidentally ran aground inside the Karlskrona naval base in southern Sweden. On this occasion, the Swedish government had no option but to call a spade a spade, and the Soviet government, in turn, was forced to apologize for the incursion (which it excused by explaining that all the submarine's navigational instruments had simultaneously malfunctioned).

On most other occasions when submarine violations of Swedish territorial waters were recorded, Leitenberg demonstrates that the

Swedish government seemed determined to avoid coming to the politically inconvenient conclusion that the Soviet authorities were both lying to them about previous submarine operations and ignoring their pleas that such operations be discontinued.

The unwillingness of the Swedish government to acknowledge the extent of the submarine incursions extended even to a reluctance to believe the testimony of their own armed forces, who during 1983 publicly released sonar recordings of an intruding submarine. "When it came to the question of 'evidence,'" Leitenberg informs us, "the Swedish government [which from 1982 to 1986 was the Social Democratic government of Olof Palme] even contradicted their own previous statements of their efforts to make reality conform to their own view of events." In April 1984, after one of the longest series of submarine incursions, Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom stated that the "Swedish government places great weight on the assurances that [Soviet] Foreign Minister Gromyko made that the USSR has not violated Swedish territory since the grounding in Gasfjarden in 1981." Leitenberg notes that Bodstrom's statement was at odds with his own government's position, which identified the Soviet Union as responsible for the lengthy series of submarine intrusions in October 1982 at Harsfjarden, close to Sweden's major naval base at Musko.

The author summarizes the Swedish government's attitude as follows: "Swedish [government] policy clearly was unable to face realities and their unpleasant, complicating implications."

Having exhaustively chronologized this seven-year series of intrusions and the diplomatic maneuvering which accompanied them, Leitenberg turns his attention to an analysis of the Soviets' motives for initiating the operations and for continuing them in the face of (admittedly muted) Swedish protests. The theories which come under his scrutiny include such seemingly farfetched hypotheses as the one posed by a Swedish naval captain who suggested that the Soviets were trying to persuade the Swedes to increase their ASW resources so that in time of war they would be able to prevent NATO submarines from hiding in Swedish territorial waters.

Leitenberg ultimately rejects what he terms "purposeful provocation theories" such as that above in favor of "military/operational motives." In what the author describes as the "most plausible" theory, British defense analyst Michael McCWire suggests that the operations fit neatly into the Soviet military concept of "preparation of a naval theater (MTVD) for military action." According to McCWire, the incursions are rehearsals for wartime operations in which the Soviets would "neutralize" Swedish coastal installations, particularly those that could be used in the context of ASW.

Despite its exhaustive approach, Leitenberg's book does contain some weaknesses, not the least of which is

the absence of any detailed maps of the area under discussion. Those readers lacking comprehensive knowledge of Swedish geography will be left somewhat perplexed as the author describes the routes taken by various submarines.

In addition, not enough attention is paid to the role of Spetsnaz troops (Soviet special forces) during the incursions. This aspect of the operations deserves to be explored in greater detail in the light of two factors: first, Leitenberg's acceptance of McCWire's theory that the operations were aimed at Sweden's coastal defenses; and second, the physical evidence of the large-scale use of midget submarines by the Soviets during the incursions. Both of these suggest substantial Spetsnaz involvement in the submarine operations.

Perhaps the book's only serious flaw, however, is the author's apparent failure to conduct any interviews with those Swedish government officials directly involved with the submarine crisis. Leitenberg quotes liberally from media interviews with these officials to buttress his own assertions. Yet despite being ideally situated in Stockholm between 1979 and 1987, Leitenberg appears never to have sought out those responsible for Swedish government policy during this period. His failure to do so is the only major weakness in an otherwise invaluable work.

SEAN NAYLOR
Boston University

Mawdsley, Evan. *The Russian Civil War*. Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 367pp. \$45

Why did the Reds win? Why did Lenin's enemies lose? What was the human cost of the Russian Civil War? These are only a few of the enduring questions about the first phase of Soviet history that Professor Mawdsley addresses. His answers are invariably thoughtful, well documented, and persuasive.

For better or for worse, Mawdsley does not hesitate to take strong positions on hotly disputed issues, even when he is in the minority among his peers. The book is clearly a labor of love, and Mawdsley's publisher deserves special thanks for bolstering it with the best maps and the most intelligent bibliographical essay yet to see print on this period.

Mawdsley's most important thesis has to do with exactly when the Civil War started. He sees the Bolshevik seizure of power—the October Revolution of 1917—as its beginning. From this perspective, Mawdsley minimizes the importance of foreign intervention and attaches greater significance to Lenin's program for social and economic transformation than do scholars who date the Civil War from the summer of 1918.

Mawdsley finds support for this view in a broad range of Soviet, emigre, and Western literature. He tells the story of the war itself better than any single volume has done before, concluding with an incisive essay on why the war ended as it did

and what its toll in human lives may have been (seven to ten million).

Readers with a broad interest in military history will find this work unusually satisfying. Even those who specialize in current affairs will discover that Mawdsley's analysis of authentic Leninism can help to clarify what Mikhail Gorbachev is up to in Moscow today.

PAUL HOLMAN
Naval War College

David M. Lampton & Catherine H. Keyser, ed., *China's Global Presence: Economics, Politics and Security*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988. 237pp. \$26.50

Political repression is the hallmark of communist governments, and recent events in the People's Republic of China (PRC) prove that economic and political "reforms" remain subordinate to the imperative of communist party control. This fact seems to have been consistently overlooked by analysts of Chinese affairs, as exemplified in this book.

With one out of every five people in the world living inside its borders, China is a potential economic and political superpower. The key word is potential. This book is an attempt to analyze the PRC's potential by examining the political, economic and security trends evidenced in China today and projecting them into the future. In doing so, it demonstrates the strengths and

weaknesses of current Chinese analysis in this country, and the extreme difficulty involved in anticipating the future of a nation and a culture whose recent history is characterized by change that is constant, rapid, and often bloody and repressive.

The book consists mainly of papers presented by leading China analysts at two conferences in 1987 that were cosponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute of South East Asian Studies. Each paper is followed by comments and discussions by other China analysts. This is both interesting and frustrating: Interesting because it provides alternative views of the topic; frustrating because it demonstrates the lack of consensus among the "experts" on where China is going. However, it is an excellent source for understanding the issues and the debates surrounding China's modernization and the background to both the recent student demonstrations and the government's seemingly anachronistic response. Though the book's conclusions have been overtaken by recent events, it is fascinating.

In many ways, political and economic analysis resembles intelligence analysis; specialists examine recent trends, develop patterns of activity, and project these patterns into the future. If recent trends have been peaceful and positive, then, barring major disrupting factors, the resulting projections will be the same.

So it is with most of the papers in this book, with each analyst basically forecasting varying degrees of continued progress in his area of expertise, i.e., political reform, economic development or security affairs. Unforeseen or unexpected events (such as the government's repressive reactions to a threat to party hegemony) often make this kind of analysis wrong. Thus optimistic, straight-line projections of China's economic growth (as in Chapter 3) make little sense if there is a good prospect for domestic political turmoil (as indicated in Chapter 1). To the editor's credit, some of these "what ifs" are addressed by the comments and discussions following each chapter.

The perceptive first chapter was written by David M. Lampton, coeditor of the book. Lampton recognizes that political stability is the key to progress. He begins by describing the likely political context in which Chinese economic and defense developments must take place. He provides a concise survey of current political reform developments within China and the political difficulties of achieving economic growth while supporting a growing and increasingly corrupt bureaucracy. His analysis of the balance that exists between conservative elements of the PRC communist party bureaucracy and the "reformers" (exemplified by former General Secretary Hu Yaobang) is very useful for putting the recent Beijing student demonstrations into perspective. But he, like other China

analysts, failed to predict either the strength and popular support of the student "political reform" movement or the government's response. Clearly, prediction is a hazardous business, but as Lampton says, "Any projections concerning China's economic and military impact in the year 2000 must be premised on certain assumptions about the political trajectory of the People's Republic of China (PRC) between then and now."

It is an interesting current phenomenon that both major communist world powers are being forced to reconcile the need for more political and economic freedom with the communist imperative to maintain party control. In China's case, the ingrained conservatism and aging leadership of the party described by Lampton suggest that the focus will be on more centralized control. This will have severe implications for reform. Unfortunately, this possibility is not adequately addressed in the book; and yet, as we have recently witnessed, this is what has occurred, with Deng Xiaoping playing a key role not as a "moderate" but as an arch-conservative concerned with preserving party control at all costs.

The later chapters examine Taiwan's economic and political developments, the potential for Sino-American trade, prospects for the PRC economy, future implications of the PRC's electronics and aircraft industry, China's role as a nuclear power and the security implications for Asia of Chinese military and economic power. All

basically project continued progress in all areas.

Specific conclusions reached by these analyses include the following:

- Taiwan's economic and political growth will slow but continue.

- In the PRC, economic and political reforms are precarious but will likely continue to evolve slowly.

- Prospects for continued Sino-American trade are good, but volume will remain a modest component of total U.S. foreign trade in the year 2000.

- In the electronics and aircraft industry, the PRC will focus on its domestic market. It is unlikely to produce advanced systems that are competitive in the global market.

- The PRC will continue to expand its nuclear forces and will play an increasingly important role in global arms reductions.

- The PRC's use of military power in the region will be cautious because of the need for a peaceful environment to achieve domestic economic and political development.

These conclusions contain no surprises. The "spice" in this potpourri of analyses is provided by the comments of other conference participants, who appeared to be more willing than the authors to raise the hard questions. Here are two examples of these insightful, even prescient comments: "... who really understands China? ... the Chinese themselves don't always understand what goes on in their own country. Those who visit China frequently can come up with as many answers to a single question as there are

people to talk to;" and "The question does arise how China specialists could have misread the political situation so miserably. In analyzing the Chinese political scene, must we always depend on hindsight to make sense of Chinese politics? If this were the case, then the profession of China studies has not made much progress since the 1950s. . . ."

In light of recent events in China, these are interesting comments for a group of China analysts to make; and their candor makes this book especially valuable to those who want to understand the variables in the current Chinese "equation," as the communist government of that state once again demonstrates the fragility of political reform in a totalitarian dictatorship.

E.D. SMITH, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Long, David F., *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 448pp. \$32.95

For over 70 years the main source for the diplomatic role of our naval officers in the 18th and 19th centuries has been Charles O. Paullin's *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883*. Now, Professor David F. Long of the University of New Hampshire has produced this reference book that both succeeds and expands the Paullin book, although Long has chosen to have his work start 20 years

after the beginning of Paullin's on the grounds that 1798 is the beginning of an independent Navy Department. Long accepts Paullin's terminal date because it marks a dividing line between the "old" navy and the "new" navy and because Commodore Shufeldt's successful overseeing of the Korean-U.S. treaty in 1883 was "the last time that a U.S. naval officer on active duty was given such a responsible diplomatic assignment." This was also about the time that the transoceanic cable line came into being: ambassadors, proconsuls and military officers everywhere were thus put on a short leash to the home office.

The book also expands Paullin's "negotiations" to "activities," thereby encompassing other categories, some of which seem to fit the modern definition of naval presence and one which would seem to stand better by itself: "they [naval officers] acted as warriors during their nation's declared hostilities."

While Long intends this as a reference work, his introductory chapter does provide an analytical framework, particularly in his use of Secretary of State William Seward's judicious defusing in 1869 of a State/ Navy dispute over a South American war. Seward refused to declare either the minister or the admiral subordinate, saying that the government benefitted from having two points of view and that while the minister's "proceedings are approved, those of Admiral Gordon are not disapproved." Neither diplomats nor sailors would be completely happy

with this evenhanded approach, especially in China during the age of extra-territoriality.

A good reference book has three audiences: the scholar who requires accurate and authoritative information, the general reader who needs clarification and the random reader who is curious. All three groups are well-served by this book. The third group can have real fun, for instance, reading of "Mad Jack" Percival, commanding Old Ironsides, who took hostages in Annam in 1845 to force the Annamese court to release a French bishop who seems to have made a career of being arrested. Percival tried to take on the whole kingdom with only one 18th century frigate, only to find that the bishop had been released to a French man-of-war. Some of the 19th century contretemps of naval officers in Nicaragua also make lively, if cautionary reading.

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Heinrichs, Waldo. *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 279pp. \$19.95

Although Professor Heinrichs cannot fully describe Roosevelt's intentions in the crisis year of 1941—Roosevelt's love of dissembling made it impossible to know then, or now, whether he had some hidden plan to take the country to war—Heinrichs does the next best thing. He cites the

president's decisions in their context using what anthropologists call "thick description," in this case a month-by-month analysis of what information the administration had, how they considered it, and what they decided between the passage of Lend Lease in March to Pearl Harbor in December. This is a comprehensive history that sheds new light on American foreign policy.

Heinrichs concludes that Roosevelt was determined to protect the country's interests on their own terms, that he supported but did not defer to an allied cause, and that he understood that the primary threat came from across the Atlantic. Heinrichs' main point is that the president and the administration made foreign policy according to a systematic evaluation of the global implications of events and to the country's military capability. Roosevelt, like Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, knew the value and the limits of force.

Heinrichs' vertical chronology makes it easy to follow the complex of influences behind every major decision. He shows that policy was based increasingly on what armed force was available and anticipated, and that technology and operational doctrine played a large part. In fact, the focus of the book turns out to be not Roosevelt after all. Rather it is the mass of considerations interconnected by the process of American policy evaluation, the threads of which, admittedly, only Roosevelt held in their entirety.

As an example of Heinrichs' analytic method, refer to the month of July 1941. The government related the German invasion of Russia directly to the future of the Atlantic and a new deterrence policy towards Japan. American security depended on control of the Atlantic. For this the defeat of Germany was essential, for which in turn the survival and continued resistance of the Soviet Union was necessary. To help, the United States could supply the Russians and prevent the Japanese from opening a second front against them in Siberia. Events on the Russian western front were thus behind sending marines to Iceland (army troops being unready for so sudden a move) and the decision to escort the convoys. At the same time, and by the same token, the government sought to contain Japan's careening expansion in the Far East.

The Japanese had the choice of moving north to take advantage of the wounded Russians, or, with fewer worries now on the Manchurian border, to turn south toward a maritime empire. Deterrence was meant to prevent action in either direction. The elements of diplomatic and economic pressure are well known. Less so are its military dimensions. Roosevelt's quid pro quo for help to the British in the Atlantic was their dispatch of the *Prince of Wales* to join the *Repulse* in the Indian Ocean. The Philippines became part of an offensive strategy, based in part on a buildup of submarines but mainly on long-range B-17s, whose deterrent value the

army air force touted (as it turned out, entirely unrealistically). This Asian strategy, a Far Eastern second front from Manila, was meant to enhance security in the Atlantic. This is truly global thinking. However wrongheaded were some of the assumptions about strategic bombing and containing Japan, Heinrichs' point is that the administration was consciously thinking in terms of a worldwide balance of power, and action in the Pacific was meant to add to the security of the Atlantic.

For an understanding of U.S. foreign policy in 1941, for clues to appraise the elusive Roosevelt, this is now the book with which to begin.

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van der Vat, Dan. *The Atlantic Campaign: World War II's Great Struggle*. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 424 pp. \$25

World War II's Battle of the Atlantic, the Allies' triumphant effort to use the Atlantic sea lines and Germany's nearly successful attempt to deny, was the longest and bloodiest campaign in naval history. Dan van der Vat's *The Atlantic Campaign* is a one volume history of this epic struggle, intended for the general reader. Surprisingly, there have been few English language attempts prior to this. Most related works tend to concentrate upon one specific aspect, such as the crucial convoy battles of early 1943, the sinking of the *Bismark*, or intelligence. Author of previous

naval narratives, *The Grand Scuttle* and *Gentlemen of War*, van der Vat brings to his work the dual vocation of historian and journalist and a healthy skepticism toward accepted historical wisdom. He also brings fluent German and archival research accomplished in Germany. The result is a straightforward chronological narrative that begins with World War I's aftermath, travels through Britain's rearmament mistakes (particularly the forsaking of the fleet air arm), and then relates the tale of lost blood and treasure. No World War II historian or naval planner should bypass *The Atlantic Campaign*.

Any weak points in this comprehensive work are in emphasis or interpretation. With respect to emphasis, the author rightly portrays the long neglected Canadian contribution to convoy escort on the North Atlantic run; but, there is nary a word about the Allied merchant marine, whose losses of personnel and ships dwarfed even those of the U-boats. This silence is a bit incongruous in view of the fact that merchant shipping was the reason for the Atlantic battle. Moreover, van der Vat seems to have recognized this implicitly in his compliments to the little known but immensely successful efforts of Captain Eric Band, RN and Captain Frederick B. Watt, RCNR to maintain the morale of merchant mariners via Canada's Naval Boarding Service.

The Kriegsmarine staff for U-boats is given due applause for being small, efficient and the servant of the

operating forces. Doenitz' Chief of Staff, Captain Eberhard Godt, is given full credit for his contribution. However, the Western Approaches Command in Liverpool is given short shrift. While Admiral Sir Max Horton was every bit the dynamo portrayed, he was not the whole command. DCOS (Operations) Captain Stephen Ravenhill and Staff Officer A/S Commander C.D.H. Howard-Johnston were a match for Godt. Individually and collectively, the Western Approaches staff was that rarest of miracles, a shore establishment highly esteemed by sailors.

With respect to interpretation, two subjects deserve readdressal: Convoy HG-76 and intelligence. In December 1941, passed-over Commander Johnny Walker, officially "lacking qualities of leadership," took a thirty-two ship Gibraltar-to-Plymouth convoy, HG-76, through an eight-day running battle. Walker safely delivered thirty ships and left in his wake four or five sunken U-boats, an incredible victory when victories were few. Walker would eventually become Captain Frederick John Walker, CB, DSO***, RN, whose escorts sank some thirty U-boats. However, HG-76 was more than just a dramatic victory which introduced a fighting hero of the Atlantic. The operations of HG-76 were scrutinized by Commander Gilbert Roberts of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit. From his study came the tactics which transformed Commonwealth escorts from individual lookouts into teams

of U-boat killers. Van der Vat misses this link.

Regrettably, there is no separate chapter on intelligence. However, woven through *The Atlantic Campaign* is the theme that Anglo-American intelligence, important though it was, has been overrated. When the Ultra secret was declassified in 1974, it caused a rethinking of Allied World War II successes. Van der Vat questions this wholesale historical revision. He correctly states that Ultra was only one means of intelligence. (Donald McLachlan in his classic *Room 39* outlines no fewer than seventeen naval intelligence sources, of which wireless intercepts were most valued but by no means stood alone.) Van der Vat also reminds us that Allied communications themselves were by no means secure. Foremost in van der Vat's challenge is the occasionally forgotten truth that intelligence alone does not win battles. Assuming that the raw information from many sources is correctly evaluated, three things can happen, and two of them are bad. The intelligence may not be disseminated to the right command, as at Pearl Harbor. Or the intelligence may not be correctly acted upon, as in the case of convoy PQ 17. Or, lastly, as at Midway, correct intelligence may be rightly received and ably employed. But even then success is only made possible, not guaranteed. Perhaps in his quest to put the still rather new Ultra revelations in perspective, van der Vat mildly underrates the total effect of intelligence. This is particularly

true for the latter stages of the war when Ultra decrypts, handled in Washington by Captain Kenneth Knowles of OP-20-G, were instrumental in the destruction of fifty-one U-boats by U.S. hunter-killer groups. Still, the challenge to the Ultra revisionists merits consideration.

Van der Vat is no admirer of Admiral Ernest J. King, but the allusion to near "psychotic Anglophobia" goes too far. The King intellect surpassed that of any English-speaking colleague. Cominch *was* prejudiced against anyone and anything not stamped "USN" (perhaps the English foremost); but he was no psycho. Still, while an American might wish the tone were less harsh and more credit given to King's late but effective Tenth Fleet organization (listed beneath his portrait in the Pentagon as one of his great achievements), van der Vat does debunk the long-standing myth that King's early attitude about convoy was a triumph of mindset over evidence. King actually believed in convoy from the outset, but he also believed that limited escort along the U.S. coastline was useless. King was proven wrong. Limited escort *was* better than none. Van der Vat here discerns a subtle mistake in King's thinking rather than the blunder many have ascribed.

These oversights are minor in what is an impressive achievement. In John Waters' *Bloody Winter* and Martin Middlebrook's *Convoy*, one may perhaps more easily grab the essence of this one campaign *which*

had to be won. But for completeness, *The Atlantic Campaign* is the single best English language reference and a book which should become a standard text.

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Breuer, William B. *Operation Torch: The Gamble to Invade North Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 272 pp. \$18.95

This is a popular account of the Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa in November 1942. William Breuer is a combat veteran who has produced several World War II histories for the general reader. Operation Torch, the first blooding of American ground troops in the Mediterranean theater, has been often bypassed by authors with more spectacular tales to tell. However, many of the military and naval leaders who were prominent in landings on the beaches of Sicily, Italy, and France made their appearance first in North Africa. Through Breuer's lively prose the reader will sense the trepidation, confusion, and courage of American troops and their leaders as they staged their first major amphibious assault.

Allied leaders contemplated various ways to enter the war. One early option was an invasion of western France in 1942 or 1943. That this was seriously considered provides a sense

of how troubled those times were. The Allies were concerned that without a show of force in the West, the Soviet Union might be forced into a separate peace. Stalin was urging the establishment of a second front to divert German pressure on his beleaguered troops. Breuer boldly states that the British staged the suicidal Dieppe raid (Operation Jubilee) in August 1942 in order to convince Washington (Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall) what a mistake a larger invasion would be at that early date. In other words, they intentionally staged an attack they knew would fail in order to win an argument at the conference table.

Breuer emphasizes the tortuous nature of military politics in Vichy France and how difficult it was to determine whether the French in North Africa would oppose an Allied landing. The Allies went to great lengths to prevent French opposition. The book contains extensive coverage of General Mark Clark's ill-advised (by Robert Murphy), clandestine voyage in a British submarine to have a meeting with a sympathetic French general on the North African coast. The very real possibility of Clark's capture, with its propaganda and intelligence value, overrode the practical result. The romantic, daring quality of the mission was undeniable, but it did not prevent hostilities with the French.

Finally, Breuer vividly portrays what went wrong in the various landing zones when local French commanders opposed the Allies with

force: the naval debacle in Oran harbor, the French strafing of American paratroops at Tafaroui airport, the chaotic situation at Port Lyautey, and the disorganized landing at Cape Fedala near Casablanca, to mention but a few examples. After four days of sporadic warfare and urgent diplomacy, French resistance collapsed. The cost was 1,434 American casualties (556 killed, 837 wounded, 41 missing); for the British, 330 casualties; for the French, 2,500 casualties (700 killed, 1,400 wounded, 400 missing). The French air force lost many pilots and planes, and their navy scuttled the fleet at Toulon and other ports in southern France. In the last analysis, as Breuer points out, it was fortunate the French chose to fight. As a result, Operation Torch became a "gigantic combat laboratory" where untried troops learned bitter lessons before having to face the seasoned Wehrmacht. The landing was a success, but as General George Patton later admitted, "only through the intervention of Divine Providence."

Breuer does not use footnote or endnote citations. His sources include 54 books, mostly biographies and memoirs written between 1945 and 1980. The bulk of these accounts were published in the 1950s and 1960s. He also lists four titles under "unit and campaign histories." One of them, George F. Howe's *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1957), of the famous "Green Series," was probably indispensable to the writing of *Operation*

Torch. Breuer may have also consulted Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1953), but does not list this valuable work. For those who need a quick, readable summary of Operation Torch, this book is ideal; but for deeper treatment and guidance to primary sources, one should go elsewhere.

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Stafford, Edward P. *Subchaser to Sicily*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 320 pp. \$17.95

Stead, Gordon W. *A Leaf Upon the Sea: A Small Ship in the Mediterranean 1941-1943*. Vancouver, Canada: Univ. of British Columbia, 1988. 185 pp. \$27.95

These are two great books! Those who go down to the sea in small ships will find them particularly interesting. Both books are warmly and personably written with an easy flowing style. They are hard to put down once started.

It is remarkable that two so similar works would be published in the same year—one by an American reservist, the other by a Canadian recounting his service with the Royal Navy. Both were young men thrust into command of a small warship as their nations geared up for the full fight of World War II. In the

American case, LTJG Stafford took command of USS *SC-692*, a wooden subchaser: 110 feet in length, 18 feet abeam and 106 tons displacement. In LT Stead's case it was called a motor launch, HM *ML-126*, but was roughly the same size and had the identical mission—chasing submarines—which neither did very much of. But they did do a great deal else.

As was the custom in those days, when shipbuilding was outrunning personnel training, both ships were manned with a few seasoned enlisted ratings and filled out with reservists and new recruits. So both skippers faced the challenge of working up their crews in a new class of ship while developing their own sense of command. Fortunately, both were blessed with a good sense of humor and were experienced in navigation and seamanship as a result of earlier days in sailboats.

After an initial workup and local operations, both vessels undertook lengthy voyages from home waters to the Mediterranean theater where both continued to operate throughout the war in one form or another. It was during these transits that what had been not much more than large yachts took on a toughness that characterized them as warships thereafter. The story of this transition is compelling reading. I could not help but be amused at how quickly during the transit senior officers in both navies adopted the practice of using these small ships as messengers between the larger ships in the formation. These days we have

a tendency to do the same thing with ASW helicopters.

Once in the Mediterranean the experiences of the two vessels differ somewhat and then converge again. Since *ML-126* arrived more than a year earlier than *SC-692*, and was stationed at Malta, she saw considerably more action.

The most gripping parts of *Leaf Upon the Sea* come from the section on those desperate days before the Allied victories in North Africa. Once in Malta *ML-126* found that sweeping mines had a much higher priority than chasing submarines, so they became expert at that hazardous task. One memorable afternoon *ML-126* was pounced upon by three Messerschmitts while the RAF was busy elsewhere. As I read this account, I could not help thinking that most modern warfare analysts or war game umpires would consider that the little ship was outgunned by more than 3 to 1 and what guns she could bring to bear were manually controlled, and would then declare a clear victory for the attacking aircraft. In the real world of 1942, the outcome was markedly different: *ML-126* 3, Messerschmitts 0.

Because *SC-692* arrived in the Med in May 1943, her early days were less dangerous, if not less busy, as she ran east and west along the North African coast on one mission or another. Within a matter of months, however, she found the mainstream of the war and participated in the invasions of Sicily and Italy. Here the stories of the two small ships come together as both are

caught up in these momentous events. Both books provide unique and exciting views of these operations. Particularly moving is an incident after the capture of Sicily: The prudent mariner in LTJG Stafford declined a convenient berth in a nest alongside a quay wall in Palermo for a more dispersed position in an offshore anchorage; an air raid that night sunk the two SCs that remained in the nest. Throughout this phase, the pace of both books is fast and action filled. Then, remarkably, the two authors are relieved within 6 days of each other in October 1943 and head back to North America for some well deserved leave and reassignment to duty in larger ships (destroyers and destroyer escorts).

Both books are personal memoirs as well as accounts of the authors' ships and crews. The writing is free-flowing and technically correct, making them enjoyable reading for civilian and naval personnel alike. I commend them highly to those with an interest in going to sea in small ships, those looking for a new perspective on naval operations in the Med during World War II and to those just looking for some exciting reading.

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Berry, Henry. *Hey Mac, Where Ya Been?: Living Memories Of The U.S. Marines In The Korean War*. New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
323pp. \$22.95

This is the third book written by Mr. Berry dealing with the experiences of the American combat soldier during this century's major wars. Having previously dealt with the marines fighting in the Pacific during the Second World War, Berry now turns his attention to Korea. As in his previous work, the story is told in the words of the marines who fought in Korea. The viewpoints presented and the memories recalled do not deal with the art of high strategy and policy. There is little here to explain why the war was fought as it was. Those looking for such insights are probably better off seeking answers in other recent efforts. For those interested in understanding the war from the viewpoint of the average marine, this work presents a different insight into the nature of the land war.

It's all too easy with the passage of time to forget the human aspects of fighting in Korea in the summer and winter of 1950. The lack of readiness to fight again so soon after the trauma of World War II and the massive demobilization that followed tends to be forgotten today in the flush of the Reagan defense buildup. But the reminiscence of many marines vividly brings home the experience of moving rapidly from a carefree peacetime existence to the early confusion of landing in Korea. The widespread feeling that the North Koreans could be easily handled was rapidly dispelled as the South Korean and U.N. forces were

forced back into the Pusan perimeter. The story of the acclimation of the average marine as he came face to face with the twin enemies of weather and the North Korean and Chinese human-wave attacks is the glue that holds this book together.

Berry's work traces the marine involvement from MacArthur's decision to provide a marine brigade to help shore up Walker's shaky Pusan perimeter, through the landings at Inchon, the push to Seoul, the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir, and the final hard-fought engagements during the armistice talks. Recollections of the retreat from the Chosin, in particular, help to explain how the marines held together in the face of the almost constant human-wave attacks of Chinese Communist troops. Considering the less favorable aspects of the retreat on the opposite side of the peninsula, the marines have every right to be proud of this part of their history. The frustration of the period of armistice negotiations takes on new meaning when seen from the perspective of marines suffering daily casualties during a period when peace was presumed to be close at hand. Memories of the lukewarm reception that greeted all too many marines on returning from Korea would be echoed a generation later.

This book is eminently readable and very useful for an understanding of what combat in our first major undeclared war was really like. Marines, in particular, will appreciate that special bond that held their brothers-in-arms together during

the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir and continues in the Corps today.

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Spurr, Russell. *Enter The Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea 1950-51*. New York: Newmarket Press, 1989. 335 pp. \$22.95

Korea, the "incomprehensible crusade," the forgotten war now enjoying a long overdue renaissance, has been portrayed more comprehensively but never better than in Russell Spurr's *Enter The Dragon*. Spurr, an "old China hand" and *London Daily Express* correspondent in Korea in 1952-53, not only culled the archives, but took full advantage of door openings following Mao Tze Tung's death in 1976 to interview many Chinese participants, from private to army commander. His stunning, dramatic book is thus largely told from the Chinese point of view. And a captivating story it is.

When mainland China—under-rated, scorned, butt of countless jokes—suddenly, unexpectedly exploded into the Korean War in late 1950, she set into motion the longest, most disgraceful retreat in American military history. *Enter The Dragon* bars no holds and willingly lauds and excoriates friend and foe alike. Though it covers barely the first year of the Korean War, ending

with the June 1951 calls for a cease-fire, it enthalls from its first page.

Spurr is at his best dealing with people: the Chinese general afraid of spiders; the American general to whom the enemy was nothing but "Chinese laundrymen;" the U.S. regimental commander vowing to urinate in the Yalu. There are dozens of fascinating personal glimpses: Mao the dogmatic school teacher, overconfident, undercapable; Douglas MacArthur, "a man of many words," surrounded by fawning, adoring courtiers, who saw himself, one reporter wrote, "as a Ghenghis Khan in reverse," but far less knowledgeable about Asia, air-power, intelligence, and politics than he thought; Syngman Rhee, intolerant, vindictive, despotic; and Matthew Ridgway, "America's most underrated military genius." No less intriguing are looks at the less mighty: Big Ears Wong, Fat Belly Wu, Limp Zhang, Opium Li, Sawtooth Soong, "Nervous John" Coulter.

Enter The Dragon opens with a Chinese liaison officer's account of the North Korean Army's tightening of the noose around the "Pusan Perimeter." Anticipating a North Korean victory, Chinese political and military leaders were severely alarmed, though not entirely surprised, by General MacArthur's tactical masterstroke at Inchon. North Korean leaders immediately recognized they were lost unless the Chinese intervened. Spurr strongly suggests that the Chinese did not want war with the United States.

Only recently victorious against the Nationalist Chinese and dedicated to and preparing for an invasion of Taiwan, Spurr convincingly portrays Chinese leaders reluctantly entering the Korean War to prevent liquidation of a friendly (and buffer) state. The Chinese hoped their intervention could be limited in scale and serve as a warning. Of particular concern was America's possession of the atomic bomb. The Chinese, of course, were not talking with the West and the West was not talking with the People's Republic of China. To U.N. forces (mainly South Korean and U.S.) on whom the first blows fell, Chinese intervention was anything but limited and offered precious little warning. And here is the mainstay of Spurr's book.

Spurr describes in few words but vivid detail the People's Liberation Army and its Korean War variant, the Chinese "Volunteers" (Zhou Enlai's idea and term), and its chief adversary, the American army. Weak in mobility, communications, supply, transport, and firepower, the Chinese nevertheless fielded a daunting force: physically tough, superb at camouflage and infiltration (both figured prominently in the "surprise" of Chinese intervention, as did stubborn American refusal to believe it likely or even possible), adept at long, overland marches, and extremely confident.

Spurr's portrayal of the American army when the dragon entered is a devastating one. Hastily sent to Korea from the occupation army in Japan, Spurr calls it "scandalously

unfit, understrength, and under-trained." He takes it to task for "criminal carelessness," slackness, complacency, poor discipline, and grave laxity (partly the result of an environment in occupied Japan whereby eager male Japanese did much of the U.S. soldier's work for him while other Japanese performed more intimate off-duty services—all well within the GI's budget).

Even the reader well versed in the Korean War will be hard pressed to remain ungripped by Spurr's unfolding of the mammoth clash between Chinese and American forces. Though evidence of a Chinese presence dated a week earlier, the ferocious main Chinese attack occurred 1 November 1950. Without air cover, artillery, or tanks, superbly infiltrated infantry-heavy Chinese formations fell first upon the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. Accompanied by bugles, whistles, and gongs, reminding at least one GI of a "Chinese funeral," it was the prelude to the longest, most shameful retreat in American military history: 275 miles in six weeks. To be sure, spectacular gallantry and extremely stubborn resistance are not ignored. The 1st Marine Division's magnificent retreat to the sea (a euphemism by any other name still smells the same) ranks as the singular, stellar U.S. division-sized operation of the Korean War; the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division's loss of half its artillery and 3000 men *in one afternoon* the most tragic. Spurr treats both very skillfully.

In the ensuing weeks, heady Chinese success altered the original goal of warning the United States. By December 1950, the Chinese goal became the original North Korean one of unifying the entire peninsula under communist rule.

If the Chinese were weak in modern firepower, lacked standardized weapons and were furnished with only crude, hand-drawn maps, this foot-mobile force, logistically supported by a few hundred trucks and *half a million coolies*, still staggered the world's mightiest military power, undid General MacArthur and President Truman, and set percolating doubts about the relationship between political ideas and material wherewithal which continue to our own day. Political vicissitudes aside, *Enter The Dragon* ends on the military upbeat with General Ridgway's near miraculous turnaround of the Eighth Army—and of the Korean War.

Enter the Dragon is no apology for Chinese intervention. It is a remarkable account of a neglected war, told principally from the main enemy's point of view. As such it seeks far less to convince than to inform. It would benefit from more maps, less threadbare photos, and a thorough editing (the Dieppe raid was 1942 not 1943; the 8th Regiment 1st Cavalry Division was the 8th Cavalry Regiment; napalm was first used not at Okinawa but at Pelelieu; U.S. Marines did not first operate under the U.S. Army in Korea but had in both world wars). These flaws,

however, are minor. *Enter The Dragon* is nothing short of superb.

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Van Creveld, Martin. *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present*. New York: The Free Press, 1989. 342pp. \$22.95.

This book is different. Its goal is to provide a historical analysis of the role that technology has played in the development and transformation of war, but it is not simply an account of weapon evolution and the impact of that evolution on combat. The book has a larger vision of technology within the society and the total impact technology has on war. Accordingly, a great deal of attention is given to mundane subjects such as roads, maps, communications, and management, each of which has a significant influence on war.

Van Creveld has organized his material by four eras. The first, reaching to about 1500 A.D., is the Age of Tools, when military technology derived its energy from the muscles of men and animals. The second extends to about 1830 and is the Age of Machines. The third goes through the Second World War and is the Age of Systems. The final era covers from 1945 to the present: the Age of Automation. Each of these four sections of the book contains five chapters. Four of them each deal with a particular aspect of warfare,

such as field warfare or naval warfare, more or less chronologically for the era. The fifth chapter in each section is thematic. These deal with irrational or dysfunctional technology which does not get exploited, the rise of military professionalism, the invention of invention, and real war (as opposed to make-believe war).

In addition to a decent index, the book contains a bibliographical essay with brief comments about books related to each chapter of the book. Its conclusion is that a comprehensive and systematic theory of the relationship between technology and war is not available. Perhaps such will have to wait for a modern Clausewitz.

Martin Van Creveld is an internationally acclaimed military historian who teaches history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He brings a broad international perspective to this book due to his interaction with members of both the American and Israeli defense communities.

His discussion of guerrilla war and terrorism is quite worthwhile, but there is much more of value in this book. It helps to put in proper perspective the impact of a nation's infrastructure and technology on its war-making. It will stimulate one's thinking. Each of the four sections of the book devoted to the different eras contains approximately the same number of pages; this places most emphasis upon the more modern periods since the four eras are progressively shorter. Even so, the book is weakest in its final section.

The treatment of the Age of Automation, 1945 to the present, seems superficial when compared to the fundamental insights for earlier eras. Perhaps this is the result of so many technological changes since the Second World War; or perhaps some of the fundamental interactions between technology and war in this era are still obscure. Whatever the cause, it suggests that a great deal is yet to be said on the subject of modern technology's relation to war.

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Baker, A.D. III, ed. *Combat Fleets of the World 1988/89: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 908pp. \$96.95

Giorgerini, G., and Nani, A., eds. *Almanacco Navale 1988*. Genoa, Italy: Istituto Idrografico Della Marina, 1988. 1092pp. \$59

These two large volumes are awesome compilations of data and illustrations on the world's navies. As anticipated in the review of the previous edition of *Combat Fleets* published here (NCWR Summer 1987, p.129), *Combat Fleets 1988/89* arguably now has overtaken the longtime "standard reference of the world's navies," *Jane's Fighting Ships*, as the best single encyclopedia of naval vessels. Their opposite number from Italy, *Almanacco Navale 1988*, adopts a somewhat less ambitious

format but succeeds nonetheless in providing a wealth of information and many unique illustrations.

The trend over the past decade or so for naval annuals to become huge, very expensive books reflects several factors. One of these is the proliferation of navies: there are many more independent nations now than 100 years ago. Brassey's *The Naval Annual* of 1886 tabulated data for ships of 32 nations; today, *Combat Fleets* includes 160 nations! Another factor is the growing tendency in naval annuals to account for subsidiary craft of almost any kind, most of which were ignored in Brassey and Jane (though not in Clowes' *The Naval Pocket Book*) in the early years of their publication.

How do these reference books compare in terms of accuracy? To some degree, this is unknowable. How, for example, does one find authoritative data on ship displacements, torpedo loads, etc.? As a practical matter, the degree to which the books' data reflects photographic evidence, takes advantage of the rather voluminous periodical literature, and draws on official and shipbuilder public releases determines the level of accuracy achieved.

Combat Fleets is arranged alphabetically by country. Each nation's entry includes introductory data and narrative on shipboard weapons and other systems, naval aircraft, and (for a few major navies) shipbuilding programs by financial year. The book contains about 3600 photographs, including almost 600 of Soviet ships and aircraft alone, and

140 drawings. A good number of photographs (and drawings) of major vessels are quite large, filling half a page each. Notes in the captions show that the photographs have been studied carefully. The data entries by ship type include both detailed tabular data and, in many cases, textual commentary. The treatment of key dates (construction orders, keel laying, etc.) is much more complete than *Almanacco*, which only gives years for three events: keel laying, launch and completion. Although fewer plans are provided than in the *Almanacco*, they are generally much more detailed than those in the Italian book.

Almanacco Navale is divided into two major parts: first, the coverage of the world's warships by country, and second, a set of six appendices that cover oceanographic and hydrographic research ships, naval aircraft, missiles, guns, torpedoes, and radar. The coverage of naval weapons and radars is tabular in format, and interesting; for example, an estimated maximum range (target type unspecified) is given for many radar systems. There are some 1300 photographs (22 in color), including 160 of U.S. Navy ships and 180 of Soviet ships. In addition, about 750 ship classes are illustrated by line drawings (66 of U.S. Navy ships and 126 of Soviet vessels); and there are 20 3-view drawings of aircraft, 13 summary pages of major combatant ship silhouettes for recognition purposes, and five color pages of national flags. Most information is

tabular with relatively little evaluation or comment.

Almanacco Navale has some information unavailable elsewhere. For example, it lists codenames—one presumes the NATO designations—for the various sonars carried aboard each class of Soviet submarines, such as "Shark Fin" and "Whale Tongue." What the average reader can make of this is unclear, but it does permit, assuming it is accurate, speculation about similarities and differences among classes.

Combat Fleets is readily available in the U.S. through the Naval Institute Press. *Almanacco Navale*, on the other hand, is not marketed in the U.S. and must be special-ordered. As a result, it is little known. It contains a full English language translation of the two-page key to reading the data tables, as well as an insert card with French, German, and Spanish equivalents for key terms. Assuming that one could obtain the book at close to its Italian price, it is a worthwhile investment. *Combat Fleets*, however, delivers much more information (including almost twice as many illustrations), more than commensurate with its somewhat higher price.

CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT
Baltimore, Maryland

Fisher, David F. *A Race on the Edge of Time*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988. 370pp. \$19.95

Nissen, Jack and A.W. Cockerill. *Winning the Radar War*. New York:

St Martin's Press, 1987. 224pp.
\$19.95

While their common assertion that radar won the war may be a little enthusiastic, Nissen and Fisher have both written important histories of the development of radar and of its role in World War II. They come from different backgrounds and therefore bring different perspectives to the radar war. Nissen was in the middle of it; Fisher is a postwar scientist and historian.

Before the war, Jack Nissen was a young radio-electronic engineer doing weekend volunteer work at the very secret Bawdsey manor house where the first Chain Home station was being developed. When the war began, he was swept into the technical services of the RAF, where he spent the war developing radar and its application to fighter defense. Later he commanded radar fighter control stations and joined the Dieppe raid to try to capture key parts of a German radar station.

David Fisher is an accomplished scientist and writer who brings a technical historian's perspective to the history of the development and application of radar. Unfortunately, his book is marred by many forward jumps and asides on his opinions of today's defense policies.

Both books give us important reminders for, and insights into, today's problems on the selection and development of complex weapon systems. Drawing on earlier works (C.P. Snow's *Science and Government* and R.V. Jones' *The Wizard War*), both Nissen and Fisher recount the

prewar controversy between Tizard and Lindemann over air defense and the application of radar. This controversy shows that able scientists may disagree profoundly, that political nexus is important, and that there is no guarantee that the optimal solution will be found. It *was* in this case, but it was a near thing. Fisher has written a good account of this time, and he shows the importance of some of the less well remembered players on the RAF staff.

Nissen's account recognizes the importance of an integrated system for air defense that includes radar, communications, plotting centers, aircraft and the tactics to knit it all together. Too often historians look on a single technology such as radar as the key to the whole problem. Through his own experience of commanding a radar direction center, Nissen demonstrates that all the pieces, especially the tactics, have to be in place and working together.

If we are to accept, as asserted by previous writers in the *Review*, that the development of a radar-based air defense system—the first Strategic Defense Initiative—was the salvation of Britain during the bombing attacks, the very curious question arises of why radar-based air defenses didn't protect the Germans later in the war. Nissen nibbles at this question in his description of German radar developments. While German radar was good and they understood and practiced ground-based fighter direction, they appear to have been vulnerable to jamming and decep-

tion. Also, they became overwhelmed by Allied saturation raids.

Nissen covers the selection and development of the first radar jamming and countermeasures by the British. His description of the delicate choice of technique so as to be effective without revealing enough to allow counter-countermeasures is relevant to today's electronic warfare and ECM problems.

After the Battle of Britain radar continued to be developed for night fighter interception, where it was not particularly successful, and for submarine hunting, where it was very successful. Fisher's account of these later developments is comprehensive. His scientific background is apparent in his good description of the technical problems and how they were solved.

For those interested in the development of technology and its application to warfare, or for those practicing it, both Nissen and Fisher are useful additions. Fisher is the technical historian; Nissen, the technical practitioner.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
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Gorn, Michael H. *Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force 1944-1986*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. 209pp. \$9

This survey of scientists and engineers, in and out of uniform, defines their role in forecasting technological futures for the air force. It is important reading for those who would understand the processes that bear on the formation of technology policy in the military departments. As an individual who has been close to navy research and development for most of the period covered by the author (1944-1986), I note that, given changes in the names of some individuals and in the titles of the major study efforts, this could be a history of the decline of scientific advice in the navy also.

Michael Gorn traces the results of a series of major air force-sponsored technology forecasts. He also describes the repeated assaults on the freedom of the civilian and academic scientific community to contribute to or influence the results of these forecasts. This is a history of conflict between civilian and military, scientist and engineer, visionary and pragmatist—an intellectual game of "king of the mountain" with counterproductive results.

Dr. Theodore von Karman, in what became the USAF Scientific Advisory Board, established the model for air force science and technology forecasts. *Toward New Horizons* (1945) was the first such forecast. Others discussed in *Harnessing the Genie* are the *Woods Hole Summer Studies* (1957-1958), *Project Forecast* (1964), *New Horizons II* (1975), and *Project Forecast II* (1986). But after the Woods Hole studies failed to deal in a prescriptive way

with the U.S. response to *Sputnik*, the Scientific Advisory Board lost influence in the air force, influence that it has yet to regain.

General Bernard Schriever conceived the idea of an across-the-board examination of future air force missions and the technologies to support them. This examination, *Project Forecast*, also came about because of perceptions among senior officials that the USAF lacked the vision and vitality that it ought to have. The core of the study was the technology panels, each led by scientists or engineers of great distinction. But the genius was in organizing the study in such a way as to make the air force top command part owners of the product. The navy could learn a few useful lessons in "selling a study project" from the USAF.

Unlike most major navy studies, the air force since *Project Forecast* has accompanied the scientific report with a financial plan for implementation. This can be both good and bad. Inclusion of budgetary realities too early in the process of "socializing findings" can result in prematurely truncating the viability of the approach under consideration. Military budgets represent a conservative system; enhancement in one area is at the expense of another.

Michael Gorn notes the diminished opportunities for civilian and academic scientists to contribute as heavily in the more recent study efforts as they did at first. Part of this has occurred because of the increasingly adversarial atmo-

sphere between government and industry stemming from procurement disputes and embarrassments. There is much similarity between the USAF and the naval aviation community; indeed, the latter is practically a microcosm of the former. To the navy's peril, there have not been the kind of technological appraisals that the air force has sponsored. Two that have been done by the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences dealt respectively with technology and naval aviation (1983), and an across-the-board study of the future navy called *Navy XXI* (1988). Although both studies sparked interest and enjoyed some implementation, the navy regards such activities as advisory only. This may be tantamount to saying that the scientific community enjoys even less influence with the navy than it has with the air force.

There is another perspective that is somehow lacking in *Harnessing the Genie*. One really has to look at scientific advice and its reduction to practice in fielded weapons systems as the very "front end" of the defense systems acquisition process. While the air force attempts to market the results of its major technological forecasts to the ultimate military user (and keeper of the budget claimancies), there is little or no interaction with the major entities in the systems acquisition processes: the program offices. Considerations of technology base issues receive short shrift throughout the military departments in their approach to acquisition. I can testify

personally to the almost complete disconnect between the technologists in the DOD laboratories and the acquisition program managers. What kind of efforts are made by any of the services to "market" study results to all of the tiers of the defense industrial base? All too often the results of far-reaching studies are given "eyes only" treatment. One can only hope for reform in systems acquisition education, at places like the Defense Systems Management College, so that fewer technology base opportunities will be missed.

I repeat: This is a worthwhile book. I hope someone will commission a navy companion piece, and, for that matter, one for the army as well. But if such activities are undertaken, they should be related to the tribal rites that each of the military departments follows in its acquisition and force development processes.

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS
Alexandria, VA

Collins, Michael. *Liftoff: The Story of America's Adventure in Space*. New York: Grove Press, 1988. 288pp. \$25

Well, he's done it again! Michael Collins, fighter pilot, experimental test pilot, astronaut, State Department official, museum director, and author, has produced another superb book. His previous effort, *Carrying the Fire*, is a highly personal account of his own development and adventures in aviation and astronautics.

This fascinating, occasionally hair-raising memoir is an ideal introduction to the current effort.

Liftoff is more ambitious. In seven exceptionally well organized chapters, the author traces the engineering and technical development of capabilities for space travel in language which will capture the general reader and yet still satisfy all but the most specialized practitioners in space endeavors.

The range of description and analysis is unusually broad. The Apollo XI mission to the moon, during which Collins traveled with the first moonwalkers but did not descend himself, reads like an adventure novel. The description of the Challenger disaster is an exquisite balancing act among technical precision, compassion, and perspective on failure in what has been a remarkably successful program overall.

The final chapter, "Ad Inexplorata," could stand alone as a first-class piece of thinking and writing. It begins with a remarkably clear exposition on our solar system. Then, Collins argues persuasively that a commitment to explore Mars could be the keystone to renewal in the United States, not only of the space effort but of national purpose in general. Collins shows himself simultaneously visionary and practical, culturally sensitive and politically savvy.

The book is very well put together. Its page format is somewhat larger than normal, a great asset when presenting the

artistic and technically informative drawings by James Dean. These drawings added a great deal to this reviewer's understanding of what was already clear prose. A list of acronyms at the beginning, a first-class glossary and space flight log at the end, and an unusually complete index all help to make the book a pleasure to handle. Author, illustrator and publisher deserve highest praise. *Liftoff* is "a piece of work."

MICHAEL A. FRENEY
Naval War College

Ellison, John N., et al. *Mobilizing U.S. Industry: A Vanishing Option for National Security*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. 126pp. \$12.85

Mobilization is a topic which has been out of fashion for many years, despite occasional lip service to the contrary. This short volume (only 88 pages of text), by members of the International Economic Studies Institute, is a "cry in the wilderness." The message is straightforward. Nuclear parity has made strong conventional forces more important. Large budget deficits will inevitably force the country to choose cheaper, and thus smaller, high quality forces in being, backed up by stronger reserve forces and improved surge and mobilization readiness. The U.S. industrial base is being seriously eroded by international competition, calling into question surge and mobilization capabilities. This erosion is occur-

ring at a time when those capabilities should be expanding, not contracting. Accordingly, the authors call for a series of organizational reforms, new committees and new studies to focus attention on mobilization issues and to provide an administrative framework for enhancing the mobilization base.

The book begins with a short introduction, followed by an equally short chapter outlining the argument for the current and future importance of mobilization preparedness for defense. The argument, as noted above, is that conventional forces are increasingly important, and that tight budgets preclude the luxury of sufficiently large conventional forces in being. Further, the authors note that if arms control reduces Soviet conventional forces, mobilization becomes an even more viable U.S. national security option. Chapter III, which occupies half of the book, presents a series of case studies of some key sectors: raw materials, petroleum, ferroalloys, machine tools, and semiconductors. These studies serve to document the contention that the mobilization base is seriously eroding. Selected to represent basic inputs, processing and manufacturing industries, and high technology sectors, the case studies suggest common problems: diminishing domestic market share and growing reliance on foreign sector and subsector capacity; declining profits, capacity and R&D expenditures; a diminishing pool of skilled labor; and economic decline in subsector industries.

The authors have a very definite point of view: mobilization is increasingly important, the mobilization base is increasingly eroding, the problem is neglected, and corrective policy actions are available. Their argument is convincing up to a point. There is little question that the problem is neglected. They marshal a lot of evidence that the base is eroding, and they suggest numerous potentially useful policy actions. However, they are not entirely convincing regarding the importance of the problem. There are two crucial, interrelated considerations in determining whether mobilization is important—timing and cost. At one extreme, if the next war is fought by forces in being and ends before mobilization can take place, then enhancing mobilization capability is a waste of resources. This in fact has been the prevailing view for years. At the other extreme, if the war is sufficiently drawn out, the considerable U.S. resource base can eventually be brought to bear on the war effort, even if no mobilization planning whatsoever takes place. Between these two extremes are future war scenarios which suggest that spending money on mobilization capacity will enhance defense capabilities.

But even if mobilization capacity is a useful addition to overall national defense, it can be purchased only at the expense of other things, and those things may contribute *more* to defense. Thus, making a case that mobilization capability is useful as a

deterrent and in the event of a future war scenario is not sufficient to make the case that significant resources should be devoted to mobilization. It depends on what must be given up. Many of the policy options presented by the authors do not involve great budgetary cost. However, it is economic cost, of which budgetary cost may be only a small part, which is relevant in determining whether enhancing mobilization capacity is "worth it." To take the most obvious example, trade barriers to protect strategic industries will raise prices and reduce real incomes of U.S. consumers, who purchase non-defense products which are also directly or indirectly produced by these industries.

The authors discuss both timing and cost, of course, but they are not explicit about either. Such detail is beyond the intended scope of the book. Their purpose is to call attention to the mobilization issue, not to recommend particular levels of mobilization planning or even to identify, except by example, sectors of the economy where mobilization planning should take place. Their explicit recommendations involve setting up an administrative structure for addressing the issue seriously—which would surely involve explicit questions of timing and cost.

Is this a good book? It depends. The argument is well developed and documented. It provides an excellent entry into the literature on the subject. However, it is not likely to

convince the skeptic. The skeptic will want to know more.

J. ERIC FREDLAND
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Mintz, Alex. *The Politics of Resource Allocation in the U.S. Department of Defense: International Crises and Domestic Constraints*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. 149pp. \$21

Alex Mintz argues that studies of military spending have focused on the total level of expenditure while neglecting the components of the defense budget. This is an overstatement when one considers the numerous analyses of defense programs published by the Congressional Budget Office and the Brookings Institution, among others. But on the topic of the defense budget there is always room for more research. Mintz differentiates his work from other analyses by concentrating on the determinants of the principal appropriations categories, e.g. military personnel, procurement, etc., over the 1948-1980 period.

He applies an eclectic model with basic spending decisions determined by organizational practices and each budget component increasing on an incremental basis according to a fair share allocation principle. He finds that this bureaucratic politics model usually explains the pattern of defense spending quite well. It demonstrates how the DOD budgetary process has successfully resisted

reforms such as the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) and zero base budgeting (ZBB) when judged by the impact on the appropriations categories.

The one area of defense spending showing less incrementalism is military procurement, with considerable fluctuation from year to year. However, even the other budget categories show some nonincremental variations in response to internal and external shocks. Mintz draws on several theories, including the political business cycle, neo-Marxism, the arms race, and war mobilization, for his set of internal and external influences.

Some of his results are not surprising, while others seem counter-intuitive. It is not surprising that nonincremental military personnel spending is most influenced by war mobilization. Less obvious may be the model's finding that changing the party in control of the White House has a significant spending impact on military personnel. Increases come with Democratic administrations and decreases with Republicans. This politically related pattern is most likely due to Democrats being the president during most of the Korean and Vietnam wars, while Republicans were in office during most interwar and postwar periods.

Few readers will be surprised to learn that military pay hikes seem to follow an electoral cycle. The largest pay increases, in both number and size, came in budgets which coincided with a presidential elec-

tion year. The second highest were in congressional election years.

Some of Mintz's results do not conform to expectations. He finds that international crises have a significant impact on increases in RDT&E spending, but only a relatively weak effect on other spending categories. This is contrary to the hypothesis of international crises causing the share of RDT&E to fall as resources are reallocated from long-term programs to budgetary categories more closely related to readiness, i.e. personnel, O&M, and procurement. Failure to observe the expected result may be due to the way Mintz related the variables in his statistical models. International crises were lagged by one year in their effects on spending, i.e. the effects of a crisis in 1961 were determined by analyzing spending in 1962. For military personnel and O&M spending, this lag may be too long to show much of the effects of the crisis. The Berlin crisis of 1961 probably had a bigger budgetary effect on the accounts in the year of the crisis than in the following year, when the crisis had cooled off. And a one-year lag may not be long enough to show the full effect of the crisis on accounts like RDT&E and procurement, which take longer to plan and implement (e.g. shipbuilding outlays are spread over several years).

Mintz does not carry the test of his budgetary model through the Reagan years, but he does comment on the Reagan defense program in light of the model's results. The Reagan

defense budgets were consistent with elements in the Mintz model favoring increased defense spending, especially in the areas of RDT&E and procurement. Notable influences were the growing gap between Soviet and U.S. military spending in the 1970s, and public opinion favoring greater defense spending. The weight given to the neo-Marxian variables of industry profits and unemployment is questionable.

This book is brief but has material which should interest students of defense budgeting. However, potential readers should be warned that the book is a revised doctoral dissertation, with all the weaknesses of that form of writing.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
Wheaton College

Jennings, Peter. *The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences*. Occasional Paper No. 4. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1988. 108pp.

A surprising characteristic of the 1985 diplomatic rift and downgrading in defense cooperation between the United States and New Zealand has been the singular lack of serious analysis of the implications for Wellington of the break in this previously close peacetime alliance. Given the importance the American alliance had in New Zealand defense policy formulation since the early 1950s, one would have assumed that there would have been greater

attention paid to this important issue. Yet, outside of defense circles, there has been little concern generated in New Zealand by this fundamental alteration in that country's security posture.

This above-mentioned lacuna has been rectified recently in a monograph written by Peter Jennings, a teaching fellow at the newly opened Australian Defence Force Academy. Jennings brings to this subject a wealth of primary-source material and rigorous analysis. The work, in short, extensively documents and assesses the extent of the break in the United States-New Zealand defense relationship. The author then argues convincingly that the defense policy of the fourth New Zealand Labour Government, led by David Lange, has been an abject failure, and not only for ending the bilateral American alliance. The arguments Jennings uses are that the Labour government's attempts to effect greater defense self-reliance are simply unrealistic, in addition to the fact that Australia is incapable, and most importantly, unwilling to assume the role previously played by the United States in New Zealand's defense planning. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, deadly accurate in his foreboding assessment about the likely future "Trans-Tasman" security relationship: "In time, it may be shown to be the case that Australia is a harsher taskmaster to New Zealand than ever was the United States." Clearly, closer ANZAC defense cooperation is not the panacea for New Zealand's

defense problems, as it has been made out to be by the Labour government and its supporters.

Of course, as in any work, this reviewer did find a number of issues on which he disagrees. For instance, in describing the important but little-known standardization and interoperability fora which exist between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and (surprisingly still) New Zealand (commonly known as the ABCA programs), Jennings' states that all were an outgrowth of the ABCA Armies program. In actuality, these programs were initiated in 1948 by the defense ministries of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. Also, my own study of war planning in ANZUS does not support Jennings' contention that this activity was largely conducted on a bilateral basis. Declassified information clearly points to the fact that trilateral planning and the coordination of national contingency plans were the norm under the ANZUS defense relationship prior to February 1985.

Despite these rather limited observations, I have no doubt that Jennings' monograph will shortly be recognized as *the* standard analysis of the implications for New Zealand's security caused by the downgrading in Wellington's defense ties with Washington. New Zealand defense policy, unfortunately, has traditionally not engendered great academic interest; this work has now substantially changed this poor state of affairs. Jennings is to be com-

mended for the immense amount of primary-source research and careful documentation used in his work. The author's undertakings would be richly rewarded if members of the current Labour government in Wellington would carefully study his work so that they might finally appraise themselves of the havoc they have wrought on New Zealand's defense posture, which has been the result of their misguided conception of national security.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Starr, Richard F., ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, 1988. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 598pp. \$49.95

This definitive work is an annual compilation of the organization, strength, and activities of communist parties and revolutionary fronts. It provides worldwide coverage of communist parties, arranged alphabetically by country within six world regions, and includes an essay about each country's communist party organization. The essays include the number of individuals in each country's communist party, names of the party's officers, party legality, its publications, and a brief history of the party's interaction with the country's body politic. These overviews are exceptionally well done. Tables showing party congresses and a brief register of the

status of communism in each country are extremely useful.

Because of its simple arrangement and wealth of information concerning each country's communist party or revolutionary front, the volume is a worthwhile annual addition to defense institutional libraries. Although price may prohibit individual annual purchase, many professionals in the field would benefit from a onetime purchase.

MURRAY L. BRADLEY
Naval War College

Morgan, Charles. *The Gunroom*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1988. 242pp. \$3.95

"A young sailor," says the publisher's blurb on the cover of this short novel, "struggles to withstand the harsh mental and physical brutalities of service in the British Navy in the years before World War I." "Charles Morgan's first and most controversial novel," it continues, "appeared in 1919 only to disappear immediately. . . . Morgan and his publishers believe the British Admiralty to be responsible. . . ."

I was thus prepared for a fairly lurid exposé of the twilight world of the midshipman and of the gunroom in which he lived, of corporal punishment and the abuse of power, and of the captains who tolerated it because things had always been done that way. And indeed these themes are certainly present; the author himself describes the book as being "written in blood." But it commands

at least some of our attention, for Morgan experienced the world of the midshipman firsthand, and his book is to a large extent autobiographical. He joined the navy in 1907 and served in the gunrooms of HM ships *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. Quickly convinced that the life was not for him, he resigned in 1913 to go on to Oxford and to a successful literary career. He returned to serve in the navy during both world wars.

The book thus has an authentic ring to it, and one is struck as much by what has survived from the Edwardian navy as by what has changed. There are some telling naval vignettes. We see the hero, John Lynwood, and a handful of his contemporaries waiting with tense foreboding in a rain-soaked seafront hotel for the boat that will take them to their first ship. For advice on the ship's program and on the personalities of the officers they turn to the obsequious naval tailor who is there to make final adjustments to their uniforms. His knowledge of the navy is encyclopedic. More important, he won't bite. And Morgan captures exactly what most of us have long forgotten, those first impressions on joining the training ship, the brusque impersonality, the sense of a system which tolerates no error but which has neither time nor patience to explain its arcane purposes.

The lot of the midshipmen in the *King Arthur* is certainly bleak. The boorish and arbitrary Kramer is "Sub" of the gunroom. He exerts his authority in the only way he knows how: the way he has been taught.

Outside the petty tyranny of the gunroom an unending routine of coaling ship, gun-drill, quarters, and fleet maneuvers are already (1911) signaling the inevitability of war, without recreating Nelson's band of brothers.

But Lynwood's disillusion has deeper origins than the casual brutalities of the *King Arthur*, an unhappy ship if ever there was one. Transfer to the *Pathshire*, commanded by a man of perception and humanity, and deployed to a station remote from rumors of war, brings, at best, momentary relief. The real problem lies deeper; it is the stifling effect of narrow professional focus and of an enclosed society impervious to external influence on the development of a reflective, creative, and idealistic, if over-sensitive young man. Lynwood is caught in a net, but it is a net wider than the navy itself. The net is a competitive social and international order of which the navy is the unthinking and unwitting instrument. "It can't go on like this," cries the heroine, Lynwood's only link with sanity, and herself the victim of the ensnaring social order, "we must substitute the motive of Sharing for the motive of Gain. It's the only way out. It's the only way to stop the cruelty everywhere."

As a novel this work is uneven, as the author himself was the first to admit. The characters are weakly drawn, their relationships unconvincing. The thing breathes a youthful naiveté that many will find annoying. However, as a social history of the Edwardian navy it carries a ring of

truth. It has something valid to say about enclosed societies, about "monks without the vows," about enforced conformity and the suppression of the individual.

The gunroom, with its potential for the abuse of power, is long gone. The enclosed society has been opened to general scrutiny. Earlier marriage, wider employment opportunity, and the forces of liberalism have broken the net. But the naval

reader will find in this book some fleeting echoes of his own past, long since forgotten or suppressed.

Did the Admiralty ban this book? I doubt it. Its naive idealism was ill-matched with the mood of 1919. Compared with the trenches of Flanders, life in the gunroom was, as they say, like a vicarage tea party.

G. RHYS-JONES
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Dorchester, England

Request for Contributors to *Encyclopedia of American Wars* Series

Benjamin R. Beede, a Rutgers University faculty member, seeks contributors to *The Spanish-American War and the Small Wars*, a volume in the forthcoming Garland Publishing series entitled *Garland Encyclopedia of American Wars*. The volume will include naval operations in the Spanish American War and marine operations ashore in the Caribbean and Central America, concluding with the termination of the occupation in Haiti in 1934. It will include some entries on American volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. Prospective contributors should contact Mr. Beede at 7 Thrush Mews, North Brunswick, New Jersey 08902.

Recent Books

Buell, Thomas B. *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 518pp. \$23.95

Once a student at the Naval War College and twice a member of the faculty, Raymond Spruance went on to prove himself as the U.S. Navy's outstanding tactician and operational commander of the 20th century. After World War II he returned to the College as its president. When Little, Brown published the first edition of this book in 1974, Professor Gerald Wheeler wrote in the *Naval War College Review* that Buell "deserves the thanks of the Navy, those who served with Admiral Spruance's forces . . . and the reading public in general for this excellent biography." Now, in its "Classics of Naval Literature" series the U.S. Naval Institute makes the book available once again, this time with a fine new introduction by John B. Lundstrom.

Chinnery, Philip D. *Life on the Line: Stories of Vietnam Air Combat*. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 256pp. \$17.95.

Chinnery has spliced together a series of vignettes (thirty-three in all) from the recollections of former aviators who flew combat in Vietnam. The stories are arranged in a rough chronological order in three parts: the start-up phase, the air war, and the wind-down. This book is best enjoyed if each story is read independently, for there is little to tie them together. The author appears to have taken his inputs from wherever he could get them. To his credit, he focuses on the daily air war involving arduous, dangerous and mostly forgotten missions. The book makes the point that while most missions flown by the army, navy, and air force were team efforts, the most vivid memory of the participating aviator was of that which occurred within the confines of his cockpit. The impact of his mission on world events was lost in the melee of just getting done what was expected. Some recollections are vivid, some a bit hazy. Each saga, regardless of historical accuracy, is well illustrated with candid and official photos, along with well-annotated maps. Good bedtime reading.

Connaughton, Richard. *The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear*. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1988. 300pp. \$49.50

For naval readers, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 is remembered for Admiral Rozhdestvenski's mad Russian dash from the Baltic, round

Capetown, through Kamranh Bay and to the Straits of Tsushima, where he lost it all in one afternoon. For political historians, the war is remembered for President Theodore Roosevelt's role in negotiating the settlement and for dating the rise of Japan as a Pacific power potentially in opposition to the United States. The land campaign is generally forgotten. Connaughton, a British officer and military historian, has done an important service by reconstructing in detail that land campaign, with barbed wire, trenches and machine guns, that presaged the horrors of the First World War to come. Regrettably, no one in Europe noticed.

Dougan, Clark and Weiss, Stephen. *The American Experience in Vietnam*. New York: Norton, 1988. 352pp. \$39.95

This book claims to be "the complete history" of the war in Vietnam. It isn't that, but it does have eyewitness accounts by observers and participants such as Walter Cronkite. The photographs are impressive, and half of them are in color. The book is well printed and well designed.

Gilbert, Stephen P. and Carpenter, William M., eds. *America and Island China: A Documentary History*. New York: University Press of America, 1989. 418pp. \$37.50

This fine college text and reference book is divided into three sections. Part one includes articles on the history of the Republic of China from 1911-1988 by Dr. Harold Hinton, military relations between Washington and Taiwan by Dr. Martin Lasater, and U.S.-ROC economic relations by Dr. Jan Prybyla. Part two contains documents relating to U.S.-ROC relations between 1949 and 1978, and part three contains similar documents covering relations between Washington and Taipei from 1979 through 1988. The most significant contribution of the book is the complete collection of documents relating to U.S.-ROC relations from 1949 to the present. These cannot be found in any other single text. It is thus an invaluable source book for those concerned with modern Sino-American relations, particularly the relationship evolving between Washington and Taipei since the severing of formal diplomatic relations in 1979.

Lewis, Bruce. *Four Men Went to War*. New York: St. Martin's, 1987. 209pp. \$16.95

Samuel Johnson once said: "Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier." Lewis tells the individual stories of four young men who became soldiers in 1940: an American air gunner, a British paratrooper, a German tank driver and an Italian Alpini. None had reason to think meanly of himself when it was done. None of them were remarkable, save that all went into combat, did their duty, and survived to live productive lives. The American and the Briton became POWs, the German a defeated POW in

his own country. The Italian is perhaps the most interesting for he made it through the Russian campaign and back, protecting his men all the way.

Middlebrook, Martin. *The Berlin Raids*. New York: Viking, 1988. 407pp. \$24.95
Middlebrook, author of several books on the strategic bombing campaign in Europe, has turned his attention to the 1943-44 campaign by the Royal Air Force against Berlin. Beginning with Arthur Harris' promise "to produce in Germany by April 1st 1944, a state of devastation from which surrender is inevitable," Middlebrook traces in detail the nineteen major raids on Berlin. The issue was twofold: whether German defenses would overcome the anti-radar systems of the Royal Air Force and whether the RAF would be able to so precisely locate and mark the targets as to overcome the inherent limitations of blind bombing. This was a major test for the popular prewar thesis on the efficacy of strategic bombing. The campaign failed. Middlebrook's work is an important contribution for historians who would examine the question of why the promise of strategic bombing failed at such a huge cost.

Miller, George H. *Provide for the Common Defense*. Washington, D.C.: Washington Publications, 1988. 165pp. \$14.95

During the long period after the end of World War II when possession of nuclear weapons seemed to make it unnecessary to think strategically, Rear Admiral Miller fought, seemingly alone at times, against that dangerous notion. In this book Admiral Miller, now long retired, has republished some of his articles, one of which appeared as long ago as 1949 and another as recently as 1988. More than anyone else, he struggled to close the chasm separating the Navy from the merchant marine. The author calls for "an end to the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine and an end to land-based nuclear proliferation" and pleads for a "comprehensive review of U.S. National Security Policy on a scale similar to that undertaken by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s."

Mottola, Kari, ed. *The Arctic Challenge*. Boulder, Col.: Westview 1988. 335pp. \$29.50

This collection of essays by scholars from the circumpolar nations explores the impact of the strategic competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the other Arctic nations and on the politics of the region. The book's several authors view the Arctic as a unique geographical and emerging political region. The focus is on strategic military affairs as viewed by those in between, a not always comfortable position. The data used and the scenarios postulated seem accurate. The essays are important contributions for scholars and researchers involved in understanding the potentially significant role of the trans-Arctic region in the 21st century.

Neilson, Jonathan M. *Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 328pp. \$39.95

When Secretary Seward bought Russian America from the Czar in 1864, the American military was otherwise occupied. When the formal transfer of sovereignty took place in Sitka in 1867, Captain Peschurov of the Czar's forces gave to General Rousseau of the American Army no small problem: civil administration of a huge, unknown and unsettled territory. Thus began the long history of the military's special relation with the territory and state of Alaska. Law enforcement, justice, civil administration, exploration, mapping, medical services, transportation, communication and tax collection have all been part of the military history of Alaska, in addition to the defense of the only part of American territory occupied by a foreign power since 1812. Neilson, a lecturer in history at the University of Alaska, details not only the familiar World War II and Cold War history, but also the earlier history as Alaska became part of the United States.

Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R. *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*. New York: Free Press, 1987. 329pp. \$19.95

This is a book for officers and officials serving in government. It depicts, in great detail, how they can use history effectively by both recognizing false analogies and developing sound ones as a means of clarifying and isolating issues before making a decision. The authors emphasize that the history of an issue can be used to define decision objectives and to foresee likely results. In short, this is the best primer available on how history can improve decision making in government. It will be particularly useful for staff officers and analysts.

Oberg, James E. *Uncovering Soviet Disasters*. New York: Random House 1988. 317pp. \$19.95

Subtitled *Exploring the Limits of Glasnost*, Oberg's book recounts what is known about Soviet industrial accidents on land, in the air, at sea, and in space. In the pre-Glasnost era, the Soviet Union was quite reluctant to admit that the perils of industrialization applied with political impartiality to the worker's paradise. Oberg's central thesis is that the Soviet Union is now more open about these matters, however, his case is built on anecdotes since comparative statistical data is not available. It appears that the Soviet Union suffers industrial disasters at about the same rate as any other Third World country engaged in forced industrialization.

Perry, F. W. *The Commonwealth Armies*. New York: St. Martin's, 1988. 250pp. \$45

Throughout much of the 20th Century, the Commonwealth Armies—those of the United Kingdom, India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South

Africa, and the several colonies—were linked by their common ancestry and regimental traditions. Perry limits his concerns to the administrative history of raising manpower and organizing military units for the First and Second World Wars. He does not touch the interesting questions of why these men served and what their service accomplished.

Ranft, Bryan and Till, Geoffrey. *The Sea in Soviet Strategy*. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2nd ed. 1988. 284pp. \$21.95

"Withal, this is a highly germane book, benchmarking the current state of our collective awareness and the state of the Soviet Navy" said the *Naval War College Review* when this work was first published in 1981. That observation remains true with the publication of this revised and updated edition. Ranft and Till have done an admirable job of setting the Soviet Navy in its historical and contemporary context. More than a list of ship and weapon inventory and performance statistics, this book traces and analyzes the forces—political, economic, and social—which have shaped the Soviet Navy. There is discussion of the influences of Gorbachev and Chernarvin; we will await with interest the next edition when those influences will have matured.

Sajer, Guy. *The Forgotten Soldier*. 1967. Reprint. Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1988. 465pp. \$19.95

Originally published in French and subsequently translated and published in English by Harper and Row, this edition is reprinted as part of the publisher's "Great War Stories" series. A young Frenchman born of a German mother, Guy Sajer donned a Wehrmacht uniform at the age of sixteen in the autumn of 1942. He witnessed the worst of the Eastern Front in the elite *Gross Deutschland* division. Loyal to an army that treated its soldiers no better than prisoners, Sajer writes about fleeing from an enemy constantly on his back, recrossing a previously fought-for landscape, and witnessing an exodus of people surging west to escape the Russians. This is a story of war eloquently told.

Semmler, Kenneth, ed. *The War Despatches of Kenneth Slessor*. St. Lucia: Univ. of Queensland, 1988. 493pp. \$47.50

An essential companion to Semmler's 1985 edition of *The War Diaries of Kenneth Slessor*, this matching volume provides the collected dispatches of Australia's official war correspondent in World War II. In a distinctive style, Slessor describes the daily lives of Australia's fighting men from the London blitz to Greece, Syria and the Western Desert, as well as the jungle fighting in New Guinea. Slessor's colorful prose and humane viewpoint contribute to ranking his work among the newspaper classics of war literature.

Sumrall, Robert F., *Iowa Class Battleships*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988, 192pp. \$34.95

Skulski, Janusz, *The Battleship Yamato*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988, 192pp. \$27.95

The Naval Institute has published simultaneous studies of the two classes of ship generally recognized to represent the ultimate in battleship design. The in-depth volume on the *Iowa* class provides a comprehensive history of the careers of each ship as well as the configuration changes each has undergone since her launching. Overall line drawings are included. Details of individual equipment are provided via text and photographs. *The Battleship Yamato*, in contrast, as the most recent addition to the Institute's "Anatomy of the Ship" series, focuses on the external details of the ship. The bulk of the book consists of over 600 drawings, ranging from overall views of the ship to individual 25mm ammunition box fittings. The book closes with an especially interesting and haunting drawing of the wreck as seen by the crew of a small research submarine in August 1985. Mr. Skulski's effort is remarkable in view of the efficient effort the Japanese made just before the surrender to destroy all drawings and photographs of the ship.

Thomas, Chris and Shores, Christopher. *The Typhoon & Tempest Story*. New York: Sterling, 1988. 224pp. \$49.95

At \$49.95 a pop (plus tax), one must be quite dedicated to the history of World War II aircraft to buy this book. Fortunately, for the serious student of World War II aircraft, the book is worth it. It is extraordinarily detailed, well illustrated and has comprehensive appendices. Both aircraft—the Typhoon as a ground attack aircraft and the Tempest as a high altitude interceptor—did extraordinary and very successful work in the later part of the war. Far more than their better known brethren such as the Spitfire, they represent the apex of piston-engined fighter development in the United Kingdom.

